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
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
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LAST COUNSELS
OF AN
UNKNOWN COUNSELLOR.

"Is she worth keeping? Why, she is a pearl,
Whose price hath launch'd above a thousand ships,
And turn'd crown'd kings to merchants."

"'Tis mad Idolatry
To make the Service greater than the God."

SHAKESPEARE, *Troilus and Cressida*.





JOHN DICKINSON, - ÆT. 60.

LAST COUNSELS
OF AN
UNKNOWN COUNSELLOR,

JOHN DICKINSON,
BARRISTER-AT-LAW, F.R.A.S., F.R.G.S., ETC., ETC.

EDITED BY
MAJOR EVANS BELL,
AUTHOR OF "RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS OF INDIAN POLICY", "THE OXUS AND THE INDUS",
"THE MYSORE REVERSION", ETC.



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TO
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE GEORGE THOMAS,
SIXTH EARL OF ALBEMARLE,

ETC., ETC., ETC., ETC.

MY LORD,

When I asked your Lordship to accept this little book at my hands, I had not seen your charming "Fifty Years'" recollections, nor was it until it had received the stamp of a cheap edition, that I ascertained its one great deficiency. Although every one has read therein of some Indian adventures, and of the memorable journey home by an almost untrodden route, no one could learn from its pages what I had long ago learned from the pages of *Hansard* and from the correspondence of my late dear friend, John Dickinson, that the young Staff officer's brief experience had borne good fruit, in a season and in a field where the labourers were few and the toil uninviting.

Of those who, between 1853 and 1857, protested in Parliament against abuses and negligence in Indian administration, and against the policy of destroying local self-government and proscribing native genius, only one, to my knowledge, Sir Erskine Perry, now occupies a consultative position at the India Office, or holds any place under Government. Official honours, executive recognition and popular applause, have

been alike withheld from those who, in common with your Lordship, and for the most part in communication with John Dickinson, fought, with little immediate success, the uphill fight of that critical and portentous period. But, my Lord, their labour was not lost; it has influenced and affected all subsequent action of the Crown and the Legislature towards India. Nor shall honour be always denied them. The light of history, under which many a coronet and many a star of those days must yet grow dim and lustreless, will sooner or later display the truth. When the full record is laid open, the name of John Dickinson, the unknown counsellor of Princes and Statesmen,—with which your Lordship has allowed me to associate your own,—will be more brightly illuminated, and will be seen to deserve even a larger meed of honour and public gratitude than I have claimed for it at present.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your Lordship's obliged and most obedient servant,

EVANS BELL.

November 1877.

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JOHN DICKINSON.

A BRIEF obituary notice of Mr. John Dickinson was reduced by the editor of our leading literary journal into a single sentence of about six lines, on the ground that this gentleman was "hardly known, either as an author or as a man of letters". The editor was undoubtedly right. As a politician Mr. Dickinson was even less known. His literary capabilities were of no mean order; his political insight was recognised by many statesmen of eminence; but his chosen work lay in a quarter so obscure, and dealt with matters of such little general interest, although of great moment, that neither fame, nor profit, nor popularity ever fell to his lot, and scarcely at any time entered into his calculations. In this almost entire absence of personal ambition, and in his free choice of such an unfrequented field of labour as that of Indian reform, rests Mr. Dickinson's best claim to public respect and gratitude. He stepped in where no one else was able or willing to tread, and the place that he left vacant will not be easily, if ever, filled again.

The department of Imperial affairs in which Mr. Dickinson laboured for twenty-six years, as if he were earning his bread by it, is one where every English inmate pines and languishes—whether aware of it or not—for want of light and sound from outside. But for intermittent flashes and calls from various quarters, the India Office would only be awakened and illuminated by echoes and reflections from Calcutta, where the light and the voices are almost entirely artificial. There everyone sets up his own candle, and blows his own trumpet; all paint one picture, with very little shade in it; all play one triumphal tune, the more monotonous for elaborate variations. These works of official art are finished and transmitted home without any check from local spectators or auditors, the most important pieces being produced and preserved in secret and confidential portfolios, concealed from those directly concerned, as well as from the public, and seldom subjected to any but official criticism.

It has been made a subject of reproach against representative institutions, and against the Party Government which is their inevitable consequence, that executive power is weakened, and becomes uncertain in its action. The history of the world, especially in our own times, may well lead us to deny that either old autocracy or modern Cæsarism can protect or promote national interests with greater effect than a constitutional monarchy or a republic. Administration and government are not identical or convertible terms. Good administration and good government by no means necessarily coexist. A high scale of nutrition, the liberal supply of stimulants, even though tempered by occasional blisters and judicious blood-letting, will never compensate for a bad constitution. When the living soul is wanting, a superficial regularity of functions indicates nothing more noble than a monster or an automaton. If a person, or a State, enjoys a good constitution, the means and appliances for administering to its material wants may be very rude, rough, and scanty, and yet life may be vigorous and its work well performed. On the other hand, no amount of careful administration—however lavish the provision, however exquisite the apparatus—can rectify a constitution that is inherently bad, or spoiled by long abuse. If some energies are greatly in excess, and others quite deficient, if some faculties have been over-cultivated, and others utterly suppressed, if a limb or muscle has been too long in unnatural repose, or dependent on foreign support, the balance will not be restored by merely palliative measures: there must be a constitutional reform, or the superficial regularity of functions will not long be maintained.

Under any sort of despotism, or non-popular government, constitutional reforms are convulsive; there is a danger of hæmorrhage on the slightest change of regimen. In ordinary times the mechanism may move regularly, and occasionally great energy may be displayed; but any serious obstruction or opposition is sure to betray at once that the central organ is not sound. The head scarcely knows whether the extremities are hot or cold. The Doctor is removed so far from the Patient that he cannot feel his pulse.

Under a free government the state of the circulation can always be ascertained, and inflammatory symptoms are never dangerously suppressed. Even should a serious operation be required for the removal of some morbid growth, pain and loss are minimised by anæsthetic compensation. Nor is this harmony between the constitution and the daily life of the country impaired by the fact that a Minister, on first assuming charge, and to a certain extent all through his incumbency, must rely very much for instruction and guidance upon the permanent staff of his department. The successive changes in the personality at the head of each office, though leading sometimes to an apparent inconsistency in executive action, and even to an occasional falling off in efficiency, and

to what may seem a waste of experience, do really contribute the great restorative and progressive qualities of our parliamentary rule. The experience is not lost, but goes into opposition, where it becomes vigilant and authoritative criticism. The stagnation of inveterate routine is prevented, and fresh life and spirit are diffused through the old chambers. The new chief opens up new sources and channels of information, and gives a fair hearing to interests and ideas that may have hitherto been overlooked or misunderstood. The changes arising from party government are seen to be beneficial, because it is becoming so generally recognised that political science has no sacred and settled code of doctrine, but has ever been, and ever must be, an experimental science; that no form of dominion, no scheme of legislation, is always or everywhere applicable; that laws and institutions have only a relative excellence. The highest feat of statecraft must ever be that of getting through the necessary experiment without danger of explosion, with deliberation and dexterity. The difference between Conservative and Liberal, now-a-days, is for the most part merely that of sooner or later, how and when.

In the India Office, however, the weight and influence of the permanent staff at home and abroad can hardly fail to be felt much more than in any other department of State, and the beneficial results of a change of Ministry must always be much less important. Besides having to contend against the difficulties of a strange nomenclature and unfamiliar forms,—too likely to impede the action of one who has not served an apprenticeship,—both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, however broad and statesmanlike may be their views, however inclined they may be to escape from the bonds of official precedent, are thrown back upon their permanent staff, because from them alone can they get any intelligence. The Home Office, the Colonial Office, even the Admiralty and the War Office, are in vascular communication with the outer world of life and independent thought. The India Office is cut off from all but official channels. Let the Secretary of State and the Viceroy do what they will, they can hardly prevent the professional element from predominating in the counsels of the Indian Empire, both in London and Calcutta. The Viceroy is virtually in contact with no one but public functionaries, members of a close guild, within which they live and move, where their treasure is, and where their heart is also. The Secretary of State has a Council of retired officials.

Giving the executive and administrative hierarchy of India the highest possible credit for zeal and good faith, for pure and lofty motives, their utter isolation from the races around them—their withdrawal from all social intercourse, and from all but business relations with any class of the Indian people—shuts them out from the best sources of information, lowers their standard of justice, and frees them from a wholesome sense of public responsibility. The only opinion for which British officials in

India need care, and the only one, therefore, for which, in general, they do care, is a very narrow one,—private, rather than public,—the opinion of their own “Service”, and, ultimately, that of their own fellow-countrymen at home. But if they can please their professional superiors, by whom praise, promotion, and distinctions are dispensed, the rest is gained. No one for whom they care inquires further. The admiration or the aversion of the herd might affect some of them, if they could get any authentic intelligence of it. But that seldom happens. Subordinates holding a precarious position will not risk loss or hard language by telling a disagreeable truth. Not only has no native of British India any vote or voice in executive administration, but no Indian is placed in such a situation as to be enabled, as a right or as a duty, without invitation and without intrusion, to offer advice or remonstrance to the Imperial Government. In addition to the differences of birth, creed, education, and manners, that keep the two races apart, there are positive laws to separate them, besides interests, prejudices, and customs that have more force than absolute law. Even in those exceptional cases—known by all to be exceptional—where the most kindly feeling and a sense of mutual obligation subsist, patronage on the one side, and faithful servitude on the other, do not create a real or complete sympathy. There must be something like an equal standing before we get that. For this reason the surest disclosure of popular feelings, the most valuable suggestions ever given as to the broad outlines of Imperial policy have always come to us from the Indian Princes and their Ministers. But these glimpses of the naked truth, never so well esteemed by Anglo-Indian functionaries as by British statesmen, have never been so frankly afforded to any official person as they were to Mr. Dickinson during the last few years of his life.

Mr. Dickinson came of a good North-country stock, remarkable for longevity during several generations. His grandfather, Captain Thomas Dickinson, who died at an advanced age in 1828, himself the son of a Captain in the Navy, was for forty-four years Superintendent of Shipping to the Board of Ordnance. His grandmother, *née* de Brissac, was of the ancient French ducal family of Cossé Brissac, of which the elder branch was driven by the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes to settle in this country. Their eldest son, John, born on the 29th of March 1782, was introduced when quite a boy to the craft and mystery of printing, through the door of apprenticeship, which by the custom of those days had almost invariably to be passed in order to enter into any trade, and even into some of the professions. A friendly intimacy had subsisted for many years between Captain Dickinson and Mr. Andrew Strahan, the King’s Printer, and to him was John Dickinson bound. His active and energetic mind, and remarkable ingenuity as an inventor and mechanician, impelled him to strike out an independent course for himself immediately

on the expiration of his indentures. He at once turned his attention to the manufacture of paper, and very shortly enlisted the potent co-operation as a partner of Mr. George Longman, brother of the late Mr. Longman, the publisher, and for some time M.P. for Maidstone.

At the commencement of the present century the impossibility of obtaining a uniform and continuous supply of paper for any purpose was beginning to be severely felt, and the success which had attended the application of machinery to the spinning and weaving industries suggested the extension of similar methods to the manufacture of paper. Yet the whole change from a process almost mediæval in its rudeness to that by which the immense circulation of our daily press has become possible, was comprised within the lifetime and effected by the exertions of two men, Henry Fourdrinier and John Dickinson, whose respective patents "for manufacturing paper of an indefinite length", and "for cutting and planing paper", were taken out in the years 1806 and 1807. It was at this time that Mr. Dickinson purchased Apsley Mill, Hemel Hempstead, to which four other mills in Hertfordshire were eventually added, two of them entirely constructed and the water power contrived under his own superintendence. He took out many patents for improvements, more or less important, in the manufacture of paper, including one for introducing coloured threads into the body of paper—a preservative against forgery which has ever since been employed in our Exchequer bills—and for applying magnets to remove any portions of iron that may be in the pulp, thus preventing iron-mould in the paper.

But Mr. Dickinson's mind was not wholly given to manufacturing pursuits. His talents as an inventor and as a practical student of physics and chemistry were highly appreciated by such eminent authorities as Sir Humphry Davy and Dr. Wollaston, and his avocations and tastes alike brought him into intimate and lasting connection with the principal publishers of London and Edinburgh, and with many of the distinguished authors and men of science of the day. In 1845 he was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society. He took much interest in astronomy, and erected an observatory at his country house, Abbot's Hill, Abbot's Langley, of which he had been at once architect and builder. As a magistrate he took an active part in the general concerns of the county.

Old John Dickinson died on the 11th of January 1869, eighty-seven years of age. He had begun his career with a thousand pounds of borrowed money. At his death nearly four hundred thousand pounds of good securities were found at his bankers. His mental and bodily activity was extraordinary to the last, and, in the words of one of his oldest friends, "he had thoroughly lived out his life, and had found time and means to crowd into the short intervals of business more kindly and generous deeds than would make the staple of many ordinary men's lives."

Mr. Dickinson married in 1810 Anne, daughter of Harry Grover,

near
A

Esq., of The Bury, Hemel Hempstead; and by that lady, who died in 1870, he had issue two daughters, Frances Elizabeth, married to Frederick Pratt Barlow, Esq., and Harriet Anne, the first wife of John Evans, Esq., of Nash Mills, F.R.S. and F.S.A., and one son, John, the subject of this brief notice, born on the 28th of December 1815.

Considering the manifest and brilliant success of his father's enterprise, and the associations and expectations amidst which he was brought up, it is somewhat remarkable that John Dickinson, junior, as he was called for so many years, never "took to business". It certainly was not at Eton,—though that lesson is too often picked up there—that he had learned, after becoming aware of his father's large fortune, to despise its origin, or to look down upon trade and manufacture. He was quite free from any such weakness; always took a pride in what his father had planned and accomplished, and delighted in nothing so much as in showing friends and visitors to Abbot's Hill over "the mills" in the neighbourhood. But he had no turn for either mechanics or accounts; his tastes lay in quite other directions. After a brief endeavour, once or twice ineffectually renewed, to qualify himself as an active partner in the business, he obtained his father's leave to travel in France and Italy, where he passed several years, returning home only for short intervals, chiefly occupied and interested in the study of languages and of art, and in foreign politics. His sympathies were entirely given to the struggling liberal party on the Continent; and the consistent dislike and scorn which he from the first felt and expressed for Louis Napoleon Bonaparte as President and Emperor was not in the least modified subsequently by the French alliance against Russia, or by the war with Austria which led to the liberation of Italy. Although he gave keen attention to these and kindred subjects, and acquired unusual knowledge of old French literature, there were no visible results of his study and observation, except some desultory essays in journals of no great note, until in 1850, by an impulse which was at once irresistible, he found his vocation as an independent Indian reformer.

His father had one brother, Thomas, who was in 1850 a Lieutenant-Colonel high up in the list of the Bengal Army, and at home on furlough. It may as well be mentioned here that in 1852 and 1853 Colonel Dickinson commanded a brigade in Burmah, attained the rank of Major-General in 1854, returned once more to England, and died in 1859. His son, Sebastian Stewart Dickinson, who practised for some years as a barrister at Bombay, represented Stroud in Parliament from 1868 to the general election of 1874, and has always, like his father and his cousin—and for the most part in communication and concord with the latter—taken an active interest in Indian affairs.

General Dickinson had a vote, as a holder of India stock, in the Court of Proprietors of the East India Company, and frequently attended

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Col. Thomas
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its meetings. That singular assembly, though almost deprived of direct power over its nominal delegates, the Court of Directors, afforded a field for openly discussing their proceedings, and for invoking and informing public opinion. The same Act of 1858 which shut up the Court of Proprietors, also put an end to the accidental and imperfect representation of India in Parliament by a few of the Directors, unofficially chosen in both capacities. Their successors, the Councillors of the Secretary of State, being mere nominees, and excluded from the House of Commons, the mediatisation of the East India Company did but strengthen the secrecy and irresponsibility of Indian administration, and confirm the supremacy of permanent officialism.

Colonel Dickinson fully appreciated the great principles involved in the two Sattara cases, frequently then and since confounded and denounced as if there had only been one, and that one equally vexatious and wearisome. In the numerous debates in the Court of Proprietors on the deposition in 1839 of Rajah Pertaub Singh, and on the refusal to admit the succession of the adopted son of his brother and successor, Rajah Shahjee, in 1848, the Colonel voted invariably on the side of the minority, which included the names of Henry St. George Tucker, General Archibald Robertson, who had been Resident at Sattara, W. H. C. Plowden, John Shepherd, Sir Robert Campbell, Colonel Sykes, William Leslie Melville, John Forbes, and John Cotton, among the Directors, and of the Rt. Honble. Holt Mackenzie, General Briggs, formerly Resident at Sattara, General Lodwick, who had filled the same office, Joseph Hume, John Sullivan, George Thompson, Captain W. J. Eastwick (afterwards a Director and a member of the Indian Council), General Delamotte, and Alderman Salomons, in the general body of Proprietors, and which was known to have the sympathy of those who were confessedly the two best living authorities, the Honble. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who had made the Treaty and placed the Rajah on the throne, and Mr. Grant Duff,* who had been the first Resident at Sattara, the Rajah's political tutor, and the organiser of the State.

The expiration of the Company's Charter in little more than three years, and the chances and conditions of its renewal, were topics of interest in 1850. There was considerable activity of discussion both in England and India. To this year, in fact, may be attributed the effective commencement of open criticism, more or less vigilant and precise, of the legislative and executive action of our Indian Government, by Native associations in the three great Presidency towns. Public meetings and petitions, got up in hopeful combination with independent and unofficial Englishmen, testified, in the years between 1850 and 1857, to the awakening of the Indian mind, and to its entry upon the beaten path of political emancipation. The growth of good feeling and fellow-citizenship among the most enlightened and public-spirited representatives of

* Father of M. E. Grant Duff, Esq., M.P. for the Elgin Burghs.

the dominant and the pupil races in India, was rudely checked by the rebellion of 1857, and has never regained the height at which it once stood.

It was in the midst of this transitory revival of interest in the affairs of India,—too soon to be diverted by the Crimean war, and utterly perverted by the mutinies,—that John Dickinson, who had already been attracted by the debates in the Court of Proprietors on the annexation of Sattara, was encouraged and urged by his uncle to take up Indian reform as a study and a pursuit. There he was, according to the General, a young man, without a profession, of ample means, and heir to a great fortune, with a vein of humanitarian and cosmopolitan enthusiasm in his composition, which was wickedly thrown away on continental politics, but might be most usefully concentrated on our Imperial dependency.

John Dickinson, by his uncle's guidance and introduction, was very soon closely allied with the small and unpopular body of Indian reformers which, either as a powerless opposition in the Court of Proprietors, or addressing a scanty audience through the press, was bravely combating the mingled apathy and misdirected energy of Indian administration. Apathy was in those days most clearly observable in the scanty means of communication, the bad roads, unimproved river navigation, and neglect of canals and irrigation works, by which commerce was hampered and hemmed in, and the growth of staples most profitable to the Indian producers and most coveted in England was impeded or made impossible. These crying wants, when clearly expounded, attracted attention in all our cotton-consuming districts, and for many years the most cordial and efficient aid in the movement for Indian reform came from the Lancashire Chambers of Commerce, both in their corporate capacity and in the persons of their most active members.

Mr. Dickinson's first thoughts and efforts were therefore given to the best means of increasing the produce and promoting the supply of the Indian staple most required in our manufacturing towns. In 1850 and 1851 a series of letters from his pen on this important subject appeared in the *Times*, afterwards published in a collected form as "*Letters on the Cotton and Roads of Western India*,"* in which he pointed out with remarkable power the discreditable deficiencies that existed. Great efforts were made and great progress effected under the vice-royalty of the Marquis of Dalhousie towards removing this reproach. No sooner was relief felt from the all-engrossing strain of war in the Punjab, than the system of internal communication, especially with reference to good common roads, became the leading subject of the Governor-General's consideration. In consequence of Lord Dalhousie's own observation and inquiries, unquestionably stimulated and enlightened, however, by the representations and proceedings of the party with which Mr. Dickinson

* Roworth and Sons, Bell Yard, Temple Bar, 1851.

was connected, a Public Works Commission was appointed in 1852, with two of whose three members—Colonel, now Sir Arthur, Cotton and Colonel Balfour, now Sir George Balfour, M.P.—Mr. Dickinson always maintained a friendly and frequent correspondence. The report of this Commission led to a great development of the Department of Public Works; manifest benefits were conferred upon many classes in Great Britain and in India; trade and wealth grew apace; and henceforward there has been no ground for complaint as to stinted expenditure, or inactivity, in that direction. There has been more reason to complain of too many schemes, and of overgrown establishments. The same may be said of the Educational Department, more especially since 1854.

But, unfortunately, in proportion as the apathy, which the Indian reformers of 1850 attacked, disappeared, the misdirected energy, which they had only begun to doubt and deprecate, was immensely augmented. The administrative achievements in the Punjab, under the Governor-General's personal supervision, had sharpened the official appetite for centralised uniformity; the "Services", having fresh fields of emolument and distinction placed before their eyes, and seeing so many of their brethren admitted, could not but press to get in also. The great majority of Anglo-Indian officers, military and civil, with all their home connections, were prepared to believe that the financial burden imposed by the wars in Afghanistan and Scinde could be relieved by what was called the consolidation of the Empire. Territorial aggrandisement was to be sought, not beyond the actual frontiers, but within them. The introduction of British management into every district of India, would bring, it was said, unspeakable blessings to every man's door. Indian Princes and ministers were unimprovable, and their failings and defects were incorrigible. Native States ought to be annexed, in the interest of the poor ryot all over India, but especially in the interest of the taxpayer in our own provinces.

What have been the moral and material results of this policy, pursued on every possible pretext during the eight years of Lord Dalhousie's government,—from the annexation of Sattara in 1848, to that of Oude in 1856,—the great rebellion of 1857 and the present condition of the finances of India will sufficiently testify. Against that policy of contempt and confusion the small party which John Dickinson held together for so many years consistently and unceasingly protested, not entirely without effect, and but for the destruction of public interest and the interruption of every reforming movement by the Crimean war, they might have done much more to check the tide of annexation. As it was, they stopped Lord Dalhousie in 1852 from commencing an inroad on the ancient States of Rajpootana, which must have incalculably enhanced our difficulties in 1857. If "the ominous reports, in circulation all over the country, to the effect that the policy of Lord Dalhousie had triumphed,

and that the gradual absorption of all the Rajpoot States was sanctioned by the Home Government,"* had been confirmed by the confiscation of Kerowlee, feelings of despair and hatred would have been roused that must have driven all Rajpootana, and in its wake all the Hindu States of India, to join in the rebellion. Fortunately Sir John Low and Sir Henry Lawrence were, in succession, Agents to the Governor-General during the period of suspense, and full effect was ensured to their opposition by the vigilance and unceasing efforts of Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Dickinson, backed by a few Peers and Members of Parliament with whom they were in regular communication. A threatened motion in the House of Commons turned the scale,† and the annexation of Kerowlee was forbidden.

Two years later, the Crimean war being then in its most exciting stage, Sir John Low, "the Patriarch of the Political Service",‡ occupied, as one of the Governor-General's Councillors, a higher and more independent position than in 1852, when, as Governor-General's Agent in Rajpootana, he had opposed the annexation of Kerowlee. Yet his remonstrances against the extinction of the faithful tributary State of Nagpore in 1854, were utterly futile. He urged in vain his own personal knowledge that the annexation of Sattara was universally regarded in Rajpootana, Malwa, and the Mahratta countries, as "*a case of might against right*", and his firm belief that the annexation of Nagpore would lead to "*a deep-rooted hatred of our supremacy*," that "*our reputation for good faith would be injured*," and that we should "*lose moral influence in other parts of India*".§ Nagpore was annexed by Lord Dalhousie—privately assured, of course, of the approval and support of the Ministry—without even the form of a reference to the Court of Directors; and it was found very difficult by the opponents of annexation in London to secure the serious attention of any one to Sir John Low's protest, or to the complaints of the deceased Rajah's representatives. Mr. Hume called for the papers, and no further action was taken.

Nagpore and Jhansi were annexed in 1854. In the same year the sovereignty of Tanjore—the Rajah not having been a mediatised or pensioned Prince, as was pretended, for besides the share of the revenue under treaty, he retained a small territorial regality—was extinguished. In 1855 the heir of our oldest ally, the Nawab of the Carnatic, himself the son of a reigning Nawab, and previously recognised repeatedly by

* *Kaye's Sepoy War*, vol. i, p. 97.

† *Quarterly Review*, July 1858, p. 269.

‡ *Kaye's Sepoy War*, vol. i, pp. 78, 79, and vol. iii, p. 846. General Sir John Low, G.C.B., is now the last surviving Assistant of Sir John Malcolm. In that capacity he received the personal submission of Bajee Rao, the last of the Peishwas, in June 1818, nearly sixty years ago!

§ *Papers, Rajah of Berar*, No. 416 of 1854, pp. 42, 43, 44.

the Madras Government and by the Court of Directors as "the next heir", was disinherited by Lord Dalhousie, and offered a pension for life, which he refused. In 1856, on the eve of Lord Canning's arrival, the friendly and faithful State of Oude was annexed.

All these cases were aggravated by a shameful spoliation of private property, both in land and goods. Ancestral estates and ladies' bowers, precious heirlooms, family relics, and nursery toys, were indifferently confiscated. Before the eyes of all India the contents of jewel-rooms and wardrobes were exposed for sale by public auction.

In 1853 the Nizam of Hyderabad, the most influential Mussulman Sovereign in India, was compelled to resign the administration of some of his richest provinces into the hands of English officers, in order to provide for the regular payment of a force,—the Hyderabad Contingent, previously called the Nizam's Army,—which he had been erroneously told by Lord Dalhousie he was bound by treaty to maintain, and for the liquidation of a debt always disputed by him, and officially acknowledged since not to have been owing. The mandate of our Government was most repugnant to the Nizam's feelings and wishes; he resisted as long as he could, and only submitted at last, in the words of Colonel Davidson, then Assistant (afterwards Resident) at Hyderabad, under the influence of "objurgations and threats".* The Nizam's vain endeavours to gain time were cut short by an intimation that unless he at once consented to sign the new treaty, orders would be given for the advance of British troops, not merely into the districts that were demanded but also into his capital. Then the Nizam and his advisers saw that he had before him the choice of signing the treaty or being dethroned. He signed.

Sufficient light was not thrown upon this case of the Nizam's Berar Provinces by the partial communication of the papers to Parliament in 1854, which were calculated to persuade most readers that there really was a large balance against the Nizam; that the sequestration of the Berars was the only available plan for securing the debt, and the plan most advantageous for the debtor; that this was a case of consent, and not, as it really was, a case of coercion. Yet its true nature did not escape the notice of Mr. Dickinson, and of those with whom he was acting.

But before 1853 none of these cases of annexation and confiscation had taken place, except those of the Punjaub and Sattara. The appropriation of the Punjaub was plausibly disguised as a conquest.† The

* *Papers, the Deccan*, No. 338 of 1867, p. 26.

† Not so closely disguised but that the breach of trust was immediately detected by Mr. John Sullivan, formerly Member of Council at Madras, who published in 1850, "*The Koh-i-Noor, to whom does it belong?*" See also my "*Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy*," chapter vi, pp. 97 to 179.

Sattara case, the very name of which had become a bore and a by-word, in consequence of ten years' tedious debates on the deposition of the Ex-Rajah, and which was complicated by the existence of two claimants, was yet brought before Parliament and the Court of Proprietors with all the strength that could be mustered. In the important and critical case of Kerowlee, as we have seen, the opponents of annexation administered a check to the policy in the ascendant at Calcutta. But the check was very transient.

After 1853, when the Crimean war had commenced, Lord Dalhousie and his professional advisers in India, the old Civilians and permanent staff in London, had it all their own way. People would attend to nothing but the war with Russia. The energetic Viceroy of India had been successful in wars with the Sikhs and the Burmese, and when everyone was complaining of the incompleteness of our establishments, and the incompetence of those at their head, he was often apostrophised as the much-wanted Minister of War. Everything conspired to give him perfect freedom of action. Amid the ever-changing excitement arising from the victories and sufferings of our troops,—from the first royal salute and Te Deum down to the fireworks on the proclamation of peace,—the Manchester school was in very low estimation. No man regarded the views of Cobden and Bright as anything but sordid and unpatriotic. From any supposed follower or disciple of theirs, the slightest imputation against our national rectitude, the least hint depressing our national glorification, would have been very badly received. Yet in this quarter lay the strength of the India Reform party.

All this was well understood, and joyfully appreciated at Calcutta, as the following extracts from Lord Dalhousie's organ, the *Friend of India*, penned when the long-deferred annexation of Oude was close at hand, will prove:—

"The true obstacle in our way was not political. It was not the strength of States which we could abolish by a phrase, but the strength of an ignorant public opinion at home which was the stumbling block in the path. We did not fear Wajid Ali" (the name of the reigning King of Oude,) "but the Member for the West Riding" (Mr. Cobden).

"The current of opinion has changed at last, and the new direction is indicated by the discussion upon Oude. Three years ago the absorption of that country would have excited a storm of indignant platitudes. Within the next three weeks it will have been accomplished, and without a word of disapprobation.

"Hyderabad and Travancore, Guzerat and Gwalior, will expire also, with more ejaculations, perhaps, but with even less of the sympathy of mankind."*

Yes—"three years ago", just three years before, Mr. Dickinson, as the result of long negotiations and infinite painstaking—as all will

* *The Friend of India*, Thursday, January 10th, 1856.

understand who have ever attempted such a task—had succeeded in fairly getting under way that “India Reform Society”, of which he remained for nine years the Honorary Secretary, and for seven years more the Chairman. Before three years had passed, “the current of opinion”, in the words of the *Friend of India*, “had changed”, and the Honorary Secretary had begun to contemplate the possibility of being left all alone. But for the revival of interest in Indian affairs consequent on the events of 1857, that anticipation would probably have been realised.

On Saturday, the 12th March 1853, at a meeting held at Mr. Dickinson's apartments in Charles Street, St. James's Square, “with a view of bringing public opinion to bear on the Imperial Parliament, so as to obtain due attention to the complaints and claims of the inhabitants of India”—Henry Danby Seymour, Esq., M.P., in the chair,—it was resolved that “this Meeting constitutes itself an ‘India Reform Society’, and names the undermentioned gentlemen as a Committee”.

T. Barnes, Esq., M.P.
J. Bell, Esq., M.P.
W. Biggs, Esq., M.P.
J. F. B. Blackett, Esq., M.P.
G. Bowyer, Esq., M.P.*
J. Bright, Esq., M.P.
F. C. Brown, Esq.
H. A. Bruce, Esq., M.P.†
Lieut-Col. J. M. Caulfield, M.P.
J. Cheetham, Esq., M.P.
W. H. Clarke, Esq.
R. Cobden, Esq., M.P.
J. Crook, Esq., M.P.
J. Dickinson, Jun., Esq.
M. G. Fielden, Esq., M.P.
Gen. Sir J. F. Fitzgerald, K.C.B., M.P.
W. R. S. Fitzgerald, Esq., M.P.‡
M. Forster, Esq.
F. French, Esq.
R. Gardner, Esq., M.P.
Right Hon. T. M. Gibson, M.P.
Viscount Goderich, M.P.§
G. Hadfield, Esq., M.P.
W. V. Harcourt, Esq.||
L. Heyworth, Esq., M.P.
C. Hindley, Esq., M.P.

T. Hunt, Esq.
E. J. Hutchins, Esq., M.P.
P. F. C. Johnstone, Esq.
F. Kennedy, Esq., M.P.
M. Lewin, Esq.
F. Lucas, Esq., M.P.
J. Magan, Esq., M.P.
W. T. McCullagh, Esq.¶
E. Miall, Esq., M.P.
G. H. Moore, Esq., M.P.
B. Oliveira, Esq., M.P.
A. J. Otway, Esq., M.P.
G. M. W. Peacocke, Esq., M.P.
Apsley Pellatt, Esq., M.P.
J. Pilkington, Esq., M.P.
J. G. Phillimore, Esq., M.P.
T. Phinn, Esq., M.P.
H. Reeve, Esq.
W. Scholefield, Esq., M.P.
Henry Danby Seymour, Esq., M.P.
W. Digby Seymour, Esq., M.P.
J. B. Smith, Esq., M.P.
John Sullivan, Esq.
G. Thompson, Esq., M.P.
F. Warren, Esq.
J. A. Wise, Esq., M.P.

* Now Sir G. Bowyer, Bart., M.P.

† Now Lord Aberdare.

‡ Now Sir W. R. Seymour Fitzgerald, K.C.S.I., late Governor of Bombay.

§ Now Marquis of Ripon.

|| Now Sir W. Vernon Harcourt, M.P., late Solicitor-General.

¶ Now W. T. McCullagh Torrens, Esq., M.P.

In the next month, April 1853, Committee and office rooms were taken at 12 Haymarket, and Mr. Dickinson was there installed as Honorary Secretary. In contemplation of the renewal of the Company's Charter being debated and decided in the next session of Parliament, Mr. Dickinson's labours in 1853, were incessant. Mr. J. F. B. Blackett, M.P. for Newcastle-on-Tyne, worked with him, day after day, as if he had been an Assistant-Secretary. Mr. Blackett's efforts during 1853 can only be fully estimated by a reference to *Hansard*, which will show that throughout the discussions on India in that exhausting session he was one of the most prominent and able debaters on the side of reform; and that in every speech he evinced not merely great rhetorical power, but the unwearied industry and cautious investigation with which every detail had been mastered.

In 1852, Mr. Dickinson had produced the "Government of India under a Bureaucracy", his most important published work, a small book rather than a pamphlet, extending to two hundred and nine pages. It was this publication that at once attracted the attention of Mr. Danby Seymour and of Mr. Blackett, and thus contributed more than anything else to the rapid formation of the India Reform Society. A cheap edition was published in 1853, as one of a series of 'India Reform Tracts', and had a very large sale and circulation.

It was in this little work that Mr. Dickinson made the clearest possible exposition of the true doctrine as to succession by adoption in Hindu States and as to the "ruling sanction", and at the same time gave warning, with marvellous prevision, of the dangers into which we were being dragged by Lord Dalhousie's false doctrine and the policy based on it.

He pointed out that our claim to have acquired the position of Paramount Power in succession to the Great Mogul or Emperor of Delhi, was quite untenable, because the Emperor had been utterly powerless for many years before he fell into our hands; because he never, then or at any other time, made any grant or delegation of even his titular supremacy to us; and because before and after the Emperor's connection with the East India Company, the Company had made treaties in specific terms with all the Princes of India, without reference to the Emperor on either side, and that by these treaties alone could our relations with the Native States be regulated. Our position as the Paramount Power existed only *de facto*, not *de jure*; "it was won and is kept by the sword". "And", he added, "we had better not forget that we keep it by the sword of a Native army, which has a strong personal interest in the right of adoption", both on religious and worldly grounds, —a son being essential, according to the Hindu faith, to secure the father's salvation by performing his obsequies, and an adoption being the sole mode of supplying an heir in default of a son or grandson in the

male line. Having pointed out that this right was, therefore, "the dearest privilege of the Native Princes, and the most necessary to them", he came to the question of the ruling sanction claimed by our Government.

"Where there is a dispute or doubt as to the succession, the sanction of the Paramount Power is necessary ; because the Paramount Power is entitled and bound to keep the peace in India, and to prevent any violation of rights, or outrage, on the feelings of the people which may endanger the public safety."

"But this sanction of the Paramount Power is a judicial sanction ; it is the same thing as the Lord Chancellor's decision on a will ; and when the sanction of the Paramount Power is required or requested in allied States, not subject to it, but connected with it by treaties, its duty is to find the heir, and to give the succession to the heir, not to seize on the inheritance, in defiance of all the heirs.

"It was as much an act of robbery for us to appropriate the principalities of Sattara, Colaba, and Mandavie, in defiance of all the heirs, as it would be for the Lord Chancellor to pocket a legacy because it was litigated in his court. We are improving upon a precedent set by Caligula, in our violation of the right of adoption. When Caligula was invited to a nuptial feast, he carried away his friend's wife : when the British Resident is invited to the deathbed of a Native Prince, he turns his friend's widow and orphan out of doors, and confiscates their inheritance.

"These things lodge and rankle in men's minds in India, where too many of our troops are interested in this question of adoption. I am convinced that the Government will some day regret the system that is making so many enemies. It will some day absorb a Native State too many, and feel a pang like one who has put a fruit into his mouth, with a hornet in it. We must not expect the Rajpoot Princes to lie still like oysters, waiting to be dredged. They are, and ever were, a high-spirited, martial race, prompt to appeal to the sword, and just the men to say, in a fit of exasperation, 'better an end with fear than fear without an end'.

"Meanwhile, the Natives have a stereotyped expression for their communications with us, which gives us a false confidence. They seem what they know we expect them to appear, and we do not see their real feelings : we know not how hot the stove may be under its polished surface. For the fire is not out, we are obliged to keep it up by *our Native army, which may blaze into a conflagration, and burn the Empire. There may be some conspiracy, of which, as at Vellore, we have not even a suspicion, until the Native Regiments open their fire on our Barracks* : and, as a merchant who is obliged to throw all his treasure overboard to save the ship, a storm may arise in India, which will cost us more to maintain our power, than all we have gained, or can ever hope to gain, *by our confiscations.* (p. 166.)

"Would not a violation of religion and the rights of property, which lit a

flame of insurrection in Rajpootana, and sent over three-fourths of our Bengal Sepoys to the enemy, instantly paralyse the right arm of England?" (p. 177.)

This exposition of true doctrine and warning of dangers that were soon to prove real, was put forth in 1852, and spread widely abroad in 1853. It was not unknown in Calcutta, but it was utterly disregarded. Nagpore and Jhansi were annexed in 1854, under the false pretext of "lapse", although in both cases kinsmen had been adopted. Oude was annexed in 1856, under pretexts equally disingenuous.

While urging the improvement of communications and extension of irrigation works, the employment of Natives in high offices, and other liberal measures of administration in our own Provinces, Mr. Dickinson at the earliest period of his labours had become convinced that the only means of securing our moral influence and virtual supremacy in India, was by scrupulously maintaining towards the allied and tributary States a policy of good faith and goodwill. In that direction, as he saw, lay the secret at once of stability and social progress. Such were the views of his first coadjutors, and of the statesmen who supported them in Parliament,—among others, of Mr. Bright and Mr. Cobden, of Sir Erskine Perry, Sir Fitzroy Kelly, and Mr. Arthur Otway, of the late Lord Monteagle, of the late Marquis of Clanricarde, and of the Earl of Albemarle. Mr. Dickinson's "India under a Bureaucracy", which was re-issued as No. VI of the India Reform pamphlets, dealt largely with the subject of the protected Principalities; and in the same series in 1853 appeared No. IV, "The Native States of India", No. VII, "Indian Wrongs without a remedy", on the general topic of political appeals, and No. IX, "The Government of India under its Native Rulers", all intended to counteract the teachings of the annexation school, then beginning to prevail.

In 1852, just in the nick of time, as if to serve as an exponent and defence of Lord Dalhousie's policy, a clever book was published by a rising young Bengal Civilian, then at home on leave, suggesting that every possible opportunity should be sought for stopping the stipends of mediatised Princes, and for absorbing the allied Principalities. "It is indeed", said he, "only in this way"—by rejecting adopted heirs—"that we can hope *gradually to extinguish the Native States, which consume so large a portion of the revenues of the country*, and so prevent us from lightening the burdens and improving the condition of the mass of the people."* Another favourite official plea was that we really ought to annex the Native States as fast as possible, in order to bestow upon their inhabitants the blessings of British administration.

But the little band of Indian reformers, including among them gentlemen who had gained experience and won distinction in every

* *Modern India* (Murray, 1852), by George Campbell, Esq., B.C.S., now Sir George Campbell, K.C.S.I., M.P., late Lieut.-Governor of Bengal.

branch of Indian service, and who were in communication with enlightened correspondents in every part of India, by no means shared the easy confidence of our officials regarding distress and suffering prevalent in the Native States, or the unimpeachable excellence of British administration. Strange facts that came to their knowledge led them to desire some independent and unbiassed inquiry.

During the vacation after the Parliamentary session of 1853, Mr. Danby Seymour undertook a voyage to India to judge for himself of the condition of the people. He was induced by the representations of some fellow-passengers to stop at Madras, and make a tour through the interior of that Presidency, a plan which he carried out under the guidance of an accomplished Native gentleman, the late G. Luchmenarusu Chetty, afterwards a Member of the Legislative Council of Madras. Mr. Seymour wrote home, while on this tour, a series of most graphic letters, giving such a harrowing description of the oppression to which the agricultural population were subjected, and of cruel practices notoriously employed both for the collection of revenue and by police officers, as to inspire his friends of the India Reform Society with the strongest determination that some public inquiry should be made. It was arranged that a motion condemning the system of assessing and collecting the revenue in the Madras Presidency, should be brought forward by Mr. Blackett on the first available open day, which was on the 11th of July 1854. The moral success of Mr. Blackett's motion, chiefly owing its origin and its force to Mr. Danby Seymour's public-spirited enterprise and personal testimony, proved a crisis in the affairs of India, which ought not to be overlooked. The beneficial effects of that debate were both real and durable. The Government was nearly defeated on a division, which fairly represented the roused feeling of the House. It was the first occasion on which the Ministry and those Members who were also Directors of the East India Company, were forced to admit that there were grounds for inquiring into grievances and abuses, the existence of which, up to that time, they had flatly and vehemently denied. Mr. Bright replied to Sir James Weir Hogg, and referring to the "unpalatable truths" in Mr. Danby Seymour's speech, remarked that previously "it had been part of the system of the Government to which the honourable baronet belonged, to suppress all such impertinent exposures with dogmatic assertions and arrogant abuse."* In consequence of this debate, the Governor of Madras, Lord Harris, with creditable promptitude, organised a Commission to inquire into the practice of torture, on which he placed Mr. J. B. Norton, a barrister practising at Madras, afterwards Advocate General, and already embarked on that persevering and fearless course as a judicial reformer, as a friend of Native education, and as an opponent of Lord Dalhousie's doctrines, which has made

* *Hansard*, vol. 135, p. 80.

his an honoured and a memorable name among all classes in every part of India. Mr. Norton constituted the non-official element in the Torture Commission, and it was owing to his acuteness and independent energy that the investigations were pushed as far as they were, and that the Report of the Commission, printed in 1855, was tolerably outspoken. From about that time Mr. Norton became one of Mr. Dickinson's closest allies and most regular correspondents.

The good results of Mr. Blackett's motion, and of the debate of 1854,—backed and strengthened by the constant vigilance and frequent action in the House of Lords of the Earl of Albemarle and the Marquis of Clanricarde, with occasional help from the Earl of Ellenborough,—were not confined to the direct measures of redress and reform that were forced on the authorities in India. The personal appearance on the scene of an English senator, "taking notes", and the consequent proceedings of the local Government and of both Houses of Parliament, reminded our Commissioners and Collectors that since the establishment of the route through Egypt, their districts, even the most remote, had been drawn more closely within the range of Imperial supervision. They knew that the national conscience was aroused, and the best of them felt the sting themselves. The characteristic self-complacency of the Indian Civil Service was damped; conviction was brought to many an honest heart. The effect was deep, lasting and, as it proved, most opportune. But for the previous impeachment and exposure of what had been lauded as an almost faultless administration, there would have been much more of angry bewilderment and blind exasperation when the rebellion broke out in 1857, than there actually was. The leading statesmen of both our great parties were less taken by surprise than our functionaries in India; they were prepared at once to acknowledge the blots that had been hit, and to take steps for their correction. Even before the last resistance had been overcome, the Home authorities, not unmindful of the necessary work of repression and retribution, had determined on a policy of reconciliation. The men in high places at the seat of Government and throughout India,—Lord Canning and a few others excepted,—were not so ready to recant and confess their errors, or to think of remedies. Even Lord Canning, towards the close of his vice-royalty, after the retirement from Council of General Sir John Low, and when his own health and spirits were much broken, fell much more under the influence of the circle at his head-quarters, and took up to a great extent their views that Her Majesty's Government was going on too fast and too far with its restorative and conciliatory measures. All these tardy acts of justice originated with the Secretaries of State at home, contrary to the counsels of Calcutta. But for information irregularly communicated, and officious pressure exercised, by Mr. Dickinson and his friends, in several of these

instances of partial reparation, it is quite certain that the Secretary of State,—coldly supported, and in some instances opposed, by his officially trained Council,—would not have been sufficiently master of the facts to have enforced a remedial measure. In the remarkable case which occupied Mr. Dickinson's mind on the very day of his death, described in the "Last Counsels" of this volume, Lord Canning was clearly misled and kept in the dark by ordinary official prepossessions.

It has been shown that from his first entry on the field of Indian reform, Mr. Dickinson had seen how the relations of our Government with the allied and protected States had been strained in the wrong direction. But the superficial brilliancy of Lord Dalhousie's acquisitive career had then so firm a hold on the public imagination, that to do more than to enter a protest was useless. The events of 1857 and 1858 proved the supreme importance of the allied and protected States in our Imperial system. The ties were strained indeed, and yet they sustained the structure. Until, however, the general course and numerous incidents of the rebellion recalled his first convictions, and seemed, for the time, to throw commercial and fiscal affairs into the shade, Mr. Dickinson had found the most hopeful and immediately practical matters for his consideration among those that most concerned his friends and supporters in the West Riding and in Lancashire. In one of his recent memoranda it is mentioned that in 1855 "the India Reform Committee took a strong interest in a project for opening the navigation of the Godavery to its confluence with the Wurda, in the heart of the celebrated cotton fields of Berar, where a boundless extent of black soil of unsurpassed fertility was comparatively wasted for want of cheap transit of its products to the sea".

"After a vain attempt to get the project taken up by the Government, it was hoped that Manchester might be induced to undertake it as a commercial speculation, and through the patronage of Mr. Bright the scheme was considered there so seriously, that in the winter of 1854-55 a deputation from the London Committee was invited down to Manchester to discuss the proposal, and was so warmly received at a public dinner, and at a public meeting afterwards in the Town Hall, on the 18th January 1855, that I thought at the time there would not be the slightest difficulty in raising the capital required among the crowd of enthusiastic and wealthy cotton spinners, who were present on the occasion. However, the growth of good cotton in the United States seemed to Manchester men at that day too certain and satisfactory to make it worth their while to invest in a project for developing the best cotton-field of India, and, after the return of the deputation to London, it gradually became apparent that the opening of the Godavery navigation was destined to wait for an indefinite period, perhaps for one or two generations.

"One of those who awaited the decision of Manchester on this occasion

with most anxiety, was a witness we had taken down with us, Captain Fenwick, as being the only man who had ever navigated the Godavery from the Wurdah to the coast, and who had also superintended the culture and collection of cotton on a large scale in the province of Berar. He had explored some of the most deadly jungles in search of teak and minerals, when in the service of the British Government ; and the first coal which ever reached Bombay from the Satpoora range, was brought down by Captain Fenwick, under the direction of Sir Robert Hamilton, then Resident at Indore and afterwards Governor-General's Agent for Central India. Fenwick, the son of an English officer by a Native mother, had been carefully brought up and well educated, and had obtained military rank in the service of the Nizam, in whose employment he remained long enough to know the languages and manners of the Deccan as well as a pure Native. In the course of his adventurous life he had become the familiar friend of some of our most distinguished Political officers in India, such as Colonels Ovans, Keating, Evans, French, and others, several of whom are still living, and who valued him alike for his goodness of heart, his high sense of honour and duty, and the union of courage and intelligence with extreme simplicity of character.

"Such was the man who became intimate with me, and some other leading members of the India Reform Committee, in the year 1854-55, as the pioneer of a river-road from the cotton fields of Berar ; and who hoped, no doubt, in the beginning of 1855, to return to India as the servant of a Manchester "Godavery Navigation Company", in which capacity he would have done good service. However, weeks and months passed by, and it became evident that no such Company would be formed ; so in the autumn of that year Fenwick returned to seek his fortune in India, and when I shook hands with him at parting, I never expected to see or hear from him again.

"I was, therefore, agreeably surprised to receive a letter from Fenwick in the following year, 1856, to say that he had entered the service of the young Prince of Indore, the Maharajah Holkar, then just twenty-one years old, whose Prime Minister, Rao Ramchunder Rao, styled the Bhao Sahib, being a friend of his, had procured him a comfortable berth in the Indore Customs' Department, and treated him with great kindness and confidence.

"As Fenwick offered in his letter to correspond with me, as he did with his friends Colonels French* and Ovans, and I was then anxious to procure Indian information from every quarter, I gladly accepted his offer ; and a correspondence thus commenced which lasted till his death ; his letters to Colonel French or myself being habitually communicated to Mr. Bright and other members of the India Reform Committee.

"Fenwick's first communications in 1856 gave a pleasing picture of the young Rajah's application to the arts of peace, and his assiduous attention to the details of administration. Holkar was then one of the most promising specimens of that useful class of subordinate rulers, at once aids to our reforming influence and bulwarks to our Indian Empire, in which Native Princes might be systematically enrolled by such an education as the Para-

* The Chairman of the Bombay, Baroda, and Central India Railway Company.

mount Power can always insure, either by direct action or by its irresistible influence."

In this natural and simple manner commenced that intimate connection between Mr. Dickinson and an Indian Durbar, which, in the course of years, and after the terrible experience of 1857, greatly modified his views, and led him to look for a solution of the great Indian problem rather in an extended system of reformed Principalities, than in any further elaboration of our direct rule.

After the establishment of the India Reform Society, Mr. Dickinson came by degrees into communication with a very great number of well qualified and competent people, both English and Native, public servants and private persons, in every British Province, and in all the principal Native States. Without particularising them more precisely,—which in many instances, and for obvious reasons, would not be advisable or justifiable,—it may suffice to say that hardly any Indian nobleman or gentleman who has risen to distinction in any capacity, or whose name has become known in England, within the last twenty years, has not at some time been on the file of Mr. Dickinson's correspondents. But as the sources of information at his command were multiplied, and while implicit confidence was more largely reposed in him personally, the Society, through which he had hoped great things might be effected, flagged in spirit and dwindled in its muster-roll. The India Reform Society started, as we have seen, in 1853 with thirty-eight Members of Parliament on its list, some of whom were then of great eminence, while several have since held high office, or have been placed in the Privy Council. When the mutinies broke out in the Bengal Army in 1857, the Society was at a very low ebb. After the session of 1854, Mr. J. F. B. Blackett had been attacked by the illness which hurried him to an untimely grave; and he was too soon followed by another most energetic Parliamentary supporter, Mr. J. G. Phillimore.* These losses were irreparable. In 1856, Mr. Danby Seymour accepted a place in Lord Palmerston's Ministry, as Joint Secretary to the Board of Control, and, although doubtless expecting to work usefully for India as a subaltern in office, he was of course debarred at once from holding his independent position as Chairman of the India Reform Society.† On his retirement, Mr. Bright was elected Chairman, an event which may naturally seem to us now to have been calculated to give an immediate access of strength and celebrity to the proceedings of the Society. But it

* Whose unfinished "*History of the Reign of George III*" has at least the merits of vigorous and original thought and curious research.

† While this sheet is passing through the press, the morning papers record the sudden death of Mr. Henry Danby Seymour, aged fifty-seven, on the 4th of August, 1877.

was not exactly so in 1856. The unpopularity which attached to the names of Bright and Cobden, in consequence of their wise disapproval of the Crimean war, was not of long continuance, but in 1856 it was at its height, and was so much enhanced by the share they took in the condemnation of Lord Palmerston's policy in China on the 3rd of March, 1857, which led to the dissolution of Parliament, that at the general election both of them lost their seats. Mr. Cobden, who had thought it hopeless to solicit again the suffrages of the West Riding, was beaten at Huddersfield. Mr. Bright and his colleague, the Right Hon. T. Milner Gibson, were defeated at Manchester. It was not until 1859 that Mr. Cobden returned to the House of Commons as Member for Rochdale. Mr. Bright obtained in 1858 the seat for Birmingham made vacant by the death of Mr. Muntz.

Another Liberal member who had opposed Lord Palmerston's coercion of the Chinese Government, and had lost his seat in consequence, was Mr. (now the Rt. Hon.) A. H. Layard. The absence from Parliament, while all men's minds were occupied with India, of one so specially qualified by study and experience to throw light upon the subject, would have been deplorable, but for his having, with characteristic and public-spirited promptness turned his forced vacation to the best account by spending it in the midst of the Indian rebellion, and bringing back authentic and personally acquired intelligence for the benefit of his fellow-countrymen.

From the first outbreak of the mutinies in Bengal, throughout the momentous two years that witnessed the progress and suppression of the revolt, the pacification of India by Lord Canning, and the transfer of Government from the Company to the Crown, Mr. Dickinson's labours were severe and incessant. Correspondence with English and Native friends and societies by every mail, communications and consultations with members of both Houses of Parliament, seem now to have been multiplied beyond all former knowledge. Besides continuous and most efficient exertions in the field of journalism, and in the many circles to which he had access, to make the truth known as to the events passing in India, to moderate excitement, and to prevent un-mixed attention to penal and repressive measures, Mr. Dickinson took the chief part in getting up a series of public meetings which were all well attended, and distinguished for the high quality of the speeches delivered, both in eloquence and in moral tone.

The most important of all these public meetings was undoubtedly that which was held in St. James's Hall on the 11th of May 1858, to hear an address from Mr. A. H. Layard, on his return from India. Viscount Bury, M.P.,* was in the chair, and "among the vast company

* Son of the Earl of Albemarle, recently called up to the House of Peers in his father's Barony of Ashford.

that completely filled the room", says the report in the *Times*, "we noticed the following M.Ps.:—Bright, Milner Gibson, Black, Bruce, Ayrton, Hadfield, Crawford, Sir Erskine Perry, Sir James Graham, E. Ellice, Hodgson, Maguire, Col. Rawlinson, Western, Liddell, Pritchard, Stapleton, G. G. Glynn, Lord John Hay, E. Ball, Lindsay, Sir A. H. Elton, Col. Watkins, Sir John Logan, J. Wyld, J. B. Smith, Headlam, Cowan, J. Caird, Richardson, Gilpin, Grant, and Duff. There were also present, W. M. Thackeray, Doyle, A. J. Otway, Cobden" (not in Parliament!), "W. Theobald, Freeman, Ramsay, C. Lushington, T. H. Dickens, Honble. A. Gordon, Sir Allan Macnab, Sir Duncan Macdougall, the Bishop of Llandaff, and General Wilson."

Mr. Layard returned from India just in time to tell the Government and the people of England much that was most important for them to know, and much that would never have come to their ears from the regular official sources. And despite of sneers and vituperations from many quarters, that outspoken testimony sank into the hearts of statesmen and people, and bore fruit in season. He told them, first, that the alleged mutiny had been, and still was, a widespread popular rebellion, having its sympathisers in every province of the Indian Empire, and threatening with overthrow, death, or deposition those of the Native Princes who remained faithful to their alliance or allegiance. Secondly, he told them that the causes of the insurrection lay deep in the condition of the people and the policy of their rulers, especially in the harsh treatment of the Princes and great land-holders,—our annexation of States, resumption of tenures, and extinction of pensions and charges on revenue, in defiance of solemn engagements. He showed, moreover, how Lord Dalhousie had at last shaken even our financial credit with the monied class, by reducing the interest on the public funds under a pretence of having an ample balance of cash in hand, and then juggling with a so-called Public Works Loan as soon as the conversion had been effected. And without dwelling unduly upon so painful a subject, but invoking, not without effect, the attention of Government, he avowed his conviction that in many places, and on many occasions, the means of repression had been used, by the civil as well as by the military authorities, with vengeful, ruthless, and impolitic severity. And, finally, with statesmanlike breadth of judgment he called, even in the midst of rebellion, for the introduction of Native advisers into the Council chambers of our Government.

Meanwhile the India Reform Society did not flourish materially. Great applause came from India, but very few rupees. The following extract from the Annual Report of the British Indian Association of Calcutta for the year 1859, is only one of numerous recognitions from that and other quarters of Mr. Dickinson's exertions at that period.

"The Committee have to record that the acknowledgments of the Society are due to the Members of the India Reform Society for their continued efforts in the cause of Indian improvement, and particularly to their Chairman, Mr. John Bright, M.P., for his kind compliance with their request to present the Petition of this Association to Parliament at the last Session, and for his sustained advocacy of measures for the good Government of India, and also to Mr. John Dickinson, junr., Honorary Secretary to the Society, for his devoted zeal in the cause of Indian reform."

The same sort of testimony came from Associations and influential persons at Bombay, Madras, and other places, but the contributions from India towards the funds of the India Reform Society were insignificant and intermittent; there were very few English subscribers, and the burden on Mr. Dickinson was becoming heavier and more irksome. Matters in that respect were even somewhat worse than they had been in 1856, when he had written in the following terms to one of his chief Indian supporters and correspondents.

"So far as I can foresee, which includes a forecast of my own inclinations, I think we may be able to go on at the present rate of expenditure for one, or possibly for two years longer. This expenditure is necessarily confined to what may be called the bare sustenance of the Society,—a mere existence with very little activity. There is paid for rent £75, wages £30, salary of Assistant Secretary, £200; and adding bookseller's, printer's, and stationer's bills, coals, candles, gas, travelling expenses, and sundries, we cannot exist as a Society under about £400 a year. Last year the *Indian News*, as the organ of our Society, was under my management for fifty weeks. And I must mention that I have hitherto borne a large share of the Society's expenses personally,—for instance, while the *Indian News* is charged to the Society £89, it really cost me about £60 more. And so it has been with most things hitherto, but I cannot afford to continue this any longer, and it must cease definitively. It is but just that if your countrymen feel the benefits, and see the useful effects of our agitation, they should contribute largely to the expenses, which will certainly not be covered by contributors in England, for the importance of the Indian question was only just beginning to be felt here when it was obscured once more by this unlucky Russian war. The evil of receiving no regular annual subscriptions worth speaking of has been much greater than you can have any idea of in India. In the first place, besides causing what I could not but feel to be an unfair drain on my purse, it has obliged me, acting under the constant sanction of Mr. Bright, to cut down every expense of the Society to a minimum; and nothing could so prejudice our cause and cramp our action as this extreme economy. To give the strongest example of what I mean,—it is almost a necessary of life for a political movement of such a nature as ours to have some organ in the press. I might at one time have bought the *Indian News* for a comparatively small sum; and though this, a mere class paper, never was under my control sufficiently to enable me to improve its form, and adapt it for general circulation, I know that our authorities never failed to get it as soon as possible after publication, that they

might see what we were about, and what we were saying about them. Thus it had a direct influence on the Government, though ill adapted for the public, because it was known to be the organ of our agitation. What might it not have done, then, if it had obtained a good circulation among the public, which would, I have no doubt, have been the result of its coming into our hands, and being arranged and edited in good style so as to suit the general reader. From the ever pressing necessity of economising our funds, this chance was lost; we could barely retain a hold over the *Indian News* for a year, and are now without an organ at all, because we can only eke out as long as possible our never replenished funds of 1853.

“Nor is it merely that the rigid economy forced upon us prevents us from gaining converts and making friends; it compels us—it compels me at least—to make many enemies. How many “gentlemen of the press”, popular lecturers, large advertisers, and other valuable adherents—many of them well disposed and even enthusiastic on our side, but all of them dependent on their vocation for a livelihood,—have I been under the necessity of turning away from our Committee Rooms, knowing that many of these applicants could have done us excellent service, and feeling that I could have most usefully set them to work, if any funds had been at my disposal. Yet I was compelled to see that many if not most of them disbelieved my excuses, and attributed the rejection of their offers to the narrowmindedness, the favouritism, the envy, or the interested motives of the Honorary Secretary.

“Finally, our opponents depend on the expiring of our agitation for want of funds; they evidently and avowedly build their hopes on it. From two of the Directors with whom I am intimately acquainted, I know that those who are against us at the India House, the Board of Control, and the House of Commons—and I need hardly say those who are *not* against us are a small minority—hope that the exhaustion of our funds will soon dissolve the Society. Leading questions, half in jest half in earnest, are often put to me, and though I put as good a face on it as I can, they know too well, from the parsimony of our proceedings, what our financial condition must be. According to present prospects, our opposition must die out before the close of the war,—that is to say, just at the time when we might hope to direct public sympathies again, with decisive effect, on the misgovernment of India. The Society must expire within a very limited period, unless reformers in India can raise an annual income for us of at least £500 a year.”

No such income was forthcoming in any subsequent year. At the close of the Russian war the Sepoy war broke out. The passions and anxieties that ruled men's minds in England and in India from 1857 to 1859, were not likely to further plans of constitutional agitation, or to swell ordinary subscription lists. Naturally enough the disposition in English circles to listen to the alleged wrongs of India, was very limited and very languid, so long as the impression or the recollection remained of the treachery, the horrors, and the outrages by which that insurrection (like all similar insurrections) had been signalised. The grandeur and

the glory of military events, the splendour of heroic deeds and sufferings, filled and occupied the public mind. Even those who had helped the most before the outbreak, had now something else to think of, and other work on hand. The foremost questions now were military and financial; the sole object in view was the future security of the Empire from a storm such as had just been weathered. To that all administrative reforms, all redress of grievances, were postponed; to that all the details of reorganised establishments were made subservient. What would commonly be called "Native" interests, though really of national and Imperial importance, were swamped and swallowed up in the mere departmental changes consequent on the transfer of Government from the Company to the Crown. The supersession of one set of officers by the formation of the new Staff Corps; the damaged prospects of another set by their regimental purchase funds becoming inoperative; the offer of a bonus or a pension to one branch of the service by way of compensation, or to accelerate promotion; the protest of covenanted Civilians against some encroachment on their vested rights; all these matters of private and class interest attracted much more attention and excited more discussion among the legislators and electors of the United Kingdom than had ever been aroused by some high-handed act or elaborate measure of the Indian Executive, involving the continuance of a dynasty or a State, and affecting the fortune of millions.

Considerations of this nature laid the foundations of Mr. Dickinson's ultimate convictions, confirmed by much experience and thought, as to the incurable costliness and irreconcilable exclusiveness of our administration. From the year 1857 he began to see more and more clearly that we did not, in fact, and could not, govern directly the stupendous population of India, with whom our scanty band of English functionaries were connected by no ties whatever. The tribes of India, like those of other countries, are governed by their social and religious leaders. Rank and wealth in India have the upper hand, as in some other parts of the globe. The priests and doctors of all creeds, influential among all classes, but whom we can never help or please, are under the ordinary command of great landlords and Princes. Our Government is in close contact with the Indian Sovereigns and Chieftains, who fully appreciate the solid advantages of British Imperial supremacy, and through whom, if the prescribed principles and practice of its "Political" representatives were made more congenial and consistent, it could govern and guide all the nations of India. In proportion as we destroy, weaken, or alienate these manageable conservative powers, we shall set loose the unmanageable brute force and the uncontrollable fanaticism of a vast continent peopled by two hundred millions.

On the 24th of June 1858, in the debate on the second reading of the India Bill, Mr. Bright delivered his grand speech on Legislation

and Policy for India,—a speech that created a profound impression among the educated and reflective classes of the Empire, which has not been effaced by the lapse of time. The name of Mr. Bright still serves in India to signify that nobler side of British domination, which recognises, in his own words, that “India must be governed, not for a handful of Englishmen, not for that Civil Service whose praises are so constantly sounded”,—that “India may be governed, if you like, for the good of England, but that the good of England must come through the channel of the good of India”. The great principles expounded, the practical advice given, by Mr. Bright in 1858, are as true and as valuable now as they were then,—not the less true or valuable because, many precious opportunities having been lost, they may now be more difficult of application.

One point upon which Mr. Bright laid great stress was that there was “no better test in the long run of the condition of a people, and the merits of a Government, than the state of the finances”. “And yet”, he continued, “we find the normal state of the finances of India has been that of deficit and a growing debt. If that be so, the Government is a bad Government. It has cost more to govern India than the Government has been able to extract from the population of India. The deficit has had to be made up from loans. The debt is continually increasing”.

Since 1858 the expenditure, the deficit, and the debt have gone on continually increasing. Therefore the Indian Government, in that great matter of the finances, is still a bad Government.

A great part of Mr. Bright's speech was occupied in a protest against the excessive centralisation of our Indian Government, and the autocracy of the Governor-General. He boldly proposed to break up the Empire into at least five Presidencies, bounded in general by the differences of language and geographical position,—the capitals being probably Calcutta, Madras, Agra, Lahore, and Bombay. The Governors of these five Presidencies were to be perfectly equal in rank and salary, to be assisted by Executive Councils selected from the Europeans and Natives in their respective territories, and to correspond directly and independently with Her Majesty's Government.

Carried a little too far, in our opinion, by the desire to delineate clearly, and with sharp outlines, his quite original scheme of independent Presidencies, Mr. Bright proposed the abolition of the office of Governor-General. In this, we venture to think he lost sight for the moment not merely of the urgent call for unity of plan and purpose in the event of political and military emergencies, but also of the want of one visible representative of the Imperial Crown to preside with adequate mastery and influence over the protected States. Undoubtedly the States might be grouped, as they are to some extent at present, each group attached

to a Presidency; but the authority of one among five Provincial Governors, although in direct connection with that of the Crown, might seem to an allied Prince too much on a level with his own to be regarded with unhesitating deference. There could not be five Viceroys in India. Yet no title or attributes inferior to those of Viceroy would be appropriate or effectual for him to whom the duty is assigned of leading and directing the constituent Sovereigns of the Empire.

If one might presume so far, it would not be difficult to account, on very probable grounds, for Mr. Bright's denunciation, at that particular time, of the office of Governor-General, and for his preferring five modest Presidencies to one grand Indian Empire. For many years the advocates of a consolidated Empire had done all that could be done to disassociate that idea from the preservation of local rights or the promotion of local reforms, and to connect it with the destruction of friendly dynasties and the spoliation of princely estates. Lord Dalhousie's organ, the *Friend of India*, declared repeatedly during the full tide of annexation that the object of Lord Dalhousie's policy, as laid down in his Minute on the Sattara succession, and which, "*to be just, must be invariably adhered to*", was "*to change India from a congeries of States into an Empire one and indivisible*".* Assuredly Mr. Bright, who had always opposed annexation, and upheld, with a scant measure of success, the Native States that were menaced, and those on whose behalf an appeal was made in any form, did not forget them in the course of his great speech. He declared his conviction that "the edifice we have reared in India is too vast", and his belief that "few men now, and least of all those connected with the East India Company, will not be willing to admit that territories have been annexed that had better have been left independent". He reminded the House of Commons that after the annexation of Nagpore, "the dresses and wardrobes of the ladies of the Court had been exposed to sale, like a bankrupt's stock,—a thing likely to horrify and incense the people of India who witnessed it". These things having been done in prosecution of what was then called an Imperial policy, and by a Governor-General of high-pitched and pompous pretensions, over whom, as Mr. Bright urged, "no real control had ever been exercised", it was natural for him to feel an aversion to the very name of Empire, and to doubt whether every Governor-General was not "liable to have his head turned" by the splendour of his position; whether "the power of the Governor-General was not too great, and the station too high, to be held by the subject of any Power whatsoever, and especially by any subject of the Queen of England".

But the fact is that no Governor-General, however strong in intellect or will, could have carried on for eight years a policy of his own that was repugnant to the conscience and reason of the British people. The

* *Friend of India*, 18th May 1854.

true explanation of Lord Dalhousie's uninterrupted career, the best defence for him which his friends can make, is that the cause of his having been, in Mr. Bright's words, "uncontrolled by the opinion of the Parliament and people of England", was that he had with him the opinion of the Parliament and people of England, and that he acted under the instructions and with the constant support of a united Cabinet. Those with whom Mr. Dickinson had allied himself were everywhere a very small minority, powerless to check, barely able to make their protest heard. It is true we can see now—all can see—that the positions of the minority were morally, legally, and historically the stronger; we are sorely tempted to charge the active majority in the Court of Directors, in the Ministry, and, above all, in the Anglo-Indian "Services", with perversely disregarding the weight of argument against them, and deciding both the general question of an annexation policy, and each particular case of its enforcement, on grounds of expected advantages to be gained for all concerned, and not on grounds of truth, justice, and good faith. But the real cause of an immoral policy holding its own triumphantly for eight years, till the cup of bitterness overflowed, was that the inactive majority in both Houses of Parliament and in the United Kingdom—those who, when once roused and interested, ultimately decide all questions—was uninstructed. In the absence of any striking event or piece of public intelligence contradicting the confident and pleasing statements of those who are called "responsible" authorities, the national conscience was lulled asleep by hearing that the extinction of Native States, and the substitution for them of British administration, was "an unspeakable blessing" to the people, "whose nationality had been scourged out of them" by their tyrannical Princes. The national reason was misled by being assured that the annexation of subordinate States would "add to the resources of the public treasury", and "combine our military strength."

The minority—such men as Mr. Bright, Lord Albemarle, Mr. Dickinson, Mr. John Sullivan, Mr. J. B. Norton, and Mr. J. M. Ludlow—did their best, in their several spheres, to instruct the public, but the subject was neither interesting nor agreeable. A feeling of national self-reproach is very unpleasant. The India Reform Society did not flatter, and did not flourish. The slight, but perceptible hold on public attention that had been gained, was almost lost amid the excitement of the war with Russia. Still the ground was prepared, and the nation reaped the benefit amid the lurid light of the Sepoy rebellion. Then the warnings were recalled to mind, and the long-refused lesson was taken to heart. A policy of annexation in India will never again obtain the acquiescence of the British people. The old difficulty does, indeed, remain: the study of Indian affairs is very unattractive. There are

new lessons to be learned,—outlines to be filled up, problems to be worked out. There may be an era of satire and sedition approaching, which we may be induced, against the teaching of recent history, against our deepest convictions, to meet with none but coercive measures. But whether we overcome our selfishness and our pride, or not,—whether we maintain our moral and intellectual superiority, and rightly grasp the meaning of the Indian question, or not,—the self-will and ambitious views of a Viceroy need not be feared. If ever an Indian disgrace, or an Indian disaster should occur, it will be the fault of the nation, and not of any one person. No Viceroy will violate his instructions.

Mr. Dickinson and his friends having been in vain opposing for years the annexation policy, were glad enough in 1858 to feel that they could now plead with some freedom, and some hope of a respectful hearing, for the continued existence and toleration of Native States, without going so far as to claim for them an assured and established place in the Imperial structure. They had hardly as yet realised the magnitude of the advantages that had been gained. They could not anticipate that within a few months Lord Canning would explicitly recant every one of the arguments by which the annexation policy had been recommended; would confess that the principal process employed for the extinction of Native States was fictitious and oppressive; and that every plea brought forward in justification of that policy was a false plea. They could not anticipate his candid admission that the absorption of friendly dependencies had not “added to the resources of the public treasury” and had not “combined,” but scattered “our military strength.” They could not anticipate his acknowledgment that no right of causing “lapses” by refusing to recognise adoptions had ever existed, and that the introduction of British administration into annexed provinces was not looked upon as “an unspeakable blessing” by the people, whose “nationality had” not “been scourged out of them”, and who did not regard their Princes as tyrants, but, on the contrary, regretted and resented their downfall. They could not anticipate his frank admission that Native States were not “incorrigible”, that their reformation was not “a hopeless task, as some pretend”; that the Princes of India may be encouraged to “become useful instruments of civil government, and to take a pride in it”; and that they have individually an influence which is invaluable to us as Supreme Rulers in India, if we will but turn it to account.* What wonder if that vision of a constitutional Indian Empire, composed in a great measure of reformed States, confederated under the presidency of a British Viceroy, which formed

* See *passim* Lord Canning's Adoption Despatch, No. 43A, April 30th, 1860; his despatch, dated June 7th, 1858, *Parliamentary Papers, Oude Proclamation*, 1859, pp. 5, 6; and his last private letter to Sir Mark Cubbon, dated November 24th, 1860, *Retrospects and Prospects of Indian Policy*, p. 342.

the subject of Mr. Dickinson's last counsels, had not yet become familiar to the party which he was mainly instrumental in forming.

It has been necessary to explain at some length Mr. Dickinson's gradual dissent from the proposal to abolish the office of Governor-General, upon which Mr. Bright by no means insisted, and which was quite separable from his by far more important proposal of the five independent Presidencies. The latter proposal holds as good now as in 1858. It is as true now as it was then, that "the duties of the Governor-General are far greater than any human being can adequately fulfil", that the ultimate decision as to innumerable details and personal appeals of remote administration, devolve upon him to such an extent as to render him "omnipotent to overbear and overrule", but "almost powerless to effect anything that is good for many of the vast countries" placed under his authority. Mr. Bright's plan of dividing British India into five independent Presidencies,—a plan as sound and as practicable now as in 1858,—was a statesmanlike protest against the vain attempt at governing two hundred millions of people, "twenty nations, speaking twenty languages," by means of a compact and centralised bureaucracy. That attempt has been carried on to the present day with manifest results of deficit, debt, famine, and general disaffection.

Mr. Dickinson's objections to go on contributing, besides his gratuitous personal services, a considerable share of the current expenses of the India Reform Society, were made stronger by his marriage in 1859. Many reasons, however, made him very averse to close the Committee rooms, and to propose the dissolution of the Society. The office at 12, Haymarket, had become widely known as a centre of information and counsel, from which access could be obtained to many statesmen, Members of Parliament, and other influential persons interested in Indian affairs. Mr. Dickinson was naturally averse to cut off so many channels and to dry up so many sources of intelligence, after having taken such pains to open them, and to lead them where they might be useful. Though the list of subscribers had shrunk till it was almost invisible, and the regular subscriptions barely sufficed for the rent of the office, new matters were constantly cropping up. Such were the Indigo planting controversy in 1861, and the Lancashire cotton famine of the three following years, which gave a renewed and redoubled importance to the culture of that great staple in India, and to every cause aiding or impeding its careful preparation and transmission to this country. Many of the old topics of 1853, such as the tenure of land, irrigation and communications, were brought forward once more, and pressed on public attention. In connection with these discussions, and with other appeals of a more local and personal character, Mr. Dickinson was entreated not to give up the local habitation and the name of 'India Reform', and from time to time funds were supplied which sufficed to clear off arrears, and to

pay special expenses. The Society, besides being the only known and visible rallying-point for Indian reformers in general, was for Mr. Dickinson himself the only attainable coign of vantage whence to carry on those inquiries and researches, which he followed with at least as much enthusiasm, and with a spirit, to say the least, as generous, as others take up sport, art, or physical science. But among those—and they were not a few—who called his devotion to Indian affairs a craze rather than a hobby, was his father. Old Mr. Dickinson could not, for a long time, understand it at all. His original dislike was gradually very much modified, particularly when he found that Mr. Bright, with whose personal acquaintance he was honoured, and another valued friend, Mr. J. B. Smith, for many years M.P. for Stockport, highly appreciated his son's exertions, and approved the course he had adopted. It was not, however, until about 1864, when John Dickinson had almost brought the Dhar case to a successful conclusion, that the old gentleman manifested any real interest in his only son's pursuits. He never, in truth, quite forgave that son for neglecting and avoiding the great business built up by his father, to which he would owe his future position, and of which he would reap by far the greater share of benefit. Always liberal in money matters, and remarkably so on the occasion of his son's marriage, old Mr. Dickinson would never make any special grant for the advancement of what seemed to him unprofitable and unpractical operations, and absolutely set his face against his son being a candidate for Parliament.

The proceedings of the India Reform Society languished very much after 1859. Almost the last meeting attended by any noticeable number of members was in the spring of 1861, for the purpose of considering the subjects in dispute between the indigo-planting community of Bengal and their mercantile supporters on the one side, and the Government and agricultural population of Bengal on the other. On this occasion Mr. Bright, referring to other heavy demands on his time and attention, and making a very handsome acknowledgment of the Honorary Secretary's efforts and sacrifices, resigned the Chairmanship and proposed Mr. Dickinson as his successor, which was carried by a unanimous vote. It was, in a great measure, from his investigations into this embittered controversy, in which he took part in defence of the Bengal Government, by publishing a "Reply to the Indigo Planters' pamphlet, 'Brahmins and Pariahs,'"* that Mr. Dickinson lost hope in either the social progress of the people, or the stability of British rule, being promoted by the enterprise of European adventurers in India. He soon realised the fact that none of them were what they are so often called, "settlers",—that the colonisation of India by Europeans is im-

* P. S. King, 34, Parliament Street, 1861.

possible,—that there never has been, and never can be, any but a fluctuating incursion of planters and produce-brokers, which brings in a sufficient number of the dominant race, irresponsible and uncontrollable, among the countless millions of the indigenous population, to be irritating and offensive under ordinary circumstances, and an additional embarrassment in troublous times. They were entitled to free access and complete protection, but not, he thought, to any undue encouragement or peculiar privileges. An influential class, quite able to make itself heard, having no permanent stake in the country, and no object but that of making money and taking it away as soon as possible, which was always asking for a coercive contract law in its own favour, and a tariff, both in England and India, nicely adapted to its own transactions, could get no hold over his sympathies. And yet he knew intimately, and highly respected some of the best men among them, and understood thoroughly their fair demands and all their genuine difficulties.

Mr. Dickinson published in 1861 a pamphlet on “The Famine in the North-West Provinces of India”,* recommending as the best means of preventing the recurrence of such a calamity, the construction of irrigation works and good roads, and a permanent settlement of the land revenue, a measure which, he believed, would bring to light a great deal of hoarded capital. He urged also that we should “renounce our exclusive claim to ‘think for the Natives’, and that we should admit them to a leading share in the civil administration of their own country, for which”, he added, “they are so well qualified that we cannot conduct it successfully without them”. He lived to see the Supreme and Sudder Courts amalgamated, and Native Judges promoted to the highest judicial bench; to see distinguished Natives placed in the Legislative Councils, and the Covenanted Civil Service opened, at least by law and in prospect, to Natives of approved ability. But although he rejoiced at this partial realisation of the just and liberal measures he had so long advocated, it came too late to alter the views he had in the meanwhile adopted as to what the ultimate aim of our policy ought to be. He had learned much, and thought much, since he first put his hand to the plough. He found it progressively more difficult, in the face of the ever-growing taxation and expenditure, the regularly recurring deficits, and the very slightly mitigated contemptuousness towards the people of our administration, to believe in its perfectibility. He was thus drawn more and more towards the policy of reorganising Native States as the best means for strengthening the good points of British domination, for curing its inevitable weaknesses, for converting an evidently transient system of provoking partiality into one of defined and equitable obligations, with every prospect of permanence. In that

* P. S. King, Parliament Street.

way alone could self-government and self-respect be restored to India without impairing Imperial supremacy, and some check be put on the intolerable drain of tribute, called 'Home Charges', now amounting to one-third of the gross revenue. Imperial supremacy, in his opinion, would not be impaired, but exalted and reinforced, by the extension of local independence. There would be a visible imposition and acceptance of responsibility for peace and good order; and the dignity and authority of those upon whom responsibility was imposed and by whom it was accepted, would ensure its efficaciousness.

It was not all at once that Mr. Dickinson arrived at these conclusions. He clung for a long time to the common inconsistent hope that British rule might be made more efficient, more economical, and more acceptable to the Natives, while the protected States were treated with scrupulous good faith and encouraged to reform their administration by the good example set in our Provinces. It was only by degrees he came to see that even the most liberal school of ordinary Indian administrators were intent, with revived and renewed self-complacency, on the conservation of international conditions that were indefensible unless avowedly transitional. He came to see that history and political science alike, negative the possibility of the permanent subjection of a vast and populous continent to the direct and centralised rule of a dominant race from afar, represented only by an army of occupation and an ever-changing body of professional functionaries. Any scheme for perpetuating such costly relations of pupilage and tutelage can only commence with contempt, and must end in conflict. The work of government in our hands is declining, rather than rising, in efficiency and general repute, absolutely in some degree, but still more relatively, or with reference to the keener perceptions and more advanced capabilities of our political pupil. We should be proud, rather than jealous or apprehensive, of these results of our teaching and example. We ought not to be blind to the moral and intellectual growth that calls for a relaxation of discipline. The pupilage of a community, like that of a person, is essentially a state of transition. If we neglect or refuse to prepare for the inevitable change, a bloody convulsion will take us unprepared. If the change is not begun in due time, and by us, it will be made out of due time, without us and against us.

Those whose eyes are not blinded by prejudice and self-interest may see that the due time is near at hand, may clearly perceive the premonitory symptoms of a great and growing change. In India we are not strong in social influence, and both our bad public policy and our better private morals during the last thirty years, have weakened such as there was, both upwards and downwards. Lord Dalhousie's bad policy of confiscation and resumption,—his long raid among the tall poppies, adding nothing to our crop, making the fields less gay, and

engendering poisonous weeds,—broke up many bonds of union in high places that may never be completely restored. The better taste and better morality of our public servants,—more marked since the route through Egypt was opened,—have turned their hearts towards home and their own people, and have sundered and sullied those irregular ties with the tribes of the country that were once so prevalent.

Strange fatality of the task that has fallen to our lot among the people of India! The longer we are there, the less we like them. The longer we are there, the less they like us, and the more they learn to value their Princes and representative men. These are not passing and fortuitous phenomena. The great statesman who observes the first symptoms of a national reformation or revival, may be in time to moderate or manage it; the experienced administrator, with his petty scheme of suppression or compromise, will be either too soon or too late.

The administrative, judicial and educational principles, the political maxims and practice, introduced by us, have undoubtedly promoted the extinction of tribal feuds, of religious enmities and jealousies, the assimilation of provincial interests and pursuits, and have fostered all the germs of nationality scattered throughout India by the arms and influence of the Mahrattas while the Mogul Empire was falling to pieces.

Some of those very reforms of which we have the best reason to boast as worthy results of British domination in India, have not supplied or supplemented our want of direct social influence, while they have decidedly strengthened the hands of those who may be inclined to better our instruction by using it against us. Improved communications and liberated thought,—roads, railways, telegraphs, a free press, the right of petition and of public meeting,—facilitate the expansion and application in every quarter of those mighty elements of progress which fill tyrants and dunces with dread.

It has just been said, with reference to the administration of British provinces in India, that the longer we are there, the less we like the people, and the less they like us. History and the personal recollections of those best qualified to speak, will testify to the accuracy of this generalisation. But it is even more significant of the great and growing change, the turn of the tide that may yet be taken by a great statesman, before the flood comes,—that the more we see of the Native States, and the more we let them have their own way, the more we like them, the more they like us, and the more their way becomes ours. But if the turn of the tide is to be caught in time, an English statesman at the seat of Empire must grasp the helm himself with a firm hand, for help will be reluctantly and grudgingly given at the official metropolis of India. The Calcutta Secretariat, the quintessence of the Anglo-Indian Civil Service, is not unchangeable or contumacious, but there is in it a stronger element of permanence and continuity than

there is in Her Majesty's Ministry or in the Viceregal office. It cannot easily divest itself of its hierarchical pride and corporate interests, or of its personal and professional predilections. It is hampered, also, by its own practice and precedents, and committed by its own records. In loyal obedience to the mandates of the Crown, it has learned part of its lesson, but has never taken kindly to it. For instance, the Calcutta Foreign Office, with an eminent member of the Bengal Civil Service as Viceroy, struggled hard, to the last possible moment, against the Mysore succession of 1868 and the prospective restoration of the tributary State. Very tardy and indecisive have been the measures taken within the last ten years for so modifying the fabric of administration in Mysore as to render it suitable for transfer to a purely Native Government when the Prince attains his majority.

Seven years after the recognition of the present Maharajah as heir, and four years after his enthronement, the following strange disclosure slips out in the Mysore Administration Report for 1872-3 :—

“ All ranks of the public service are becoming more and more filled with educated young men, well acquainted with English. A knowledge of this language is more necessary now, owing to the more general distribution of European officers over the Province.”*

It is not, of course, against English education that any objection is to be raised, but against the reason that is so innocently given for a knowledge of the English language having become “ *more necessary*,”—a reason which seems to indicate that while the Rajah's minority is rapidly passing away, and in spite of the directions of Her Majesty's Government, more is thought of the convenience of the English officers, and of adapting the administration to their requirements, than of any “ effective preparations for the surrender of the State to Native rule under the most favourable and suitable conditions”.

Since 1872, and, it will be admitted, not a bit too soon, excellent principles have been laid down, and most liberal professions made, but very little has been done. Something has been done, but very little. Patronage has been stopped at the bottom of the list: for several years no new English Assistants have been appointed. But there are still upwards of eighty English officers employed under the Mysore Government, holding all the best places, and enjoying emoluments to the monstrous amount of £90,000 per annum, or one tenth of the gross revenue of the country. Even at the eleventh hour,—the Maharajah's minority having now little more than three years to run,—only two out of the eight districts have been placed in charge of Hindu officials; and notwithstanding the expression of a wish, almost amounting to an order, not one of the three Divisions has been given to a Native Commissioner.

* Paragraph 717 of *Mysore Administration Report for 1872-73* (Bangalore, 1874).

The excellent intentions expressed by Her Majesty's Government have been repeated by the successive Viceroys in Council, and Chief Commissioners of Mysore. Nor is there any justice in the suspicion, unfortunately prevalent among the Natives in a very ugly and injurious form, as to the sincerity of the local authorities. They know it is their duty to execute in detail the policy of Her Majesty's Government; they feel it must be carried out, and they honestly set about it by general remarks in a despatch or Administration Report. That is a great step in advance. It is a still greater step when, not without some sacrifice and disappointment, the stream of English officers has been cut off at the source, and the lower vacancies are filled up with Natives. But when the question arises of applying these general remarks to old officers actually in possession, a much greater space has to be traversed. Vested rights and social considerations block the way. When we are forced seriously to contemplate fulfilling an injunction, "*that no further time should be lost in beginning to withdraw the English Commission gradually but steadily; replacing its eliminated members in part, if not in whole, by carefully selected Native administrators*", that measure is found to mean the stoppage of promotion, perhaps the cutting short of a career, for many English gentlemen who have claims on the consideration of Government, with whom we are on terms of friendly intimacy, and who, in the words of the despatch we have been quoting, "have but little chance of being employed elsewhere". No wonder if there should be some dismay, some remonstrance, and some compunction when such a prospect is in view, and that "further time should be lost", rather than that there should be any indecent haste in "beginning to withdraw" or to "eliminate". No wonder that doubts should begin to arise as to "*the capacities of the Native officers*", and that the "*fear*" suggested from the Calcutta Foreign Office in 1876 that "*the Native element in Mysore itself is somewhat inefficient, while that attainable from neighbouring districts may perhaps be unpopular*", should be reciprocated in Mysore. And yet four years previously the Chief Commissioner of Mysore had said that "in these days of high education, no difficulty will ever be experienced in procuring the services of Native officers who are amply qualified to work any system, however elaborate, and however nearly approaching to a European model".* But then there is a great difference between a general observation and a practical example. A self-denying ordinance will seldom be enforced with alacrity, or without considerable pressure from outside and from above. English Chief Commissioners cannot feel any burning desire to "eliminate" their friends and brother officers from the Mysore Commission, to make room for Natives, however meritorious and however well qualified. Even with all the proposed alleviation of bonuses and additional pensions,

* *Mysore Administration Report*, 1872-3, page 2.

chargeable to the revenues of Mysore, the painful elimination of the present incumbents will hardly be effected in time, unless the Secretary of State intervenes with peremptory and precise instructions.

And yet, apart from the necessity of fulfilling pledges and manifesting good faith in this particular instance of Mysore, the policy of reinstating Native administration, for which that would form a pattern and a precedent, is the only true policy in the stage at which we have arrived, for promoting the stability of the Empire and the peaceful progress of India. We may render our Imperial Government popular: we can never make our direct administration popular. The divergence of feeling and interest between our people, official and non-official, and the Natives in our Provinces, is not an evil that tends to decrease or to cure itself. On the contrary, it has increased, is increasing, and must continue to increase, in proportion as the growing facilities of communication with Europe diminish the attractions of Indian service and enhance the charms of home. The superfine erudition of the Civil Servants under the competitive system does not seem to have made them, as a class, more considerate with regard to Indian creeds and customs, more mindful of the sacredness of human life, more capable of commanding popular esteem, or of caring for it, than their predecessors who came from Haileybury under the system of patronage.*

It can hardly be expected that the growing aversion to long residence in India, the yearning to get home as fast as possible, will be in the least mitigated or diminished when educated Natives are admitted, in rapidly increasing numbers, to the superior branches of the public service, hitherto reserved for Covenanted Civilians. That will certainly not accelerate the promotion, improve the prospects, or alleviate the discontent of any English official.

But, it may be said, although this measure may unfavourably affect a class of our countrymen, it will so conciliate and gratify the people of India as to render the great task of Government more easy. That flattering expectation is open to very considerable doubt. The admission of Natives to the higher official posts, except as part of a large plan of Imperial reconstruction, will not, in all probability, strengthen, but will rather weaken, the hands of Government, and complicate the problem before it.

It is quite true that Natives educated in our colleges, seeking for our service or enrolled in it, are not a turbulent or fanatical class, and it is equally true that, as a general rule, and partly even by reason of their education and enlightenment, they cannot aid us in keeping such classes in order. They are not very often of the right breed to govern, and as a matter of fact they are, in manners, customs, and morals, governed by

* See *Papers, East India*, No. 173 and No. 265 of 1877, for two recent illustrative cases.

the same laws and the same lawgivers as their more ignorant countrymen. They can never wrest social influence, in our favour or in their own, from the hands of the Princes, the Chieftains, the old families possessing titles, property, and traditional fame. Educated Native officials cannot form an effective bond of connection between the British Government and the people of India. They are not sympathetic with us so much as antipathetic to the masses. In popular estimation, and partly in their own, they have loosened their root in the soil, and have become parasites in our hot-house. If any notion anywhere prevails, that the educated Natives in British India form a popular or influential class, it may be confidently pronounced to be very ill-founded. The very reverse was found to be the case during the mutinies and rebellion of 1857. English-speaking Natives, and those who were supposed to have English tastes and sympathies, were looked upon as renegades and spies, and were hunted out almost as remorselessly as if they had been Europeans. In the event of a really formidable outbreak, such persons, especially if they came forward and endeavoured to stem the tide, would be swept away in the first riot. A single messenger from a Nawab or a Rajah would have more influence for good over a fanatical mob than a grand procession of all the Deputy Collectors and University graduates that could be induced to risk their lives or their limbs in defence of British law and Imperial order.

There is another point of view from which this subject may be considered. Educated Natives are certainly not at present a turbulent or aggressive class, but it does not follow that their open competition with English officials on something like equal terms, will make them more submissive, or will raise the reputation and heighten the dignity of those with whom they compete. The more Natives are employed in the higher posts, the more conspicuous will be the administrative superiority of some among them over the average of their English co-peers,—already sufficiently conspicuous in judicial business,—the less will they be content with anything but a perfect equality of standing and preferment. Then, whether their claims are recognised or resisted, interminable jealousies and antagonisms will ensue, and the difficulty will present itself, that English gentlemen will not serve amicably and harmoniously, except in rare instances, in subordination to Native seniors. The incompatibility of interests, tastes, and manners will become more bitter on both sides.

In the following passage of his speech on the Governor-General of India Bill in the House of Lords on the 11th of March 1869, the Marquis of Salisbury, referring to “the difficult problem of taking Natives into the higher branches of Government employ”, seems to have manifested considerable insight into the embarrassments before us, and into the only possible remedy for them :—

"The great difficulty would be to avoid jealousy between the European and Native Civil servants. He believed that the true way of admitting Natives to a participation in the Government would be to maintain the Native Sovereignities which are at present protected in India."

"Yes!" it has been said elsewhere, in words which Mr. Dickinson cordially accepted, "the true way of admitting Natives to a participation in the Government of India", would be "to maintain, to restore, to consolidate, and to enlarge the Native Sovereignities. The essential problem of Indian statesmanship is how to reconcile self-government for India with Imperial supremacy for Great Britain. The true solution is that the more we concede the former, the more we confirm the latter."

Mr. Dickinson gave much consideration to this question of enlarging the Native States by territorial assignments, in connection with the strange and portentous aspect, as it seemed to him, of the Indian Debt. Including the guaranteed capital of railways, it now amounts to considerably more than two hundred millions, and the annual interest to more than ten millions sterling. It is like no other Public Debt that has ever existed. It behoves the statesmen and the taxpayers of the United Kingdom to reflect most seriously on their own contingent risk with reference to all Indian securities. The first peculiarity in the condition of these securities, as compared with those of British Colonies or of solvent European and American States, is that they are not in Native hands, but in the hands of English capitalists. Only a fraction, a fluctuating and a decreasing fraction, is held by Natives, rather for purposes of speculation than of investment.

A large proportion of the Public Debt of Australia, Canada, France, and the United States is held by their own citizens, forming an influential class upon whom repudiation would inflict great loss or total ruin. But the Native holders of Indian Debt are so few in number as not to constitute a class at all. Thus, instead of the Debt of India being really National, and constituting a bond of mutual obligation and confidence between the Indian Government and the most powerful classes of the country in whose name it is borrowed, it is only a bond of mutual obligation between the British Government and a certain class of British investors. For undoubtedly it is to the British Government that investors look as the ultimate foundation of their security, and not to the population of India. Successive Secretaries of State have, it is true, protested that this country will not guarantee, either in a strictly legal or in a loose commercial sense, the payment of principal or interest of Indian Debt. They say that the creditors of the Indian Government have no more claim on the British Exchequer than the unguaranteed creditors of a British Colony or of a foreign State. But it seems doubtful whether such a claim can be so summarily dismissed. Canadian and

Australian loans were raised under laws passed by local representative bodies, in which the Colonial revenues and resources are pledged to the payment, the Home Government not interfering at any stage to sanction or confirm. The Indian Debt has been created, without the consent or approval of any Indian Sovereign, or of any Indian representative body, or of any single Native Councillor, partly by the absolute fiat of an Executive appointed by the British Government and all of whose acts were subject to the approval of a Cabinet Minister, latterly under special rules and conditions prescribed by the British Legislature, the Indian Government being forbidden to borrow in the London market without an Act of Parliament. It is not very wonderful if unwary investors have come to look upon the commands of the Crown, under which Indian wars have been carried on,—for example, the Afghan War,—and the Acts of the Legislature, under which Indian loans to pay for those wars have been contracted, as coming very near to a British guaranty.

To the following sketch and outline of an Imperial policy Mr. Dickinson gave his cordial assent :—

“The only practicable measure on a large scale for the financial relief of the Paramount Power in India, and for the moral release of the Imperial Government, is that of reducing our civil and military establishments, contracting the territories under our direct administration, and promoting self-government by the enlargement of Native States. The burden cannot be shaken off,—it must be shifted. And this is the only way to do it. We cannot, as in France, tap the hoards of the middle class,—they can employ their money to greater advantage in their own occupations, and obtain much larger interest in their own neighbourhood. But we can tap the hoards and forestall the savings of Native Princes by the legitimate and irresistible temptation of territorial and political aggrandisement.

“And thereby we can dispel prejudices and enforce reform, improve our military position while diminishing the number of British troops, and establish a most powerful conservative interest in every State, each balanced against each, incapable of combination, but separately connected with the Paramount Power by precise ties of allegiance and service. The Indian Empire would become a living organism instead of being a mechanism. The Statesman and the Viceroy would then have some scope for Government, instead of wasting their energies on the incessant fuss and fidget of extravagant and inappropriate administration.

“To reconcile the just and growing demands of educated and experienced Natives with the very natural claims and expectations of our ‘Services’, is an insolvable problem. It is useless to strive after a hybrid and insincere amalgamation. Any compromise must of necessity be unstable and untenable. We have to choose between the coercive centralisation of a continent, or the local self-government of nations and languages. The choice lies before us,—to move steadily and deliberately towards a future of freedom and progress, or to drift blindly along towards a future of animosity and confusion.”

The incompatibility of interests, tastes, manners, and habits between English and Native gentlemen, which perplexes their relations in the British Provinces of India, becomes very much modified and softened, and tends to disappear, under the circumstances in which the two races are brought in contact within the Native States. If Europeans are in the service of an Indian Prince,—which can only occur under Imperial sanction,—they cannot decline subordination to their employers; and those to whom they have to report, or whose orders they have to receive, are persons of rank and station having no counterpart among the Native officials of the British Government. It must be remembered also that the Princes and Chieftains having great political and social influence, the Brahmins and other classes learned in popular lore and revered on religious grounds, are themselves by no means debarred for ever from the advantages of European learning and science. As a matter of fact old prejudices, both in British Provinces and in Native States, are yielding to the surrounding pressure, and Western education is spreading, though slowly, among the real governing classes. The number of well-educated and English-speaking Princes and Ministers is perceptibly increasing, and there is a growing demand in the Native States for the services of graduates of our Indian Universities.

And the Imperial supremacy of the British Crown being now firmly established, and, if not precisely defined, unequivocally acknowledged, there seems no reason why the employment of Englishmen in the service of Native States should not be more freely permitted. At present the number so employed is hardly appreciable. Communication is now so rapid and certain, and intelligence might be so perfected by the judicious association of Natives of high standing in our "Political" agencies, that the possibility of any complication or abuse ought to be very small, and correction very easy. Those who denounce the excessive multiplication of offices for English gentlemen in the British Provinces, are not likely to suggest their introduction into the Native Principalities in excessive numbers, or on a permanent footing. In some cases their services would be wanted for the organisation or guidance of some special or technical department; in others their engagement would be conditionally imposed, or strongly urged, for the supervision of recent reforms. But the duties of anyone nominated by the Imperial Government should be—with rare exceptions—those of some high post of direction or superintendence, and should be avowedly temporary, until a qualified Native can be entertained or trained for the place. The means might here be found of effecting the gradual and gentle reduction of such a body of officers as the Mysore Commission, or the English establishment of any Province transferred to feudatory administration, without any hardship or loss falling upon the most distinguished and deserving, and without valuable experience being prematurely lost to the Empire.

As to the British officers in Imperial employ, their representative position secures, and always will secure for them due deference and respect, and a commanding influence at every Native Court, while their exemption from executive duties and from any direct responsibility for administrative details, preserves them almost entirely from the provocations and irritations of concurrent authority and common functions. As it is, in spite of a certain unaccommodating tone and temper too often characterising the work produced and inspired by the Calcutta Secretariat, the relations between the officers of our Political Department and the Indian Princes and Ministers are on a far more satisfactory footing than those between any class of our countrymen and any class of Natives, official or non-official, in the British Provinces of India,—more friendly, more frank, and more confidential. Those relations would soon become all that could be wished, if constitutional forms replaced the arbitrary, capricious, and aimless dealings of our local authorities with the protected States. The intentions and instructions of the Home Government are fair enough, if somewhat vague, but in the process of passing through the filtering paper of Calcutta, they are often so diluted as to lose both savour and consistency. Her Majesty's Ministers and Parliament have no direct knowledge of the Indian States, and, therefore, with some faith and much charity, they lack hope. The Vice-regal Government has very little faith, and, therefore, both hope and charity are very deficient, and the knowledge that is close at hand is despised. Both in the general question of the rights, qualities, and capabilities of the Indian Princes and their States, and in several particular instances,—notably those of Dhar and Mysore,—the imperfect knowledge of the Home Government, arising out of the erroneous information and the perverse delays of official Calcutta, was corrected by the officious action of Mr. Dickinson and his friends.

It must be remembered that besides putting forward the fallacious recommendations in favour of annexation that it would add to "the resources of the public treasury, and consolidate our military strength", the rival policy of undertaking the reform of Native States was declared by Lord Dalhousie to be at once impolitic and impracticable. This rejection of reform was elevated by Lord Dalhousie into a sort of principle, and was made applicable by him to every case of a Native State that seemed to provoke interference, or to lie at his mercy. One of his avowed reasons for deciding to annex the Punjaub, after the rebellion of 1849, instead of continuing to give the promised "aid and assistance in the administration of the Lahore State during the minority of the Maharajah Dhuleep Sing",* was that "*we should have all the labour, all the anxiety, all the responsibility, which would attach to the territories if they*

* *Collection of Treaties*, Calcutta, 1864, vol. ii, p. 267.

were actually made our own ; while we should not reap the corresponding benefits of increase of revenue, and acknowledged possession".*

In the same manner he recommended the annexation of the Rajpoot State of Kerowlee by refusing to recognise an adoption, because we should otherwise "*for many years to come have to bear the labour of governing this State, employing, always at inconvenience, a British officer for the purpose*", and at the end of the young Prince's minority have to "*hand over the country with its revenue of four lacks of rupees*".†

And when in 1851 he was urged by General J. S. Fraser, the able and accomplished Resident at Hyderabad, with all the weight of many years' experience in that important post, to undertake effectual measures for reforming the administration of the Nizam's Dominions, Lord Dalhousie recorded his entire disapproval of the Resident's policy. "If", he said, "*provision be made for carrying it actively and practically into operation, all the toil of a laborious task, and all its real responsibility, must ever fall on the British Agent, by whom the Native ministry is controlled. The Agent, on his part, while he reaps no advantage from his labours for his own State, must feel himself to be without undivided authority*."‡

During the first six years of Lord Dalhousie's vice-royalty, the two successive Residents at Lucknow, Colonel Richmond and Colonel (afterwards General Sir William) Sleeman, looked in vain to Calcutta for guidance and support in carrying out projects of reform in Oude, although both of them expressed great confidence in the docility of the local dignitaries.

Sir William Sleeman incessantly urged decisive action, at first recommending that all the authority and influence of the British Government should be used to promote the formation of a strong Native administration ; and latterly advising that the Treaty of 1837 should be openly enforced. During the year 1849 he forwarded his plan for a Board of Regency, undertook to direct and superintend their operations with one additional Assistant and three clerks, and pledged his great reputation for the success of the experiment.§ But Lord Dalhousie did not wish to reform Oude ; it was his special policy to annex it. Reform, whether enforced by the Treaty of 1801 or that of 1837, whether carried out by the Resident and his Assistants with a Native agency, or by a larger number of British officers, would have spoiled every chance of annexing Oude. Therefore the Treaty of 1837 was repudiated ; therefore Sir William Sleeman's proposals were coldly and silently received. Oude was absorbed by Lord Dalhousie, on the pretext of disorders in its

* *Punjab Papers*, 1849, p. 663.

† *Papers, Kerowlee*, 1855, p. 9.

‡ *Papers, The Nizam*, 1854, p. 38.

§ *Sleeman's Journey through Oude*, vol. i, pp. lviii, lxiv, lxxvi.

government, which were all removable, and which might have been easily remedied without annexation, if there had been any wish to preserve the separate existence of that friendly and faithful State. But there was no such wish. The school of Lord Dalhousie did not want to give assistance, they wanted to take possession; they conscientiously disbelieved in the efficacy of Native efforts, and looked upon partial innovations as mere waste of time, delaying the harvest of patronage and deteriorating the crop. According to them, "to supplant the British government of any Province by the best Native government that ever yet existed, is in one moment to abolish law, and establish arbitrary power in its place."* They could not, or would not, see that a judiciously reformed Indian State would have a better Native Government than had "ever yet existed"; that under temporary British management—as an extreme measure—law would be firmly established, instead of being abolished, and arbitrary power might be limited. Every specious and plausible phrase was used to prove that temporary management was impracticable and absurd. Native Government was "hopelessly incorrigible", and, if ever "set aside for its incorrigible worthlessness" by the Paramount Power, British administration must never be "supplanted".†

It is a very remarkable fact that the party in the ascendant from 1848 to 1857, which advocated annexation and deprecated reform, took every occasion of reducing the hereditary dominion of Indian Princes to a mere personality, by upholding the autocracy of the reigning Sovereign for all purposes of destruction and mischief as absolute and indefeasible, while the permanence of a dynasty and the corporate character of a State were always overlooked or set at naught. They said of the Indian Princes, as the Pope said of the Jesuits, "*Sint ut sunt, aut non sint.*" A Maharajah must be a despot or nothing. In their eyes no being could be so despicable as a constitutional Sovereign, no rule so absurd as a limited monarchy. An Indian Prince, who had submitted to the introduction of European principles into his administration, would be "held in leading strings", would become "a mere puppet in the hands of the British Government",‡ a result evidently disastrous.

On the other hand, if a Prince were incompetent or contumacious, he might rightfully be deposed, and his Principality confiscated, and converted into a British Province. And a reigning Sovereign, in his minority, or his dotage, or in a state of imbecility, might with perfect propriety, and with binding force over his family and State, be intimidated or persuaded into ceding or bequeathing his possessions to the Honourable East India Company. Whatever their ultimate object or intention may have been, the advocates of annexation have ever, in their

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 211.

† *Oude Papers*, 1856, p. 210.

‡ *Mysore Papers*, 1866, p. 84.

policy towards the Native States, avoided reform, and maintained personal rule ; while those who opposed annexation invariably worked for administrative reform, and for the limitation of princely prerogative. These divergent aims afford a fair criterion, not merely of the comparative sincerity and straightforwardness, but of the comparative enlightenment of these two rival policies.

Of late, unquestionably, wiser counsels have prevailed at Calcutta, for which credit must be largely claimed for the restraining and instructing influence of the Home Government, urged and informed by the corrective action of Mr. Dickinson and his friends. Several States that had fallen into great disorder have been reorganised, and brought into a condition of administrative discipline and financial prosperity by the fostering care of the Vice-regal Government, without the expensive and embarrassing burden of numerous English officers being imposed in any one case,—the most notable instances, perhaps, being those of Bhawalpore, still under the admirable management of Colonel Charles Cherry Minchin, and Bhurtpore under Major Charles Kenneth Walter.* The important State of Baroda, since the deposition of Mulhar Rao Gaekwar, has been placed under the charge of Sir T. Madhava Rao, and although the British Resident has the duty of supervision, no English officer takes any part in the direct administration of the State.

Although some slight scepticism still occasionally manifests itself in the official papers of Calcutta, as to the inherent capacity of political improvement, and as to the possible wealth and well-being of the inhabitants, in an Indian State, the scribes and councillors of the Vice-regal Government would no longer venture to declare Native maladministration to be "inevitable" or "hopelessly incorrigible". Impelled by the loyal desire to attain, or at least to attempt, the objects indicated as desirable by Her Majesty's Government, they have made decided progress, and are more tolerant, more willing to help, more considerate in style and in procedure than they were in 1864, when Mr. Dickinson was fully committed to the defence of the little State of Dhar, which was saved, mainly by his exertions, first from a sentence of utter extinction, and afterwards from an indefinite period of sequestration. From 1861 to 1867, when the projected absorption of Mysore was finally negatived by Her Majesty's Government, there was a decided reaction at Calcutta in favour of the acquisitive policy that seemed for a time to have been discredited and discarded. The old arguments began to reappear, denouncing Native rule, and exalting British management. In a despatch of May 1865, the Viceregal Government, under Lord Lawrence, when insisting on the annexation of Mysore, pronounced that the only "radical cure" of misrule in a Native State was to be found in "the employment of European agency"; that "efficient action through the

* Now Resident at Joudpoor.

Maharajah and his Native functionaries", never had been, and was not now, "feasible"; and that any such "experiment" would have been, and would be, "as futile as pernicious".*

Against this threatened revival of the acquisitive policy Mr. Dickinson set his face, and with chivalrous determination and unwearied persistency fought against it, until in two remarkable contests, those of Dhar and Mysore, the forces of reaction were completely defeated.

The Dhar controversy is fully set forth in Mr. Dickinson's "Dhar Not Restored", published in 1864, and "A Sequel to Dhar Not Restored", in 1865.† And a very sufficient explanation of its course and consequences, and of its bearings on the still more important case, as it was considered by him, of his friend and correspondent of many years, the Maharajah Holkar of Indore, being included in the "Last Counsels" of this volume, little more need be said about it here.

It was in connection with this Dhar question, already complicated by much personal feeling, false pride, and prejudice, that Mr. Dickinson's officious action first became known at Calcutta. Great irritation was roused, and much indignation manifested in official circles at the discovery of this new factor in the affairs of India, this bold intruder into the sacred arcana of the Secret and Political Department. The indignation soon found vent through several Indian journals which had been nursed into success, and were then thriving, on contributions and information received from official sources. Mr. Dickinson was freely denounced as a needy and corrupt adventurer; and although the abuse was not even founded on rumour, but was random guess-work, it was probably by no means insincere. The notion they had formed of what such a troublesome person as Mr. Dickinson must be, seemed to all dwellers in the little Anglo-Indian world of Calcutta to be self-evident. They could not believe in anyone devoting himself to Indian affairs except for money. Mr. Dickinson sent the following letter in reply to one of these attacks.

To the Editor of the "Friend of India."

SIR,—An article from your paper, dated June 30th, has been forwarded to me this day, in which I am positively and distinctly charged with having "let out myself and my pen", having "written a book on Dhar for a pecuniary consideration", and having "received a fee to look only at my employer's side of the question".

I shall not condescend to exchange personalities with you, but I require you to publish my declaration that there is not a word of truth in the above statements.

There is no foundation for them in the fact (even if you knew it) that a forthcoming testimonial has been announced to me since I made known

* *Mysore Papers* (112 of 1866), pp. 58, 59.

† P. S. King, Parliament Street.

my intention last year to give up the India Reform question and to close my office.

On that occasion I was so urgently requested to keep the office open a little longer by some private friends, who undertook to defray its expenses, that I consented to do so. But I have never yet received any salary, or written for a fee. On the contrary, I have repeatedly refused requests to write for pay, as many gentlemen know.

You also accuse me of "forgetting my nationality", and "laying aside my independence".

I do not know to what you allude in the first charge, but as I have been often complimented by English Statesmen, including several Cabinet Ministers, on the public benefits which have resulted from my labours in the field of India Reform, I can bear to be charged by you, Sir, with "hatred to my country".

Finally, you say I "cannot be independent". The truth is, Sir, that few men could have afforded, like myself, to devote the best part of their lives to a political cause, and to work hard (as Mr. Bright and others can testify) for fifteen years together, without fee or reward; yet this is what I have done. And one of the reasons urged by the old Indian officer who induced me to take up the question in 1850, was that "being in no profession and heir to a good fortune, my *independent position* rendered me peculiarly fit to advocate reform in the Indian administration".

I remain, Sir, your humble servant,

JOHN DICKINSON, JUN.

12, Haymarket, Sept. 1st, 1864.

Copies of the same letter were sent to the principal journals of India, and the remarks on the subject which appeared in the *Hindu Patriot* are worth quoting, if only as a specimen of the excellent style introduced under the editorship of the lamented Harischandra Mookerjee into that paper, and which it still maintains, though written, as at the first, exclusively by Natives of Bengal.

"MR. DICKINSON AND THE 'FRIEND OF INDIA'.—We have been requested by Mr. Dickinson to publish the following letter, which he has addressed to the *Friend of India* in reference to certain serious animadversions of that journal, charging him as a political hireling for his recent publication, entitled 'Dhar not Restored'.

"We beg to assure Mr. Dickinson that he need not be sorry for what the *Friend* under the present management may choose to say about him. If we mistake not he is not a regular reader of the Serampore hebdomadal, for if he were, he would have doubtless perceived from a reference to the file of the paper for the last six months, that no person, however exalted his rank, unblemished his character, or high his attainments, is safe from the low ribaldry of what was once the leading journal in India.

"It was, therefore, not at all surprising that the *Friend* should call a devoted labourer in the cause of Indian reform like Mr. Dickinson, whose

abilities, zeal, and honesty of purpose had not been questioned even by his worst enemies, as a political mercenary, who writes for the sake of a fee, 'forgetting his nationality', and 'laying aside his independence'. The Serampore journalist only knows what he means when he accuses Mr. Dickinson of 'forgetting his nationality'. Does Mr. Dickinson forget his 'nationality' when he pleads the cause of the poor and the oppressed at the bar of the great English public, who after all are the ultimate arbiters of all Indian questions and disputes? Does he forget his 'nationality' because he considers himself a citizen of the world, and is full of sympathy for the oppressed nationalities of Asia? Does he forget his 'nationality' because he advocates even-handed justice, irrespective of distinctions of colour, creed, and country? Does he forget his 'nationality' because he denounces wrongs, because he calls for the reparation of such of those wrongs as still admit of amends?

"We who have watched with the interest of the millions, whose cause we advocate, the labours of the India Reform Society, of which Mr. Dickinson has been the guiding spirit, are in a position to say that if India has a friend in England, who has neither spared his purse nor his time to ameliorate her condition, it is he. It was he who collected the liberal Members of Parliament in that Indian congress to carry on political warfare in the interests of the down-trodden children of this country. It was he who supplied Bright and Cobden with valuable information regarding various perplexing questions of Indian politics, from which those gladiators of Parliamentary debate wrought the stunning speeches that have from time to time exercised such beneficent sway over the destinies of India. It was he whose unremitting labours brought a pressure on the counsels of the Indian Cabinet, that have now resulted in the adoption of many of those reforms and the abolition of many of those abuses which justified the establishment of the Society. To cast ungenerous aspersions on the distinguished labours of such a zealous worker in the cause of Indian Reform was quite unworthy of any honourable and well-informed journalist, but it is idle to expect anything like fair and generous criticism from the present occupant of the Serampore musnud."

It will be observed that with the exception of "the stunning speeches" of "those gladiators of Parliamentary debate", there is hardly a phrase or a word in this long passage to betray the hand of a Bengalee.

Similar invectives against Mr. Dickinson, combined with very feeble efforts at an apology for the dilatory action of the local authorities, appeared in a Calcutta daily paper, the *Englishman*, from the pen of a well-known literary Assistant in the Foreign Office. To one of these Mr. Dickinson replied, in a letter dated September the 10th, 1864, from which a few extracts may be given.

"To the Editor of the '*Englishman*'.

"SIR,—In the *Englishman* of the 7th of July last, you published a Review of my '*Dhar not Restored*', which has been reprinted in the form of a pamphlet, and extensively circulated both here and in India. The style of this

pamphlet is so offensively personal that I was not myself disposed to reply to it; but as my friends think a reply necessary, I request you to insert the following answer to your Review.

"You commence by assuming that I am either a 'hired advocate', or 'the tool of a well-known political officer'. The first assumption I have already denied in a letter to your worthy ally the *Friend of India*. With regard to the second, I beg to state that I never had the honour of meeting Sir Robert Hamilton, or communicating with him in any way, previous to the publication of my 'Dhar not Restored'."

After arguing the whole question at some length, he came to the particular form of obstruction then in actual use.

"You go on to say that 'the only point at issue is the alleged incapacity of the young Rajah'; and that on this point I oppose my opinion to the allegations of the Government of India.

"I will state presently what I consider 'the only point at issue'; meanwhile I submit that there is enough official or public evidence to justify my opinion, without adducing private testimony. First, we have evidence of the Rajah's mental capacity from two Residents of Indore, Sir Richmond Shakespeare and Sir Robert Hamilton, who both knew the young Prince well, and who agree that he is 'amiable, intelligent, and studious'. And in spite of your assumption, Sir, that he 'may be as weak and vicious as Mr. Wyndham', the young Rajah has never been accused or suspected of any vice by those who know him. So that the only 'incapacity' the Government of India can allege against the young Prince is that of delicate health; and it is a strange revolutionary doctrine, and one which may astonish our own royal family and every royal family in Europe and Asia, to assert that delicate health is a sufficient ground for forcibly setting aside an hereditary prince, and taking his government from him!

"But, Sir, the real question at issue is not the capacity of the young Rajah—there is, and there shall be, no doubt about that;—the real question—a vital one for the public in England as well as for the people of India—is: Shall the Government of that Empire be carried on according to the views of our Secretaries of State for India, expressed repeatedly in their place in Parliament, and sanctioned by the Legislature and the nation; or according to the personal feelings of a Secretary in India, guiding an irresponsible body of public servants, and influencing a Governor-General to thwart and deceive the Queen's Government? That is 'the only point at issue'; and now that it is fairly raised in this case of Dhar, I can trust our statesmen to decide it."

The Editor of the *Friend of India* was at this time operating on behalf of the Calcutta Foreign Office not only in his ordinary sphere, but also in the far more serviceable capacity of "Our Own Correspondent" to the *Times*. For several years the Sovereigns of nearly all the more considerable Native States, many of them excellent rulers, all of them exemplary as dependent allies, were exposed in turn to the insulting calumnies of the *Friend of India*, which received a publicity and a

weight denied to the utterances of any other Indian journal, by being paraphrased at short intervals in the columns of the *Times*.* It could not be expected that Mr. Dickinson should escape calumny at those hands. In consequence of one of these offensive paragraphs he wrote the following letter, which duly appeared in the *Times* of the 6th of January 1869:—

“*To the Editor of ‘The Times’.*”

SIR,—As a charge against me has been made for some years in India, which your Calcutta Correspondent has repeatedly alluded to as proved, and which, perhaps, many people believe to be proved, I hope you will allow me to answer it briefly in your columns. I am accused of having been feed to advocate the restoration of the Principality of Dhar, and of having received the sum of £10,000 from the Rajah as the price of my success. The truth is that I was not feed to advocate the above restoration, but undertook the task from public motives, and that the Rajah has never, directly or indirectly, offered me a single rupee, or the value of one. I feel bound to add that if the Rajah had offered me a sum of £10,000 (which it has been often and positively asserted that I have received), I should have accepted it without hesitation, feeling that never had barrister more fairly earned such a fee; for few barristers have the opportunity that I had of recovering for a Prince his territory and his personal independence, with a surplus of £40,000 in his treasury. Happily for me, I am independent of professional emoluments, and can afford to render some gratuitous service to my clients in India, who are of all ranks, from Princes to peasants.

“I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

“Jan. 5th, 1869.

“JOHN DICKINSON.”

The list of subscribers to the “testimonial” mentioned in the *Friend of India* letter, which was privately presented at the end of 1864, included, not exactly some of every class “from Prince to peasant”, but certainly some of almost every class from the Prince to the humble clerk in British employ; and nearly all of them were obliged to insist that their participation should be kept secret. The list was otherwise remarkable in the fact that while the names of several persons of opulence and distinction who had won undoubted benefits from Mr. Dickinson’s advocacy, were conspicuous by their absence,—the result, probably, of timidity and mistrust,—those who contributed most largely could have done so under no impulse but that of pure public spirit. This phenomenon was observable on some subsequent occasions.

Mr. Dickinson, except in the cardinal point of scrupulously keeping clear of debt, was by no means a careful economist, but his marriage, as already noticed, brought him to a sense of the unfair burden he had

* The *Times* appears to have detected this abuse of its vast influence. It has certainly been corrected for a long time.

hitherto been imposing on himself. The birth of a third son in 1863 called his attention to the duty, and the difficulty, of making an adequate provision for younger children. The testimonial of 1864 had barely repaid him what he had expended on Indian affairs in the previous ten years. He knew that the bulk of his father's property had been so settled as to leave him only a life interest, and he had good reason to believe, from symptoms of that heart-disease to which he eventually succumbed, that his own life was not likely to be a long one. He was willing to continue giving his time, his energies, and his influence, without remuneration or reward, to the cause of Indian reform and the redress of wrongs, but he determined no longer to give money; and in 1867 he made it clearly understood by his principal correspondents in India that those who were directly interested in the cases that were submitted to him, must supply such funds as he should consider necessary. One great object that he had in securing a proper attention to this rule was that he might be able to see that those among his coadjutors who, however strong their convictions, however urgent the call for their utterance, were unable to work without material support, should be compensated for their labours.

It was in 1864, just in the height of the struggle on behalf of Dhar, that I first made Mr. Dickinson's personal acquaintance. Having been confirmed in my earliest doubts as to the infallibility of Anglo-Indian officialism, and encouraged to raise another voice against it—even in the heyday of Lord Dalhousie's apparently brilliant career,—by his publication of 1853, “India Under a Bureaucracy”, I returned home with materials for my second volume on Indian politics, and with a letter of introduction to Mr. Dickinson from his friend Mr. J. B. Norton, then Advocate-General at Madras. I was very cordially received by Mr. Dickinson, and from that day to the day of his death we were drawn together very closely, both in common pursuits and in a friendly intimacy, which was strengthened by the warm affection that soon sprang up between his wife and mine.

A very short time after our first meeting I received the following note from Mr. Dickinson, accompanied by the book to which he refers :—

“Abbot's Hill, Hemel Hempstead,

“Sept. 17th, 1864.

“MY DEAR SIR,—I think it is the fashion of our philosophical age to set down every man who has a strong faith in religious principles as a ‘fanatic’, and to assume that such a man must be unfit for the practical business of life because his main motive is ‘fanaticism’, or what I should call ‘faith’. Now I feel it an honour to myself to be able to say that the late Joseph Sturge was a friend of mine, and that his biographer, Henry Richard,* is also

* Now M.P. for Merthyr Tydvil.

a friend of mine ; and, in my opinion, Joseph Sturge, though liable to error like other mortals, was about the most practical and sensible man I ever dealt with. Yet all his Quaker training could not conceal his burning enthusiasm. I say thus much to induce you to read the 'Memoirs of Joseph Sturge', which I send herewith ; and the reason I make this present to you, and to others who have tried to do good, is to encourage you to persevere, and to repress the impatience from which you suffer, by showing you how much one persevering man was able to accomplish, and yet how long and wearily he had to strive.

"We come up on Monday, barring accidents.

"Sincerely yours,

"JOHN DICKINSON."

From about 1866 or 1867, when the retrogressive destructiveness of officialism had received a signal check in the successive cases of Dhar and Mysore, Mr. Dickinson paid much less attention to questions of administrative reform in the British Provinces of India, than to the internal affairs of the principal Native States and their connection with the Imperial Government. His interest in this section of Indian politics and his conviction of its superlative importance, sprang directly from the peculiar and exclusive sources of information that were thrown open to him, and were progressively strengthened as his insight became more perfect. No person of his time, except, perhaps, the late Sir John Kaye, who occupied an official place, ever had official records and correspondence, even from the inmost recesses, so completely bared before him, as had Mr. Dickinson, who held no office and enjoyed no privileged position. On some remarkable occasions nothing seems to have been withheld from him. He had won confidence, respect, and sympathy in so many quarters, remote and near at hand, that for him there seems to have been no Secret Department. On the other hand, no official person can ever have established the same intimate, cordial, and confidential relations with an Indian Court and its notabilities, founded on a thorough belief in his indifference to all considerations but those of equity and prudence, as did Mr. Dickinson in several instances.

The influence and authority thus acquired were never exerted by him for any purposes inconsistent with the public good, with benevolence or with honourable dealing. He has repeatedly refused to give his aid or support, when he thought the object unjust, unimportant, or unattainable. If the Indian Political Department has ever been harassed by a frivolous and vexatious appeal, it has not been by the advice or with the countenance of Mr. Dickinson. His unseen hand much more often helped our officers than impeded them.

It would be a difficult problem,—even were the attempt becoming and fair—to apportion rightly between Mr. Dickinson on the one hand, and certain Princes and Ministers on the other, the credit due for the

institution of reforms in the administration of more than one Indian State. If some of the wise counsel, the detailed and practical instructions, the solemn warnings and the stern rebukes, contained in his correspondence on these matters, could with propriety be published, it would be manifest how large a share of honour on this account was due to Mr. Dickinson.

In the course of his experience of Indian "political" appeals, Mr. Dickinson became fully acquainted with the abuses and scandals caused by the absence of any juridical authority, any code of principles or procedure, for the guidance of the Calcutta Foreign Office and the Vice-regal Government in the interpretation of treaties, in settling matters of dispute with any of the protected States or the families of mediatised Princes, and in arranging the differences of two or more Durbars bound to abide by our arbitration. From the practice that had grown up of deciding all "political" cases in secret conclave, without reference to any jurist or law-officer, and frequently on *ex parte* statements, the most inconsistent and iniquitous decrees had been frequently passed, chiefly during Lord Dalhousie's incumbency, stuffed with legal terms, the very misuse of which is enough to expose the imperfect and perverted acquaintance of the writers with the International, Hindu, or Mussulman Law on which they professed to be relying. Lord Canning, in his Adoption Despatch of 1860, quoted one of Sir George Clerk's letters, declaring it to be his opinion "that it is the inconsistency, caprice, and mutability of our opinions regarding all great principles that is the bane of our supremacy in India". To this the Viceroy adds the following brief comment;—"I fear this is too true".

To judgments of this description, evincing an utter want of the judicial mind and method, apparently capricious and insincere, defiant of history, of existing contracts, and of innumerable precedents, it was impossible for the aggrieved parties to submit. Yet there was no tribunal before which they could be heard, and where they could be sure at least of ascertaining what adverse case had been set up against them. The only appeal open to them was to the Crown or to Parliament. And for such an appeal there was no recognised road, no authorised form of procedure, no decisive process. There was no certainty in any case, and in most cases very little chance, of a conclusive settlement, even if the great object of a motion and a debate in Parliament could be obtained. But before the appellant arrived,—if he ever did arrive,—by the close and costly vehicle called Parliamentary agency, at this comparatively open stage in his probably fruitless journey, he was pretty sure to have been misled for a season by false guides into some obscure path, and to have fallen among thieves. Before the licensed practitioner got hold of him, he became the prey of the quack, who bled him to depletion.

Yet all the discredit of the scandals inevitably arising from the want of a tribunal for hearing "political" appeals, was thrown by the Indian Government and its auxiliaries upon the unfortunate and bewildered appellants who suffered from that want, and who, because they had been deluded and plundered, were denounced as intriguers and corruptionists. Every possible occasion was also taken to cast obloquy and suspicion on those who upheld the cause of Indian Princes from conviction, and on grounds of Imperial policy, although all of them might not always be able to carry on expensive operations on behalf of their clients at their own charges.

Great pains were taken by Mr. Dickinson to enlighten Indian personages and political associations as to the sole conditions under which the advocacy or agitation of any claims or public measures in which they might be interested, could be pressed with good effect, and with any prospect of success, and to put them on their guard against unfounded pretensions. His efforts in this direction have, perhaps, rendered improbable in the future any such terrible misapplication of vast funds as the late Maharajah of Mysore had been induced to make in his ten years of importunity, before he consulted Mr. Dickinson.

In 1872 Mr. Dickinson wrote as follows to one of his most constant coadjutors :—

"I see you have again avowed yourself to be writing 'in the character of an advocate'. Will you pardon me for saying that I think this quite superfluous, and in fact a mistake, one of those faults in style and in the pleader's art which is condemned in the saying '*qui s'excuse s'accuse*'. Wait till you are attacked. I have sometimes regretted that I replied to the *Friend of India* and *The Englishman* in 1864, though they made specific assertions regarding me which were false. It is only people with a very weak case that abuse the plaintiff's attorney. No person of any weight, no man of mark, whether an opponent or not of our views, will think the better of you, or of the case you bring before him, because you candidly avow what is obvious enough ; or will think the worse of you, or of it, because he believes you to be paid for your labours. The cant of the officials at Calcutta, who are furious at their discomfiture, about 'disinterestedness', is not merely unfair, but stupid in the extreme. Are they unpaid ? Are they disinterested ? Of course a judge, or an executive officer, ought not to be paid by a suitor, or a petitioner, but why is not the advocate or petition-writer to be paid ? Only the opposite party or a partisan judge would object to it."

From about the beginning of the year 1870, although his interest in the general subject was not in the least abated, the growing demands of private affairs and the weakness of his health, prevented Mr. Dickinson taking up any new Indian question ; but he continued corresponding regularly with the Maharajah Holkar of Indore, for whom he had conceived a warm regard. His advice was eagerly sought and

freely given in all matters connected with the welfare and administration of the Indore State, and with the efforts made by the Maharajah to relieve himself from the unmerited stain on his reputation as a man and as a ruler from which he had suffered ever since 1857. That stain of dishonour was unjustly stamped on the brow of Holkar as the direct result of an error of judgment committed by Colonel (afterwards Sir Henry) Durand, who represented our Government at Indore during the mutiny and rebellion, and in order to clear that officer from all blame for that error of judgment. The stain was once more stamped upon Holkar's brow in 1870, in reply to one of his appeals; "and that stigma", said Mr. Dickinson in a note which now lies before me, "has been connected, very maladroitly, I think, by the Calcutta Foreign Office, with the refusal to Holkar of a territorial reward. The forfeit and the stigma cannot now be disunited".

Mr. Dickinson looked upon this as a typical and a critical case, one of far greater importance to the Empire than to the protected State and dynasty whose interests alone might seem at stake. He had always maintained that every act of injustice against a person so conspicuous and so much observed as an Indian Prince,—and still more, persistence in that injustice, in the face of demonstrative proof,—must weaken the moral authority of the Imperial Government. He thought the very worst possible pretext for such persistence was the common official reluctance to acknowledge official fallibility.

"I have always protested", said he on one occasion, "against the cry of 'Our country, right or wrong!' I cannot believe it to be patriotic or moral. Still less will I give in to the Anglo-Indian cry, expressed or understood, of 'Our Service, right or wrong!' It cannot be just, or wise, to prefer the professional credit of an English gentleman, when he was in the wrong, to the personal honour of an Indian Prince, when he was in the right."

But the case was even stronger than that. Not only was the Prince in the right, but we were deeply in his debt for the services rendered on the very day of his alleged misconduct. Not only was the honour of this Indian Prince to be offered up, but the reputations of a British Peer, of a British General, and of several British officers of distinction, were all to be sacrificed for this one object of saving the professional credit of another British officer, who had committed a manifest mistake. All this will be clearly explained in the "Last Counsels" of this volume.

Mr. Dickinson was deeply interested in the "Empress of India" Bill of 1876, and regretted the opposition offered to it by the Liberal press and the Liberal party in Parliament. His views as to this measure, and as to a want of "finish" and firmness by which its outlines as well as its details were left somewhat rough and undefined, will

be clearly understood in the following extracts from a letter which he addressed to the daily *Standard* :—

“Nobody now believes that the title of Empress was created for the Court objects stated by ‘the gossips’, but, assuming that the title was intended to promote some Indian policy, surely the Government might have given a more distinct explanation of that policy than they have yet done? It is very important that they should do so even now, for the new title vitally affects the rights of the most important Native Princes of India, and some if not all of them are feeling that it cuts at the root of that ‘independence’ guaranteed by their Treaties, and asking *sotto voce* whether they are to get any *quid pro quo*, when the new title proclaims their ‘dependence’ on the Imperial Crown, and establishes British supremacy over them *de jure*.

“I confess I have long wished to see this open assumption of Imperial domination (though a friend to the Native Princes, and fully aware of their misgivings) to inaugurate a new policy in our Eastern Empire. British supremacy having been established *de facto* in India ever since the Mahratta war of 1818, the nominal ‘independence’ guaranteed to Native Princes by their Treaties, has been for the last half century practically impossible, and progressively more anomalous and inconvenient; it has been a frequent source of bitter deception to the Chiefs, of suspicion and provocation to our Political Agents; it has left the Native Governments ‘Foreign Powers’ in the midst of British territory, and therefore incapable of having any tribunal to decide on their grievances; and has prevented their being looked upon as constituent Powers of the Empire, entrusted with specific duties.

“The authority claimed by the Queen’s new title, to dictate the policy of the Empire and to instil the principles of civilised Government, is so evidently for the interests of the people, that it ought to have been claimed long before; and if exercised in an honest spirit it will not only make our Imperial Government popular with the subjects of Native States, it will even be approved by the consciences of the Chiefs themselves (I speak from experience), especially as it will not affect their local executive authority in the least, if they do their duty. I may as well here mention an experience on this point. In the beginning of the year 1870 the late Lord Mayo told several of the Native Chiefs that ‘reforms must be introduced in their administration, either by their own free will, or by the interference of the Paramount Power’. On this one of them wrote to me that ‘as reforms must be made, he would not lose the credit of introducing them himself; but that as the determination of the British Government made it certain that they would be made universally by free will or by force, there could be no question about the good government of Native States in future, and no excuse for the British Government not giving territory to Native Princes for fear of maladministration’. This argument seemed to me perfectly logical at the time, but it is stronger than ever after the establishment of British supremacy *de jure*, by the Queen’s new title. I must add that, as a rule without exception, we have been signally successful in every sincere attempt we have made to reform a Native State; and while

the principles of Government we ought to insist upon are extremely few and simple, few Englishmen are aware what progress has been made already in introducing them by such Native statesmen as the Nawab Sir Salar Jung, Sir Madhava Rao, Rajah Sir Dinkur Rao, and others, whose names are not so well known."

"In this way only can we find an issue out of all the difficulties of our Indian Empire. We want to reduce our expenditure and *annual deficits*; we want to transfer a portion of our debt and secure the remainder; we want a Native army that is at once efficient and reliable; we want to have our principles of government accepted by the people of India: and it is only through the co-operation of their Chiefs and Ministers, often enlightened statesmen, that we can effect these objects, that we can hope to see institutions take root in India that will remain a monument of our glory.

"As we have abundance of territory in India which will never be anything but a danger and charge to us, we might transfer portions of it to the contiguous Native States, on condition of their accepting a portion of our debt, maintaining a quota of troops subject to Imperial inspection, and adopting our best principles of civil administration. The only real obstacle to such an Imperial policy is the constant pressure for promotion and patronage. In this case 'private suits do putrify the public good'. They must not prevail, for our present interests in India are almost incalculable, and our separation from India would degrade and ruin the British Empire."

The Maharajah Holkar himself, who was said, according both to official and private accounts, to have been brooding over his wrongs for years, and to have declared that he would never withdraw his protest until the stigma was removed from his name, could hardly have felt more strongly on that subject than Mr. Dickinson, who sometimes seemed quite possessed by it. Although his health declined rapidly after two heavy blows in 1872 and 1875, the death of his youngest son and of his devoted wife,* and he determined on giving up all attention to Indian affairs, new incidents were constantly occurring to revive his interest and redouble his indignation regarding this particular case. To the last of these he refers in a note dated the 10th of September 1876, only two months before his death.

"I am inclined to agree with you that the publication of the pamphlets by Travers and Durand may give us new hope of getting justice done to Holkar. I feel it puts me on vantage ground for which I have long been seeking. It enables me to come forward, privately or publicly, as I may think expedient, without consulting the people at Indore, and without its being possible to charge them with what the Politicals call 'agitation'. Verily the notions prevalent in some official circles as to what is fair and above-board, and even-handed, are somewhat peculiar. I dare say you remember my telling

* Alicia Martha, daughter of the late George Bicknell, Esq., of Cadogan Place, died June 19th, 1875.

you that some years ago one of the Agents threatened Holkar that if he persisted in giving trouble, some of the despatches regarding his case should be published, and that some people fancied the Agent seemed rather disappointed because the Maharajah made no objection. Would you believe, that having thus threatened the publication of something which, after all, they have not ventured to produce, they now go on the other tack, and threaten him with unimaginable terrors if he should presume to take advantage of an independent publication that happens to take his part? Kaye's vol. iii caused some sensation, of course, both at Indore and at Calcutta. No sooner had the volume reached Indore than the Agent solemnly warned one of Holkar's Ministers that if they appealed to Sir John Kaye's testimony as being adverse to that of Sir Henry Durand, they would incur the high displeasure of Government. Such intimidation would be incredible to anyone here who had not been as much behind the scenes as I have. The person addressed, however, was not exactly intimidated, for, with great presence of mind, he asked the Agent to give him the warning in writing, which was refused! It is too bad, but what is a Viceroy to do who has, perhaps, been a few months, or a year, in India, and who is overwhelmed with work? I can't blame Lord Mayo—who, if he had lived, would, I believe, have insisted on knowing the whole truth,—or Lord Northbrook. They call for the papers, and they get them, beautifully arranged, just as their predecessors got them, and with explanatory notes; and having no time to spare, they must take what they can get. It is not Her Majesty's Government, it is not the Viceroy, it is 'the Office', that keeps up the prejudice, and keeps back the proof of it, and threatens the victim if he brings it forward, having previously threatened to bring forward mysterious revelations against him, and then thought better of it. And I know these people so well. They are afraid of nothing so much as of being charged with 'agitation'. It matters not. I shall not wait much longer. I shall answer Travers and Durand, and Holkar shall have nothing to do with it."

On the 23rd of November 1876, Mr. Dickinson was found lying dead in the room which he used as a study at his house, 1, Upper Grosvenor Street. From his position death must have been instantaneous, and on the table near him were papers proving that almost at the moment of the fatal seizure he must have been engaged on the reply to Holkar's assailants occupying the following pages. That reply I have revised and arranged for publication.* No one, perhaps, could have gathered up the threads of his last work, and carried out his last wishes but one who, like myself, had been for a long time associated in the work to which his life was devoted, and who, like myself, shared his painful anxieties and convictions as to the course and consequences of our actual system of Indian administration, and as to the important principles of Imperial supremacy that are compromised in this particular case.

* He was, in fact, engaged on two statements, but only the reply to General Travers and Mr. H. M. Durand was to be published.

Mr. Dickinson was buried by the side of his wife and his youngest son in the graveyard of the little church of King's Langley, near the fine country house of Abbot's Hill, which will always be remembered by his friends, and his father's friends, as the scene of much graceful hospitality, and of many pleasant meetings with literary and musical celebrities.

He has left two sons, John, born October 24th, 1860, and Thomas Gordon, born February 18th, 1862.

A PROTEST AND A REJOINDER.

THE Maharajah Tookajee Rao Holkar, the reigning Prince of Indore in Central India, was born on the 3rd of May, 1835, installed in succession to his first cousin, the Maharajah Khunde Rao, on the 28th of June, 1844, and attained his majority in June, 1852, when he assumed the reins of government.

The following description of Holkar personally is abridged from a Memorandum furnished by his late Minister, Sir T. Madhava Rao, K.C.S.I., now at Baroda as Dewan to the Gaekwar :—

“He is remarkably energetic and industrious; regular and simple in his habits, and very frugal and careful in his expenses. He has developed the fiscal resources of his State so well that he is not only free from debt, but has always a surplus for internal improvements and State purposes. He has invariably been happy in his choice of public servants. His spontaneous engagement of Sir Madhava Rao for Dewan, and the generous confidence he placed in him, was a proof of his Highness's real desire for administrative progress, which has been steadily advancing in his State for years. Since he gave up Sir Madhava Rao's services to our Government, at the urgent request of the Governor-General, Lord Northbrook, he has appointed a relative of the late Minister, recommended by him, to carry on the reforms he had initiated. The Maharajah is zealous to promote agriculture, and pays especial and constant attention to irrigation works; he is well versed in the Marathi, Hindustani, Persian, and Sanscrit languages; he can also talk English, and likes to read English newspapers. He closely studies the policy pursued by the English Government, and has a sincere admiration for its power, while he thinks such men as Sir John Malcolm and Sir

Robert Hamilton were the best representatives of its justice and wisdom. His Highness is tall in stature, and robust in frame, and from his manly and commanding appearance would be at once distinguished in a crowd, though he generally dresses very plainly. He is an excellent rider, is fond of hunting, and a capital shot. He is happy in his domestic relations, exceedingly sociable by nature, and equally courteous to the higher classes, and kind and condescending to the lower.

"The Maharajah takes a great interest in the education of his two sons. The name of the eldest, born on the 11th of November, 1859, is Sivaji Rao Holkar; that of the second, born on the 17th of February, 1860, is Yeshwunt Rao Holkar. The young Princes are said to manifest much natural intelligence. They are learning English, besides the usual branches of an Indian education, in his Highness's principal school at Indore. They are of active habits, and take more exercise than has been usual with youths of their rank in India."

To this it may be added that the Maharajah has always evinced a marked appreciation of the advantages of popular education, in the lower as well as in the higher branches. The Political Agents have repeatedly described in their annual Reports the Madrisa, or College at Indore, under the direction of a Master from the Poona College, as a creditable institution, well maintained and well attended, and have stated that many of its pupils, "with an unusually good knowledge of English, and otherwise well educated", "occupy important posts in the service of the Maharajah Holkar".* The late Governor of Bombay, Sir Seymour Fitzgerald, speaking as Chancellor of the University, on the 12th of January, 1869, mentioned as "a great proof of the growing influence of the University, that among those who had lately matriculated two came from Indore, from the Madrisa founded by the Maharajah Holkar".† And in describing the Convocation of the next year, 1870, it was mentioned as a fact "very significant of the wide range of the University's influence that the first award of the Honourable Mr. Ellis's prize of books goes to a youth from the Madrisa of the Maharajah Holkar of Indore".‡ These students, the number of whom has somewhat increased lately, are supported at his Highness's expense during the prosecution of their studies for a degree.

* See *e. g.*, *Central India Report*, 1865-6, p. 8—since which period the College has been much improved.

† *Times of India*, 14th January, 1869. ‡ *Times of India*, 13th January, 1870.

Holkar's capital city of Indore has been embellished by him with many fine buildings, and is rapidly becoming a model town for sanitary arrangements and the supply of water. On the 11th of November, 1875, the Maharajah had the honour of entertaining at his capital the Viceroy of India, Lord Northbrook; and in a speech after the banquet on that occasion, his Excellency said:—"It was a pleasure to me, in passing through the city to-day, to observe the wide streets and the attention which has evidently been paid to their drainage."

The Maharajah has recently made an enlightened sacrifice of personal power by introducing trial by jury into the administration of both criminal and civil justice in his dominions.

The administration of Holkar's territories, too simple, too arbitrary, too rough and ready, perhaps, for our exalted notions, appears, on the whole, to be good. Taking the test by which our official statisticians would fain make out, if they could, the superior advantages of their elaborate system,—the test of immigration, which Lord Dalhousie ineffectually tried to wrest in his own favour, when he was constructing the indictment against Oude,*—the cultivating classes and petty traders who make up the bulk of the Indian population, seem to find something in Holkar's rule that is congenial to their tastes, or conducive to their interests. In a despatch which has been published, dated the 23rd of August, 1867, Mr. J. H. Morris, Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, observes:—

"There has been for some years an impending exchange of territory with Holkar, which will involve the transfer to the Indore Durbar of two or three Nimar pergunnahs. So far as our officers can judge, the people of those tracts feel no dislike at the prospect of re-transfer to Native rule."†

Nor does it appear that since the transfer the inhabitants have had any cause to regret it. On the contrary, the population of these districts, and, indeed, of other parts of Holkar's dominions, has lately increased by the arrival of immigrants from the adjacent British Provinces. The immigration has

* *Oude Papers*, 1856, pp. 44 to 50, and 179.

† *British and Native Administration*, p. 85.

not been in every year of great numerical importance, but in the year 1872 it reached the very perceptible number of upwards of 1200 persons, a fact which can hardly have escaped the Viceroy's notice, and was worthy of the attention of Her Majesty's Government. One consequence has been that the revenue of Holkar's new districts of Nimar has increased three-fold since it was transferred to him, chiefly from the cultivation of fresh land.

This immigration has been attributed partly to the easy terms on which Holkar grants farms on his wild and half-settled borders, partly to the growing encroachment on common and grazing lands under British regulations,* and partly to hardships inflicted by our complex judicial system, unduly favourable to the usurer and the rich litigant, and, consequently, oppressive to the needy landholder and to the poor.

But whatever the causes may be, the fact goes very far to prove that the extension of local self-government by assigning unprofitable British territory to reformed Indian States, would not be an unpopular measure.

The Maharajah Holkar has subscribed a million sterling for the construction of a railway through his dominions. He has established iron-works, in the English style and under European superintendence, at Burwai, and cotton-mills, with all the latest improvements, at Indore, as described in the following extract from the *Pioneer*, a weekly paper published at Allahabad :—

"The Maharajah Holkar's new mill, which has not been quite three years at work, and which contains 10,272 spindles and 224 looms, turned out in the first month of the present year about 35,000lbs. of yarn and 30,000lbs. of cloth; and the demand seems fully equal to the supply. As both the mills and the new railway required a large daily supply of fuel, and as the G. I. P. line was monopolising all the coal, there was a danger that the Indore woods would soon become unequal to the demand upon them. But Holkar, it seems, is equal to the occasion, for he has started a Forest Conservancy Department."†

It will thus be seen that the present Maharajah Holkar is a Prince far above the average of his class in education and enlightenment; far above the average in assiduous attention

* Appendix A.

† *Pioneer*, Thursday, April 6th, 1876.

to public business, and in the progressive character of his administration. He is intelligent enough to comprehend all the bearings of a public stigma, and sensitive enough to feel it most acutely.

If ever a protected Prince of India seemed to have been born under a fortunate star, and to have entered on the active duties of his high position under happy auspices, it must have been the Maharajah Holkar in 1852, at the close of his minority. Although descended from a common ancestor with the founder of the dynasty, and first cousin of his immediate predecessor, he had not by birth, according to Hindu law and custom, any inherent right of succession. On the early death of his kinsman, the Maharajah Khunde Rao, in February 1844, no member of the family occupied that undoubted place in the direct line of male descent which gives the right of inheritance without the process of adoption. A disputed succession ten years before had left one living pretender, previously rejected. Our Government very properly stepped in, to act as arbiter.

The young Prince, nine years of age in 1844, was enthroned with both a local and an Imperial title. He was nominated by our Government, after full consideration of all the facts as to his lineage, and as to the feelings of the family and Court ; and the selection was "unanimously approved" by the Regency and Ministers of State.*

From his installation to the last day of his minority, the Maharajah Tookajee Rao Holkar enjoyed the inestimable advantage of having only one Resident at his Court, empowered by the British Government to "exercise a general superintendence over the affairs of the State", and to direct his Highness's education. By a happy chance, very unusual amid the changeful course of Indian service, Sir Robert Hamilton continued to be Resident at Indore from 1844 to 1852, when the Maharajah attained his majority. Moreover, Sir Robert Hamilton remained watching over the early years of Holkar's

* *Papers, Succession of Sovereign Princes of India*, p. 94.

personal administration—with the higher official rank of Agent to the Governor-General in Central India,—until April 1857, when he obtained leave to go to England. Colonel (afterwards Major-General Sir Henry) Durand was appointed to officiate during his absence.

In that memorable month of April the first mutterings were heard of the insurrection of 1857. The mutiny of the Sepoys at Meerut on the 10th of May, and their occupation of Delhi on the 11th, occurred while Sir Robert Hamilton was on his way to England. The news of the terrible disasters at Cawnpore and Jhansi that quickly followed his arrival, must have effectually prevented his well-earned visit home from being a period of repose. When Central India became involved in the general conflagration, Sir Robert Hamilton decided on throwing up his leave and returning to his post. On the 16th of December 1857, he resumed charge of the Agency at Indore. In the meantime, in that interval of eight months, and by the mere change from one British Agent to another, the young Maharajah's personal reputation and interests had been blasted, and his life blighted for the following twenty years.

Within three months from Sir Robert Hamilton's departure the contagion of revolt reached Indore. The Bengal Sepoys at the adjacent cantonment of Mhow determined to cast in their lot with their mutinous brethren throughout Northern India; and on the 1st of July 1857, the plot exploded in an attack on the Residency, in which a party of Holkar's own troops were the chief actors. Colonel Durand, who had already manifested mistrust by rejecting the measures of precaution suggested by the young Maharajah, was now led by his mistrust into an utterly false movement. He made up his mind that the attack was instigated by his Highness, and would be followed up by further hostilities; and being compelled to quit the Residency at Indore, instead of retiring on the cantonment of Mhow, ten miles off, he went two hundred miles away, and denounced Holkar's "*treachery*" as "*of the true Mahratta stamp*", to the Governments of Bombay and India. And, entangled by this hasty mis-judgment, Colonel Durand, in spite of ample testimony in Holkar's favour, never

modified his verdict of "guilty" into anything but certain vague and yet most injurious imputations as to Holkar's Durbar and troops, which we shall prove to have been utterly inaccurate.

Never, perhaps, was there so striking an example of the almost absolute dependence of an Indian Prince's fame and fortunes, from day to day, on the goodwill and personal qualifications of the British representative for the time being residing at his capital. It is as certain as anything of the sort can be that if Sir Robert Hamilton had been at Indore during the crisis, he would not have left Holkar's dominions, or suspended intercourse with him for a day. He would have had no mistrust. Having lived for more than twelve years almost in a paternal relation towards the young Maharajah, Sir Robert Hamilton knew him to be surrounded by Ministers and chosen associates of English acquirements and fair general knowledge, and that he was quite free from turbulent or fanatical connections.

Sir Robert Hamilton would, therefore, have known the utter impossibility of Holkar's wavering, or inclining for one instant to any policy but that of supporting to the utmost the cause of the British Government. That was exactly what Holkar did; and no Prince in whose territories a mutiny broke out in 1857 was more prompt or more energetic in rendering assistance.

At the time, and in the best informed quarters, there was no lack of recognition of our obligations to Holkar. A remarkable article appeared in the *Quarterly Review* for July 1858, attributed to the Rt. Honble. A. H. Layard, now our Ambassador at Constantinople, who had lately returned from a tour through India, while the rebellion was at its height. In this occurred the following passages:—

"No one acquainted with the course of recent events will be inclined to doubt that we owe the maintenance of our rule in India to the fidelity of certain of the Native Princes, such as the Nizam of the Deccan, Scindia, Holkar, and the Rajah of Putteeala. Had either of them openly declared against us, no Englishman would probably have remained in the Peninsula. The Nizam would have carried with him the wavering population of Southern and Central India; in either

Scindia or Holkar the formidable Mahrattas would have found an hereditary Chief of great influence, of youthful activity, and of no inconsiderable military abilities; the hostility of the Putteeala Rajah would have left us without those Sikh allies, by whose aid alone we have been able to subdue the rebellion in the North.”*

“The English people have been too long inclined to give credence to the assertion of a few Calcutta Civilians, who, unwilling to admit the failure of their favourite schemes for the class government of India, have declared the rebellion to be a mere military mutiny. They have been ignorant that the Presidency of Bombay has only been saved by the energy, foresight, and judgment of Lord Elphinstone, although its army was on the eve of revolt, and its population, especially that of the Mahratta country, ready for insurrection.”†

Lord Elphinstone himself wrote to Colonel Durand in July 1857 :—

“If he” (Holkar) “had been ill-disposed towards us, the whole country would have risen. All the smaller Chiefs seem to take their cue from him; and even to the borders of Gujerat, the effects of his conduct would have been apparent. This comes to me from too many sources to admit of any doubt. Let me, therefore, beg you not to harbour any prejudices against Holkar, to whom I cannot but think we are very much indebted for the preservation of the peace in Malwa and also in Gujerat.”‡

The writer of the *Quarterly Review* article indicates his knowledge, obtained at first hand from the most authentic sources, of those unjust and injurious prejudices against which Lord Elphinstone protested.

“The education of Holkar from his childhood had been confided to the superintendence of a man who treated the natives of India with justice and kindness. The lessons taught by Sir Robert Hamilton, and by a visit to Bombay, where he had been received by Lord Elphinstone, had not been thrown away. When the revolted regiments called out to him, on his refusing to lead them against the English, ‘What would your great ancestor have done at such a moment?’ he boldly replied, ‘That I cannot say; but I know what he would *not* have done,—he would not have joined the murderers of women and children!’ His life, like that of Scindia’s, was threatened by the mutineers; but he unflinchingly persevered in his fidelity to us, saved the lives of many Christian families by receiving them in his Palace, and rescued those

* *Quarterly Review*, July 1858, p. 265.

† *Ibid.*, p. 225.

‡ *Kaye’s Sepoy War*, vol. iii, pp. 349, 350.

who had fallen into the hands of hostile Chiefs. The return we have made to him for these great services has been to insult him in his capital, to demand the surrender of his near relatives as traitors, and to hang summarily, and with scarcely the form of, we will not say a trial, but an inquiry, his own subjects!"*

Seventeen years later Sir John Kaye, with official knowledge of every incident from the beginning, with all the secret and confidential records of Government, and the private letters and diaries of the principal persons concerned before him, declared there could be "no question that Holkar was sacrificed to the justification of Durand".†

On this point a very prevalent, though not, perhaps, unreservedly avowed, opinion among the Anglo-Indian "Services", would be, that it is better to sacrifice the honour of a Mahratta Prince, than to damage the credit of an English officer. Without subscribing to that doctrine, it will be shown, whatever its value may be, not to be applicable to the present case. This is no question of a single sacrifice, but of a hecatomb. Mahratta Prince and British Peer, English officers, military and civil, of all ranks,—Lord Elphinstone, General Woodburn, Colonel Hutchinson, Major Hungerford, Captain Elliot, Sir Robert Hamilton,—all are to be sacrificed, stamped with incapacity and misconduct,—in order to prop up the credit of this one English officer, and to absolve him of an error of judgment.

Sir John Kaye says that as soon as the Maharajah Holkar knew that Colonel Durand, "the representative of the British Government at his capital", had evacuated the Residency, he felt that "his face was irretrievably blackened in the eyes" of that powerful official. "But yet", he says, "Holkar did not despair".‡

A great hope of reparation and redress was opened at a very early period by the return of Sir Robert Hamilton to Indore in December 1857. But from a singular chain of circumstances, which will be unfolded in due course, the original misconstruction held its own, and even gained strength at Calcutta from a new misunderstanding. Up to the present

* *Quarterly Review*, July 1858, p. 267.

† *Kaye's Sepoy War*, vol. iii, p. 346.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

day no reconsideration of the case has been possible, except under the ever present opposition of Colonel Durand, in person or in writing ; which, although supported by no evidence, based on suspicion only, and clearly biassed by the exigencies of personal vindication, has hitherto prevailed against the unanimous voices of all the English gentlemen who remained at Mhow in constant intercourse with Holkar during Colonel Durand's retirement, against the opinion of Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay, and against the repeatedly expressed wishes of the Home Government.

It may be asked, what practical good of any sort can arise from again bringing forward a case which has already passed under the deliberate judgment of several Viceroys and of several Secretaries of State ? The answer is that not only will the testimony adduced in the following pages leave no doubt as to the unfounded prejudices that have "blackened the face" of the Maharajah Holkar (whether "irretrievably" or not remains to be seen), but it will here be shown that the materials for a deliberate judgment have never—strange as it may seem—been available to Her Majesty's Government, and have never been fully and fairly placed before the Vice-regal Government of India. Every Viceroy, and every Councillor, since Lord Canning's retirement, has had the same incomplete and faulty record placed before him,—the errors being on each occasion aggravated and emphasised by the *précis* and illustrative office-notes furnished by the Department over which Colonel Durand presided from 1860 to 1864. From 1864 to 1870 he was himself one of the Viceroy's Councillors.

The same strictures apply to the materials for judgment hitherto laid before her Majesty's Secretary of State, with this additional remark, that some at least of the office-notes which prove the prejudices and the remissness of the officials upon whom the several Viceroys must have relied, are understood never to have been sent home.

Still, it may be said, Lord Canning, who could have commanded every source of information while it was yet fresh, pronounced against Holkar, and declared him to have disentitled himself to any territorial grant. But he will be shown to have made this declaration under circumstances peculiarly

misleading, after having been kept in the closest contact for a considerable time with a distinguished officer,—Colonel (afterwards Sir Henry) Durand,—who, seeming to have the latest local knowledge, may naturally have been accepted as an authority, but who was, in truth, misinformed and incurably prejudiced. It will be shown that from that officer's neglect, Lord Canning's early judgment in the case was formed on inaccurate and imperfect information, and on information which remained wrongfully imperfect after a more careful report had been promised. The reports, on the strength of which Lord Canning condemned Holkar's conduct, and denied his claim to a reward, are here tested, and are found not only to be avowedly imperfect, and to be vitiated by prejudice, but to contain no distinct or open charge. Instead of any definite accusation against any individual, they present a series of general assertions, surmises, inferences, and suspicions against his Highness, "*his Durbar*", and the people "*about his Court*" and "*attached to his person*", which prove to be utterly erroneous.

Sir John Kaye had access to all the official records, even those that were secret and confidential; and had, moreover, in his possession all the private papers of the late Lord Canning and of the late Sir Henry Durand, as well as those of Sir Robert Hamilton. In no document, public or private, in none of Sir Henry Durand's familiar letters, in none of his despatches as Governor-General's Agent, in none of his reports or office-notes as Secretary to Government, in none of his minutes as Councillor to the Viceroy,—could Sir John Kaye find any plain and open charge against Holkar, or anything to verify the vague imputations of disgraceful misconduct by which the Maharajah has been injured. "After long and most deliberate consideration", says he, "of all the circumstances of Holkar's conduct in that first week of July" 1857, "I cannot resist the conviction that he was thoroughly true to the British Government".* On the evidence of all the public and private papers, Sir John Kaye attributes Holkar's deprivation of "that which is most coveted by all as the highest honour,—a grant of territory" such as was given to Scindia,—

* *Kaye's Sepoy War*, vol. iii, p. 348.

to the "prejudices" raised by Colonel Durand "in the high places of the Supreme Government",—prejudices that were "never overcome", but which Lord Elphinstone had emphatically warned Colonel Durand that he ought not to "harbour".*

"There can be no question", is the verdict of Sir John Kaye, "that Holkar was sacrificed to the justification of Durand".†

The historian very truly observes that Holkar "seems never to have recovered from this slight".‡ For seventeen years he has been brooding over the undeserved stigma publicly attached to his name; but if, at last, baffled at all points and sick with deferred hope, he were, in the words of Sir John Kaye, to "despair", and to believe that his "face" was "irretrievably blackened",—if he wished to resign himself to the "*broad and clear distinction*" set up in favour of his compeers, and to say no more about it, the force of events would have been too strong for him. He could not get rid of the subject if he would. It has been repeatedly reopened by no action or suggestion of his, even within the last two years.

In the September of 1874 Saadut Khan, the ringleader in the attack on the Indore Residency in 1857, who had been captured in a distant part of India, was brought to trial at Indore, convicted and executed. This man had been erroneously described by Colonel Durand as "*in his Highness's Court and about his person*", and as "*a member of the Durbar*".

The evidence on the trial, and the wretched man's own confession, proved again what had been always well known at Indore and Mhow, but never explained by Colonel Durand, that Saadut Khan, though a leader in the insurrection, was not a leader in Holkar's army, and negatived the idea that he was a member of the Durbar, or in any way attached to Holkar's Court. The evidence proved what had been well known before, but never properly brought to the notice of our Government, that Saadut Khan, a sort of half-pay officer with no men under his command, so completely failed to stimulate Holkar's mutinous troops into a real assault on the Residency,

* *Sepoy War*, vol. iii, p. 350.

† *Ibid.*, p. 346.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

that he rode three miles off to the Palace in the vain hope of getting some reinforcements, where he was at once arrested by his Highness's order, so that the leader of the outbreak was actually in close confinement when Colonel Durand was evacuating the Residency.

The execution of Saadut Khan was followed by the appearance of many letters and articles in Indian newspapers, both English and vernacular, discussing his defence, and the evidence brought forward at the trial. The result, on the whole, decidedly confirmed the account given by the Maharajah Holkar and his Ministers of the outbreak and of their own movements on the 1st of July 1857, and totally failed to support the received official version of the same occurrences.*

Early in 1876, the third volume was published of the *Sepoy War*, by Sir John Kaye, whose command of every possible source of intelligence for this work of contemporary history was almost unlimited, and whose character for impartiality was unimpeachable. As Sir John Kaye had anticipated—for he was evidently thinking of this part of the volume—his views as to the treatment of the Maharajah Holkar by Sir Henry Durand and by the Government of India, did at once “excite controversy”.†

Sir Henry Durand's eldest son, Mr. H. M. Durand of the Bengal Civil Service, then an Attaché in the Indian Foreign Office, published an article in the *Calcutta Review* in April 1876, reissued very soon in London as a pamphlet, in which the correctness of “Sir John Kaye's criticism of the conduct of the late Sir Henry Marion Durand while in charge of Central India in 1857”, is warmly challenged.‡ About the same time a pamphlet having a similar object was published by Lieutenant-General Travers, V.C., C.B., who had commanded the British troops during the attack on the Indore Residency on the 1st of July 1857.§

The chief point argued by General Travers, not, perhaps, unsuccessfully, is one of some importance, as a question of his own military skill, but hardly bearing at all on the question of

* Appendix B.

† *Sepoy War*, vol. iii, Preface, p. viii.

‡ *Central India in 1857* (Ridgway, Piccadilly, 1876).

§ *The Evacuation of Indore* (H. S. King and Co., 1876).

Holkar's merits. Sir John Kaye may be wrong in saying that the flight from the Indore Residency was "precipitate" and "made without good cause". Colonel Durand's real error of judgment, for which no one would hold the Major Travers of those days responsible, was not in quitting the Residency, unprepared, as it was, for defence, but in not retiring upon Mhow, distant only ten miles, where he would have been in a position of security and within the limits of his charge. This was the false move that demanded justification, and that led to the sacrifice of Holkar.

General Travers has brought forward no facts whatever that fell under his own observation, or that he has gathered from any trustworthy informant, in support of the injurious imputations and insinuations against the personal conduct and loyalty of Holkar which he has thought proper to place before his readers.

But by these imputations and insinuations, and the highly offensive language in which they are conveyed, the General gives the most conclusive testimony to that unfounded prejudice on Durand's part against Holkar, which Lord Elphinstone endeavoured in vain to dispel, and which can have come into the mind of General Travers from no other imaginable channel.

It is thus manifest from the events of the last three years that, however much the Maharajah Holkar himself may be disposed to leave the controversy in *statu quo*, the partisans of official infallibility will not let him be quiet. They will not allow the stain on his name to fade away gradually under the pure light of impartial history. They impugn the historian's verdict, they revive the old slanders, they do their best to make the stain conspicuous and permanent.

It is not Holkar or his English friends who have revived this painful subject. But as others have chosen to drag it before the public, their errors, at least, shall be exposed. If in the process a little more of the truth is revealed than pleases them, it is their own doing. They have insisted on it. "Tu l'as voulu, Georges Dandin!"

If a military officer of distinction, like General Travers, considers it justifiable to make a virulent attack on the Maha-

rajah Holkar's honour and reputation, is there to be no defence? If a gentleman in the Bengal Civil Service—lately an Attaché in the Calcutta Foreign Office, now an Assistant in the Political Department—is allowed free use of official records, so that he can carefully extract just as much and just as little from them as may serve his purpose of decrying Holkar's merits and denying his wrongs, it can hardly be unfair to point out mistakes and to supply omissions by means of some of the official papers that were at the disposal of the late Sir John Kaye and of the present writer. A full and unreserved exposition of those papers ought certainly to be avoided, if possible, but not from any consideration for Holkar. The prospect of a partial publication has been already held out as a threat, without leading to any attitude of entreaty or resignation on his Highness's part; and, unless General Travers's or Mr. Durand's pamphlet be so considered, without any fulfilment of the threat. Nor does it seem that Holkar has any reason to dread disgrace or discredit, if an appeal to public opinion, such as was officially proposed, should be made from any quarter, and to any extent. He need not fear any awkward revelations, or wish that anything should be kept back.

Shortly after the news had arrived in London of the final capture of Lucknow by Lord Clyde, and of the re-occupation of Jhansi and Gwalior by Sir Hugh Rose (now Lord Strathnairn)—the victories which effectually dispersed the insurgents in Oude and Central India—a despatch dated July 28th, 1858, was sent by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, Lord Stanley (the present Earl of Derby), being President of the Board of Control, to the Governor-General, containing these instructions :—

“ We desire that you will, as expeditiously as possible, furnish us with a list of those Princes, Chiefs, and others, who have distinguished themselves by acts of fidelity and friendship to the British Government, together with a statement of their services, and of your views with respect to the best means of rewarding them, whether by territorial grants, by pensions or gratuities, or by honorary distinctions.

"The first of these modes would doubtless be the most acceptable to those whom we desire to gratify.

"High on the list you will, we feel assured, place the names of Scindia, Holkar, the Nizam, and the King of Nepaul, as well as those of the able and influential Ministers of the two latter Princes, Salar Jung and Jung Bahadur."*

Many Princes lower on the list, both in rank and merit, than those mentioned in this despatch, and all, with one exception, who are therein mentioned, have been rewarded with "territorial grants", "the most acceptable" mode, as the Directors rightly divined, of gratifying our Allies. The one exception is the Maharajah Holkar of Indore.

This despatch was one of the last of any importance issued by the East India Company. And five months later Lord Stanley, who having been the last President of the Board of Control was now the first Secretary of State for India, reiterated the same instructions to Earl Canning, Her Majesty's first Viceroy. In a despatch dated 31st December 1858, Lord Stanley observes that he is waiting for a reply to the letter just quoted, although the Viceroy has reported the manner in which he has "recognised by substantial or honorary rewards the good offices" of "his Highness the Maharajah of Puttiala, the Rajahs of Jheend, Nabha, and Kuppooorthulla, and others of less note". But he continues,—

"I trust no long time will elapse before I receive from your Lordship further reports of the same kind, including the names of the more influential Princes of India, especially those of the Maharajahs Scindia and Holkar, and of his Highness the Nizam."†

The manner in which these instructions were observed in several instances—notably in the instance of the Maharajah Holkar—form a very fair measure of the capacity and practical success in those critical days of our Political Agents at several Native Courts, and afford at the same time a striking proof of the urgent necessity for more patient and impartial consideration of reports emanating from those officers, when

* *Lords' Return* (77 of 1860), *Honours and Rewards bestowed on Native Princes of India*, p. 7.

† *Ibid.*, p. 32.

adverse to the interests of a Native State or injurious to a Native Prince.

Colonel Samuel Charters Macpherson, for example, the Resident at the Maharajah Scindia's capital of Gwalior, was a cool, determined Scotchman, of a liberal and genial disposition. When the mutiny of our Sepoy Contingent at Gwalior drove him from his post, he still kept up a close correspondence with the Rajah and his Ministers, did them ample justice in his official reports, and eventually secured from our Government a full recognition and substantial reward for their gallant and loyal exertions.

Very different was the lot that fell to Scindia's neighbour and compeer, the Maharajah Holkar of Indore, placed by the Court of Directors and the Secretary of State "high on the list" of Princes who had distinguished themselves, and who were to be rewarded "by territorial grants", or in other modes. Although, by the self-devotion with which he withstood the storm, and saved many European and Christian lives, he had fairly acquired claims on our gratitude, at least equal to those that were earned by any other Prince, the *vates sacer* of the place, who might have told his deeds and sung his praises, took to crying him down. The British representative at Indore, in a much less difficult position than that of Colonel Macpherson at Gwalior, had failed conspicuously—so far as his local charge was concerned—both in his precautions before the catastrophe, and in his procedure after it, and had committed himself deeply to denunciations against the Prince near whose Court he resided. And, although no subsequent inquiry confirmed his first imputations, and he never converted any one of them into anything like a direct charge, the prejudice was never cleared away; he always persisted in attributing his own local failure to the Maharajah's fault, and never fairly relieved that Prince from the odium of his original suspicions.

Colonel Durand, who was at Indore as Officiating Agent in Central India when the mutinies broke out in Bengal, differed very much in temperament and disposition from Colonel Macpherson, the Resident at Gwalior, who was properly his official subordinate.

Unquestionably a gallant soldier, possessing great capacity and many fine qualities, Colonel Durand was notoriously deficient in sympathy for those races of a divergent civilisation and alien creeds with whom he was officially connected. He evinced contempt for information and advice from Native sources, and was superciliously neglectful of intercourse with the Court of Indore and its notabilities. His own son, Mr. H. M. Durand, defending his father from a supposed antipathy to the Maharajah, says, "*Colonel Durand had been three months at Indore when the troops rose, and had seen Holkar only twice*".*

Lieutenant-General Travers makes this the subject of a positive charge against Holkar. This is only one instance in which the gallant General repeats with strange confidence an injurious rumour conveyed to him by "Natives", whom he does not name. "Natives not unfrequently expressed to me", he says, "their surprise at the Maharajah keeping aloof from the Residency at this time. His Highness could not but have known that such a line of policy must tend to confirm in the minds of the troops and people the belief which they certainly entertained that the destruction of our power would not be to him a cause of regret."† The belief is exactly such as might have been avowed by some of those men of the Bhopal Contingent whom General Travers still calls "loyal". It must have been by some such Natives of low position that any surprise can have been honestly expressed, for any English officer or Native Moonshee at the Residency would have told Colonel Travers that it was not the etiquette at Indore for the Maharajah ever to visit the Resident, except at one annual festival, the Dussera, and when specially invited. The Maharajah's Wakeel attended every day at the Residency, and when the Resident wished to see his Highness he called at the Palace for an interview. Colonel Durand only called twice, one of those visits—that of the 9th of June—having been solicited by the Maharajah; and he never invited his Highness.

Compare with Colonel Durand's bearing that of Colonel

* *Central India in 1857* (Ridgway, Piccadilly, 1876), p. 69, originally published as an article in the *Calcutta Review* for April 1876.

† *The Evacuation of Indore*, p. 5.

Macpherson at Gwalior in the same perilous days of May and June.

“ During this period of intense anxiety I need scarcely say that my communications with the Maharajah and the Dewan were ceaseless. When I did not visit Scindia, the Dewan generally came to tell me his mind, to discuss every phenomenon of the revolt, and every point of the situation in Gwalior, and to receive the encouragement so much needed under the extraordinary difficulties of his part. Moreover, the Agency Vakeel passed daily between the Maharajah and myself, with numberless notes and messages.”*

It was Colonel Durand that held aloof, not only from the Maharajah, but from every other good source of information and counsel. It is no wonder, therefore, that he was quite unprepared for the attack on the Residency, which took place on the 1st of July 1857. He had, in fact, invited the attack by neglecting sound advice. The Maharajah Holkar, unable to make any absolute prediction, hoping still that the danger might be kept at a distance, did not fail to perceive, when the Bengal Sepoys mutinied at Neemuch on the 22nd of May, at Nusseerabad on the 28th, and at Jhansi, under circumstances of fearful atrocity, on the 4th of June, that the contagion of mutiny was now approaching within his own range. On the 9th of June, therefore, at a conference which he specially called at the Palace, Holkar warned Colonel Durand that, in the event of a mutiny at Mhow, his own troops could not be trusted; and strongly recommended that the treasure belonging to the British Government,—about £130,000 in specie and £240,000 in Government paper,—should not be left, as a temptation to attack, in a building so weak and exposed as the Resident's Treasury, but should be sent off at once to the military cantonment of Mhow. The Maharajah also urged that the English ladies should immediately go to the same place, and that the Residency buildings should be made into a strong military post. Colonel Durand would not take this advice. He said that European troops were shortly expected, and that the precautions recommended by his Highness would only cause alarm and tend to encourage the evil-disposed.

* *Honours and Rewards*, (Lords, 77 of 1860), p. 97.

Alarm could not be prevented. From the 9th of June to the 1st of July not only alarm was felt but frequent warnings were given to Colonel Durand.

On the 11th of June two officers of Engineers, Captains Ludlow and Cobbe, recommended to Colonel Durand that the treasure should be moved from a detached building into the Residency, so that there should be only one place to defend. He refused, as he had before refused the still better advice of the Native Government, that the treasure should be sent away altogether.

On the 17th of June the same Engineer officers advised that his Highness's guns should be brought up to the Residency, "where they would be more under our own command". On the 18th of June Colonel Durand decided not to move the guns. Captains Ludlow and Cobbe then proposed to intrench the Residency, which was not permitted by Colonel Durand.

Thus, with everybody expecting an outbreak, no preparations were made to meet it. The Uncovenanted servants complained afterwards that, although their numbers were considerable, they were not embodied or organised, and had no place of security selected into which they could retire. The contemptible nature of the attack, when the outbreak occurred, and the ease with which a slow retirement was effected, are enough to suggest very strongly that if due preparations had been made, the results of the mutiny at Indore on the 1st of July 1857, might have been very different from what they were.

It has been said that Colonel Durand was in a much less difficult position at Indore than Colonel Macpherson at Gwalior. A few words will make this quite clear. In June 1857, when mutiny was spreading among the Sepoys, there were stationed at Mhow, about ten miles from Indore, only one Regiment of Native Infantry and a squadron of Cavalry,—about one thousand men, with no warlike appliances, except their own arms and a few rounds of musket ammunition. At Gwalior there was a Sepoy force of eight thousand men, Horse, Foot, and Artillery, with twenty-four field-guns,—a complete little army, with stores of every description.

At Gwalior there were no European troops. At Mhow there was a company of British Artillery with six field guns, in possession of a fort armed with heavy ordnance, and amply supplied with the munitions of war.

Thus the cantonment at Gwalior was the great source and centre of danger. The cantonment near Indore, with its stronghold occupied by European soldiers, was a place of refuge and security. Although the source of danger was at Mhow, the source of strength was there also. The hundred Artillerymen, though not strong enough to take the field, could keep the arsenal, and hold their own against the thousand Sepoys.

It seems impossible to doubt either the good sense or the good faith inspiring Holkar's counsel to Colonel Durand on the 9th of June, that the ladies and the treasure should be sent from the Indore Residency to Mhow. It seems equally impossible to doubt that when, this good counsel having been disregarded, the Residency was attacked, it was upon Mhow that Colonel Durand ought to have retired. The situation on the morning of the 1st of July, was, indeed, in every way worse than it had been three weeks before. In the interval the news had arrived of the mutinies and murders at Gwalior, and the flight of the British Resident. The excitement had been growing; plots had been matured. And thus, when on the terrible morning of the 1st of July, Colonel Durand at last made preparations for taking away the treasure, his tardy and inopportune orders only precipitated the outbreak. The conspirators would not allow the precious object they had been watching for weeks to be quietly carried away before their eyes when their conspiracy was almost ripe.

The ringleaders at Indore, in communication with the Sepoys at Mhow, were three Mohammedans,—Saadut Khan, a man of good family, considering himself to have some claim to be hereditary Bukhshee of Holkar's army, but out of employ and in disgrace; a Moulavi, or Doctor of the law, named Abd-us-Samad; and another discontented claimant, the real head of the conspiracy, the Nawab Waris Mohammed Khan, of Bhopal, whose character had been strangely misunderstood by Colonel Durand, and who had been living for some time within the precincts of the Indore Residency. G

The troops of the Maharajah Holkar at the Residency on the morning of the 1st July 1857, consisted of three companies of Infantry, with three guns,—three hundred Cavalry having been fortunately removed, with Colonel Durand's consent, some days before. The Maharajah's men were considerably outnumbered at the Residency by detachments of the Bhopal and Mahidpore Contingents, commanded by British Officers. With the exception of fourteen gunners and a few Sikh horsemen belonging to the Bhopal Contingent,—of whom only the gunners and five horsemen joined in any active resistance to the mutineers—all these British troops behaved infamously; most of them joined the mutineers on that day in plundering the Residency, and during the actual outbreak and attack refused to defend their post, and threatened to shoot the officers who endeavoured to recall them to their duty. Colonel Durand states all this in his despatch of the 13th of August 1857 :—

“There cannot be the slightest doubt that their attack” [that of Holkar's troops] “on the Residency was concerted with the Bhopal and Malwa Contingents, and with the conspiracy of the Mhow troops (the Bengal Sepoys).”

General Travers says that no one could “induce the Infantry to do their duty”. “That of the Mahidpore Contingent”, he continues, “failed us to a man, while that of the Bhopal Contingent, with the exception of a dozen or so, displayed a like mutinous spirit. Not a musket had been fired in our favour”.*

Colonel Durand, in his private correspondence, says :—

“The Bhopal and Mahidpore Contingent Infantry would not fire a shot, or obey an order, and threatened to shoot their European officers.”

“The Bhopal Contingent and Mahidpore Contingent fraternised with Holkar's troops. The Sikh Horse would neither form nor fight, and the only thing they thought of was keeping out of fire and bolting.”†

In another passage of his pamphlet General Travers says :—

“Our Mahidpore and Bhopal Contingent Infantry had, as stated by Durand, fraternised with Holkar's rebellious troops.”‡

* *The Evacuation of Indore*, p. 16.

† *Kaye's Sepoy War*, vol. iii, p. 332.

‡ *The Evacuation of Indore*, p. 20.

The attack having once commenced, and the defence being of such a character, the treasure became irremovable, and the ladies a fearful incumbrance. But the road to Mhow was open; there was the nearest point of comparative safety, and there Colonel Durand, representative of the British Government at Indore, would still have been at his post. He ought surely to have gone no farther from the Residency than he could help. On every principle of official propriety and military science, Mhow was his proper destination.

Discredit was cast upon Holkar; the highest reward and honour possible, the grant of territory, was withheld; and his conduct was declared to be undeserving of "respect or gratitude", solely because, from a sad error of judgment, Colonel Durand would not retire ten miles on Mhow, but went off two hundred miles to the East. Why did he not go to Mhow? The road was quite open.

General Travers says, referring to the commencement of the attack on the Residency:—"Our Cavalry picket at Rao, (seven miles on the Mhow Road) hearing the firing, galloped in and reported all quiet in the direction of that station when they left their post."*

Moreover, when preparing to withdraw from the Residency, Major Travers sent two troopers with notes to turn back the European Artillery, and these men actually met Captain Hungerford with his Battery at Rao, about seven miles from Indore; so that as Colonel Durand's party was going at the rate of three miles, and Hungerford at least at six miles an hour, they would have met in half-an-hour or so, if Mhow had been chosen as the rallying point. The retreat had begun without molestation; the Battery was believed, and rightly, to be advancing to relieve them. There was nothing on the Mhow road to disturb the retreat, and there was no pursuit.

So obvious is it that Mhow ought to have been their first object, that Mr. Durand tells us now:—"The line of retreat chosen was, of course, that on Mhow. It was possible that the Battery might be on its way, and that a junction might be effected." Well, it was on its way, and a junction could

* *The Evacuation of Indore*, p. 23.

have been effected. "But", he continues, "the hope, if hope there was, was very soon over. The Bhopal Cavalry could not be persuaded to follow; their fears of the Mhow troops were too vivid, and the attempt had to be given up."*

The Bhopal Cavalry, as a body, were of no use. They would not fight, with the exception of half-a-dozen. Their picket had reported all quiet in the direction of Mhow, and three troopers—one with a note to Colonel Platt on the first alarm, two to Captain Hungerford when the retreat began,—had obediently gone in the same direction. Who can doubt that a few faithful men would have stuck to their gallant commander as far as Mhow? The Bheels and the Bhopal gunners, with as many of the Cavalry as were amenable to orders, or without them, would have been a sufficient escort, and there was no pursuit.

In his despatch to Government of the 17th of July 1857, Captain Hungerford reports that the last Bhopal trooper sent by Colonel Travers gave him a verbal message "that Colonel Durand had not retired on Mhow, as Mhow was in Holkar's territories, and would be attacked by Holkar's troops either that night or the following morning".

The principal object of General Travers's pamphlet is to show—and it is a most legitimate object—that the retreat from the Residency was a military necessity, and that Sir John Kaye was in error in terming this retreat "precipitate".†

It may be freely admitted that as there had been no preparation for defence, the retirement from the Residency could not have been deferred much longer with safety, and that the retreat, when ordered, was conducted, so far as the evacuation went, with great judgment and skill. There was neither precipitancy nor panic. The only mistake was that Colonel Durand's party did not retire on Mhow. And this mistake is substantially admitted by Mr. Durand, when he says, "The line of retreat chosen was, of course, on Mhow, but the Bhopal Cavalry could not be persuaded to follow", while General Travers makes no attempt to extenuate or explain it. The

* *Central India in 1857*, p. 26.

† *Sepoy War*, vol. iii, pp. 340, 346.

General, however, entirely corroborates Mr. Durand's description, founded on the original despatches, of the manner in which, immediately after the evacuation of the Residency, if not before, the route and the pace of the fugitive party were directed and controlled by the Bhopal troopers whom General Travers persists in considering "loyal". According to Mr. Durand, they would not go to Mhow, they refused to go to Mundlairsur, they "resolutely declined to obey orders", and "the remnant of the little force" was "pressed on in rapid marches by the Cavalry",* to Sehore, very much, in fact, as if they were captives—as if the "loyal" troopers had determined to hand over Colonel Durand and his party as hostages to the Begum of Bhopal.

Besides the suspicious behaviour of the remnant of Bhopal Cavalry which attended Colonel Durand's retreat, and the conduct of the whole body, five excepted, in "keeping out of fire" and "bolting" during the defence of the Residency, their asserted "loyalty" must be qualified by two circumstances—1st, that, as proved by the evidence of Hirsā Singh, one of the faithful men of the Bhopal Cavalry, on the trial of Saadut Khan in 1874, that rebel leader was accompanied at his parade on the 2nd of July 1857 by several troopers of Colonel Travers's Regiment; 2nd, that General Travers himself states that when he tried to form the picket for his charge on the guns, the formation was three times broken from the rear by a Native officer, who was afterwards hung for his misconduct.†

Colonel Durand's declared views in avoiding Mhow, and in quitting the territory of the Prince to whom he was accredited, were signally falsified by events. He was wrong as to the nature and extent of the local danger; he was wrong as to the insecurity of the post close at hand which he avoided; he was wrong as to the superior safety of the distant point upon which he directed his retreat.

He was quite mistaken in supposing that his little party would be safe at Sehore, the capital of the Begum of Bhopal. How that faithful Princess, beset as she was by malcontents

* *Central India in 1857*, pp. 27-28.

† *Evacuation of Indore*, p. 13.

of her own faith and her own family, received the fugitives and facilitated their progress to a place of safety, is well known. But the comparison between the conduct and the spirit of the Begum and Holkar, which General Travers institutes, is totally unfair and unfounded. The Begum had to face the same class of difficulties as Scindia and Holkar, and required, like them, the absence for a time of visible provocation and temptation to enable her to subdue the fanatics and free-booters by whom she was surrounded.

The same inability to restrain the madness of the hour had been confessed a fortnight before by the Maharajah Scindia. When the British Contingent mutinied and murdered their officers at Gwalior on the 14th of June, Colonel Macpherson, like Colonel Durand, was compelled to quit the Residency. His carriage was arrested on the road by a party of ruffians "bound for Delhi", and commanded by a favourite Captain of Scindia's, whose violence was only prevented by the pretence that the English officers were the Maharajah's prisoners. On Colonel Macpherson arriving at the Palace, Scindia declared that, in consequence of the feeling of his troops, "he could not protect" him "for an hour". The Resident therefore left Gwalior for Agra, with many other English gentlemen and their families, escorted by the Maharajah's Body-guard. They were again placed in jeopardy on the way to Agra, by a band of mutineers from Scindia's ranks; and having been deserted by Scindia's Body-guard, were saved and brought into Agra by a private person, Thakoor Buldeo Singh.*

The same official documents inform us that some of the Maharajah Scindia's troops joined the rebel army before Delhi, while others took part with the mutineers from Mhow and Indore in the attack on Agra.†

The Regent Begum of Bhopal had, as we read in one of Colonel Durand's own despatches, "the greatest difficulty in restraining her own relatives and maintaining her own position", and "one of the family raised the standard of Islam,

* *Return to the Lords* (77 of 1860), *Honours and Rewards bestowed on Native Princes*, pp. 102, 103.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 106, 108, 109.

and was guilty of hostilities against the British Government".*

What the Begum did when Colonel Durand arrived, was to express her inability to shelter him or any English officer at her capital, or in her territories. When General Travers lays great stress on the latter part of her speech, that "if, on the other hand, they decided on remaining in Bhopal, so be it—their safety should be her care; her lot and theirs should be one",† he only shows his want of familiarity with the forms of Oriental rhetoric and courtesy. These words really gave emphasis to what preceded them, implying that if Colonel Durand remained, it would be at his own peril, and would increase her own danger. And that Colonel Durand understood it in this light is apparent from his instantly leaving the Bhopal territory.

In briefly referring to the identity of difficulties which assailed these Native rulers in the great convulsive crisis of 1857, there is no wish to detract from the honour due to Scindia or to the Begum of Bhopal, or to depreciate in the least their noble bearing in that time of trial. Without suggesting any comparison between their respective services or merits, it may, however, be confidently asserted that Holkar would not suffer in the least if one were to be instituted. And in common justice it must be pointed out that outrages were committed within Scindia's dominions identical with those that occurred within Holkar's, and that in dealing with those who had perpetrated such acts, those very temporising expedients were adopted by Scindia with which Holkar has been specially reproached.

The only real distinction between the situation and conduct of the two Princes in 1857, was that not having to deal with such a powerful mass of mutineers as that which confronted Scindia, Holkar was not compelled to carry temporising expedients to such an extremity, or to continue them so long, as was found necessary at Gwalior.

* *Papers, Restoration of Dhar* (30 of 1861), p. 18.

† *Evacuation of Indore*, p. 6. In this page General Travers quotes with approval a story from the Allahabad newspaper, the *Pioneer*, that at the great Durbar at Jubbulpore, in 1861, Holkar was "censured" by Lord Canning. This is quite untrue. There was no censure either in public or in private audience. In his speech at the Durbar, Lord Canning recognised his Highness's services.

For fully four months, from the fourteenth of June to the 15th of October 1857, Scindia was kept in thralldom by the mutineers of the Gwalior Contingent, and was only able to restrain them from destroying every vestige of his authority,—in the words of Colonel Macpherson, the Political Agent,—by donations of pay, promises of service, and “by the delusion that he must at length place himself at the head of the rebels”.* Holkar was not reduced to disguise his adherence to the British cause for a day, or for an hour. On the very day of the outbreak he openly resisted it, and kept up his communication with the British authorities at Mhow; on the fifth day he was in active co-operation with them.

No one who was at Indore or at Mhow during the crisis from the 1st to the 5th of July 1857 has ever expressed any doubt that if Holkar had immediately endeavoured to resist the mutineers by force, the only result would have been that his power would have been so paralysed, that instead of his being able after an interval of three or four days to regain the guidance of affairs, to restrain the disaffected, to maintain thereafter in his capital of Indore a centre of allegiance and good order, all the resources of his dominions would have been thrown into the hands of the rebels. As it was, no sooner had the pressure from the Sepoy mutineers been withdrawn, than Holkar resumed an efficacious control over his own army, and over the population of his own territories,—a control by no means perfectly restored, but so far efficacious that his Highness's troops were henceforth kept out of mischief, and were, moreover, by judicious management usefully employed for the preservation of order, and in some active operations against the rebels.

On the 1st of July 1857, when the explosion took place at Indore and Mhow, Holkar did his best. He failed in quelling the mutiny,—that is certain,—but then he failed where *no one* succeeded. No Native Sovereign, no British officer, civil or military, can show a better record than Holkar of the first day of revolt in 1857 within his jurisdiction. How many Native Princes, how many British officers in 1857 were able to act with freedom and boldness within a week of

* *Return to the Lords* (77 of 1860), *Honours and Rewards*, p. 107.

the actual outbreak? If, on the whole, the story of that day at Indore is a story of unavailing resistance to mutinous violence, such was the story of the corresponding day in every other place that the contagion of mutiny reached.

So unprecedented was the emergency produced, so utterly unexpected was the state of feeling disclosed by the successive mutinies in the Bengal Army, that in fact neither any Ruler of a Native State, nor any chief authority of a British Province, during the early period of the disturbances, could boast of much success in measures of precaution or prevention. Nor is it probable that any precautionary measures could have averted an explosion when once the spark was applied to such a mass of combustible materials.

It is plain enough now that although an attack on the Residency must have entered into the programme of the mutineers, the actual attack on the 1st of July was not regularly planned for that day, but was hastily got up as a counterstroke to Colonel Durand's tardy removal of the treasure. The men on the spot, who had been conspiring for some time, were forced into premature action by the fear of losing their plunder; they abandoned the pursuit rather than forego the advantage of being the first to broach the cash-chest; and all that they could carry they took away with them. The Maharajah secured all that was left, preventing his own troops and the city rabble from plundering it, and placed it in the Mhow treasury on the 7th of July.

In estimating the comparative energy and promptitude of the Maharajah's movements, the fact should not be overlooked that on the night of the 1st of July,—that is to say, at one or two A.M. on the 2nd,—the advanced guard of Cavalry from Mhow arrived at Indore, and was followed by the whole body of mutineers at an early hour in the morning.

Thus the fair explanation of Holkar's difficulties during the three days that followed the outbreak, and of his more conspicuous exertions on and after the 5th of July, is to be found in the pressure of the Mhow mutineers on the 2nd and 3rd of July, and the removal of that pressure on the night of the 4th. During three days Holkar was beset by mutinous British troops, the cause of the original mischief, and the

greatest danger that he and his compeer Scindia had to encounter. Like Scindia, he was not strong enough to beat them, but he had to deal with them. On the 2nd of July a large body of the Mhow mutineers demanded, with loud clamour and threats, the heads of the Europeans and other Christians, and of his Durbar officers and other Natives, known to be friendly to the British Government, and then concealed in his Palace. Holkar addressed the assemblage from a balcony of the Palace, and offered them his person, but he would not suffer one of the refugees to be hurt.

On the 4th of July, mounted and spear in hand, he confronted the mutineers boldly at the Residency. They received the Maharajah at first respectfully, but afterwards reminded him of the martial character of his ancestor, Jeswunt Rao, and reviled him as a degenerate Holkar. He absolutely refused his countenance and rejected all their demands. He harangued them, and especially the mutineers of his own army, with some effect, and seemed for the time to have regained a moral ascendancy. But they were too deeply committed, and too heavily loaded with plunder, to retrace their steps. Holkar temporised with them no longer, and to no greater extent than could be helped; he allowed them to take nothing that could be withheld by authority or management.

The Sepoys made no mistake as to Holkar's feelings towards them and their cause. In Sir Robert Hamilton's Report of April 26th, 1858, he says, "In more than one of the intercepted letters which have been forwarded to me the writer has warned his correspondents not to trust to Holkar, who was personally all for the English". And in another passage, "The mutinous Sepoys who have been arrested, one and all denounce Holkar and Scindia, and state that their want of success is attributable to neither of the Chiefs placing himself at their head".*

This is confirmed in the evidence given at the time by two very able and distinguished servants of our Government, Moonshee Jan Ali Khan, the Superintendent of Beowra, and his son Munzoor Ali Khan, and repeated by them at the trial of Saadut Khan in 1874. The former said:—"They" (the

* *Honours and Rewards* (Lords, No. 77 of 1860), pages 118, 119.

mutineers who made him and his son prisoners, and held them to ransom) "often said that Holkar did not assist them, and that they would soon return with reinforcements and ruin Indore".

Within four days of the attack on the Residency, and of the mutiny at Mhow, Holkar was in regular intercourse with the nearest British authorities, consulting and co-operating with them, and rendering help, by military expeditions, by the rescue of British officers and their families, by the apprehension of mutineers, by the safeguard and recovery of public property.

On the 4th of July the Bengal Sepoy mutineers, the most formidable danger he had to face, marched from Indore. On the 5th Holkar established daily communication with Captain Hungerford at Mhow, and sent thirteen elephants to be employed with the troops. On the 7th of July the Maharajah despatched a force to rescue and bring into Mhow Captain Hutchinson, the Political Assistant at Bhopawur, who, with Mrs. Hutchinson and the family of Colonel Stockley, Commandant of the Malwa Bheel Corps, had been driven from their stations by the insurgent Rajah of Amjheera, and were in great peril.

On the 7th of July the treasure saved from the Residency, 416,690 rupees (£41,669) in cash, Company's paper for 2,340,500 rupees (£234,050) and a box of jewels, were handed over by his Highness's officials to the Commandant of Mhow. About 100,000 rupees (£10,000) more were subsequently discovered, hidden in the ruins of houses, and similarly restored.

On the 7th of July Holkar issued a proclamation offering a reward of 5,000 rupees (£500) for the apprehension, dead or alive, of Saadut Khan, and smaller sums for the arrest of other ringleaders. On the same day three columns of the Maharajah's troops were despatched on the track of the mutineers, to try and intercept and capture some of them.

On the 8th of July two Sepoys of the 23rd Bengal Infantry, which had mutinied at Mhow, were apprehended by a party of Holkar's troops, and sent into the cantonment, where they were tried and hanged on the 9th.

There is no dispute or question as to the conduct and ser-

vices of the Maharajah within three or four days of the outbreak. Indeed the question of his Highness's demeanour and proceedings on the terrible 1st of July 1857, is narrowed to the space of an hour and a half or three quarters—from twenty minutes to nine A.M., when, by all accounts, the attack on the Residency began, to ten or half-past ten, when Colonel Durand commenced his retreat. He left the place under the impression that he had been "attacked by Holkar", for in these terms he wrote to the authorities at Bombay and Calcutta, and to the military Commandant at Mhow.

In the first letter of the 3rd of August 1857, written from Mhow to the Maharajah Holkar by Colonel Durand immediately after his return to his post, the following passage occurs :

"The attack upon the Residency by your Highness's troops, commenced at twenty minutes to nine, and the order to withdraw was given at half-past ten. During that interval, viz., for nearly two hours, a cannonade more or less brisk continued. There was ample time, therefore, to have made some communication from the Palace to the Residency, and to have informed me that your Highness's troops were acting without your Highness's orders; yet no such communication was made."

Colonel Durand's question must be answered. Why was there no communication between the Palace and the Residency on the 1st of July, while the attack was in progress? A full and satisfactory answer can be given.

The messenger, Jemadar Jeeva Singh, whom Colonel Durand despatched to the Palace as soon as the firing began, instead of going to the Maharajah, went straight off to his own house in the city of Indore. For this cowardly neglect of duty, the man was afterwards dismissed from the service, and otherwise punished. In consequence of this message not being delivered, nearly half an hour elapsed before any information arrived, confusion and excitement increasing every moment, and the most contradictory reports being made. General Travers says, that Holkar "commanded from his windows a view of the Residency, distant three miles, and could see the smoke of the guns."* The General probably refers to the principal or *Bara* Palace, which from its highest

* *The Evacuation of Indore*, p. 9.

windows might, perhaps, have afforded a view of the fumes of smoke, nothing more. But the Maharajah was not there. He had been residing for some time at the Hawelee, a mansion occupied by one of his chief officers, Bhowanee Singh Sirmobut, which is about two hundred and fifty yards farther from the Residency, is not of great height, and is in the midst of a row of houses facing to the North, the Residency lying to the East by South, three miles and a quarter off. As soon, however, as the news arrived that the Residency was attacked, the Maharajah ordered out his escort, with a view to the immediate succour of Colonel Durand. But at this juncture everything was interrupted by the apparition of Saadut Khan, who arrived at full gallop, covered with blood from a slight wound he had received in the face, calling on the troops to join in a war of religion, and appealing to Holkar to place himself at their head.

To proceed towards the Residency while this desperate fanatic was at large, and in apparent acquiescence with his appeal, would have been simply to make the storm irresistible. All the troops and all the armed ruffians from the city would have followed. Holkar would have lost all control, and would have been swept along in the midst of a raging crowd, to become the impotent witness, or the useless victim, of a scene of massacre and destruction.

The first object, therefore, was to secure the person of Saadut Khan. In the actual temper of the Mussulman Cavalry, it was found impossible to do this by open force, or to place the man in irons, as had been originally ordered, but by mingled persuasion and command the Maharajah got him taken away to the Palace, where he was kept for some hours. From this arrest he was unfortunately released in the evening, under the mistaken impression that he would, as he promised, use his influence to recall the Mussulman troops to their duty, but the scale was turned in favour of insurrection by the arrival during the night of the Sepoys from Mhow, and Saadut Khan then rejoined the mutineers, and placed himself at their head. Time, however, was gained by his temporary confinement at the critical moment of Colonel Durand's retreat.

Saadut Khan's removal was immediately followed by the

appearance of Bans Gopal, who was in command of the detachment of Infantry and guns at the Residency, and who demanded the Maharajah's orders. He declared that Saadut Khan had commenced the mutiny by shouting "Deen, Deen!" and ordering Mahomed Ali, the Jemadar of Artillery, to unlimber the guns and commence firing. Bans Gopal said that he had endeavoured to stop the gunners, but they went out shouting and firing, and no one obeyed him. Holkar told him he would be held strictly responsible for this day's work, and ordered him to return immediately to the Residency, to do his best to regain control over his men, and to quell the disturbance.

Having now regained the lead, and the most trustworthy guards having been placed so as to check the concourse of the excited troops towards the Residency, Holkar again ordered out his retinue, and proceeded to the Bara Palace, where his Highness alighted, to take the advice, as usual, of his adoptive mother, the Tasee Sahiba, the Dowager Maharanee. But at this moment positive information was received that the men of the British Contingents had sided with the mutineers, and that Colonel Durand and the English officers had retreated from the Residency. This was hailed as a grand success by the short-sighted fanatics in Holkar's force, which had now become uncontrollable, and a new set of difficulties was raised.

An hour and fifty minutes—the utmost interval between the first shot being fired and the retirement of Colonel Durand—pass very quickly in the midst of a tumult and a succession of startling incidents. Nor was the interval wasted in which the Maharajah placed the ringleader in confinement, sent orders for the mutineers to withdraw from the attack, and prevented any substantial reinforcement, when fifty horsemen would have rendered the safe retreat of Colonel Durand's party a perfect impossibility.

If Holkar had set on the insurgents, or if he had even passively sympathised, or wavered so far as to have left them to take their own course, not one of Colonel Durand's party could possibly have escaped. The party consisted of seventeen English persons, including eight women and two children, so that a rapid flight was impossible. General Travers says, "Our draught-bullocks could not be forced beyond a rate of

two and a half to three miles an hour.”* They left the Residency with a mutinous escort, half of whom deserted before they arrived at their first halting-place. No nod or wink was wanted. If the Maharajah had faltered, or loosened his hold for one moment, a thousand horsemen would have surrounded the Residency, or pursued the fugitives, and the work of blood would have been done.

General Travers, who has at last come forward to declare publicly what has long been circulated in private, that Holkar behaved contemptibly, if not traitorously, on the 1st of July 1857, draws a very unfavourable picture of the Maharajah’s weakness, and even declares that his Highness has confessed it. The sentence, though ungrammatical, is not unintelligible.

“Holkar’s conduct at this juncture, whether arising from agonising funk, paralysing influence of weeping wives, or prostrate judgment—all which excuses he has himself advanced—it matters not.”

But this is a very great mistake. No such degrading confession has ever been made ; no such excuses have ever been advanced. The General must be again relying on the rumours and reports of some of his anonymous Native friends. He continues :—

“The fact remains that when the British Representative accredited to his Court was being treacherously attacked, and defenceless women and children ruthlessly butchered by a small party of his own troops, his Highness took no steps to check the outbreak.”†

No such “fact remains”. In penning this sentence, as well as in the assertion that Holkar “sent no officer or order to his troops to cease from their attack upon the Residency”, the General has been unfortunately misled into a most injurious misrepresentation. His Highness *did* take “steps to check the outbreak”, and *did* send an “officer” and an “order to his troops to cease from their attack”. At the first burst of the mutiny, on the very day, and in its most critical hour, his Highness took the very decided “steps” of confining one leader, and sending another back to the scene of the outbreak with orders to suppress it.

* *Evacuation of Indore*, p. 16.

† *Ibid.*, p. 9.

His Highness took the very decided steps of sending a deputation to Mhow on the 1st of July, the day of the outbreak, consisting of his chief Minister the Bhao Sahib, the Residency Wakeel Gunesh Shastree, and Bukhshee Khoman Singh (now C.S.I.) with an escort of Cavalry, who communicated with Major McMullen, the Magistrate of Mhow, and placed a note in his hands and a letter to Colonel Platt, the Commandant.*

On the same afternoon a letter was despatched to the Governor of Bombay, which Lord Elphinstone received and acknowledged, and two others were prepared for the Governor-General and Colonel Durand. At six P.M. a letter was received from the Patwaree of Tillore, saying that Colonel Durand with his party had reached that place, on which the Maharajah at once despatched a deputation, consisting of Raojee Gora the Khasgee Wakeel, and Teekaram Jemadar, with an escort, to Tillore to secure the supply of everything that could be wanted for Colonel Durand, and to inform him that his Highness was distressed beyond measure, and ready to give all the help in his power. But Colonel Durand had continued his retreat, and for some days its direction was not known.

These are all matters of fact that were proved by oral and documentary evidence, and ought to have found their way into the report on the conduct of Holkar and the Durbar which Colonel Durand promised to write "at leisure", but omitted to write. These were all matters of fact which Colonel Durand might have known, and ought to have known, and which became known to Sir Robert Hamilton, on his resuming the duties of Governor-General's Agent. When these matters are considered, the inaccuracy of General Travers in adopting the stereotyped official allegation that "*his Highness took no steps to check the outbreak*", will be sufficiently manifest. No allegation can be more utterly untrue.

* Letter, No. 60, dated Mhow, 19th Sept. 1857, from Capt. Hungerford to the Secretary to the Government of India. The reply to this letter, addressed to Sir R. Hamilton, Bart., Agent G. G. for Central India, No. 4207, dated 13th October 1857, was delivered to the Officiating Agent, Colonel Durand, then in camp at Mhow. How these letters escaped the notice of Colonel Durand it is difficult to understand, until we observe that he took no notice of Hungerford's letters, and that after the 18th of August 1857, he made no public report on the conduct of Holkar, his durbar, or his troops.

General Travers very confidently declares :—"Had Holkar, on the outbreak occurring, mounted his horse, and at the head of his *sowaree* demanded instant obedience from his troops, they would have remained his faithful loyal servants."*

The General is quite mistaken. All the evidence proves that Holkar's troops were, to say the least, quite as unmanageable, quite as disobedient, on the outbreak occurring, as the men of the British Contingents. It was as much as the Maharajah could do to keep them in something like order, and to keep them in the vicinity of the Palace.

When General Travers talks of Holkar mounting his horse and putting himself at the head of his *sowaree* or retinue, he assumes that the Maharajah, like a Cavalry officer, had only one course before him, when he heard the hostile fire, and that was to go straight at it. The gallant General's recollection of his own insensibility to danger when charging at the head of half a dozen troopers, makes him incredulous of danger to others, and incapable of understanding that a quick sense of danger is the best proof of capacity, and even of courage, in men who occupy certain positions in the midst of certain emergencies. The truth is that the want of a sense of danger is a fatal defect in a man's judgment : as Shakespeare says, "when valour preys on reason, it eats the sword it fights with."

Lightly as General Travers may think of the position of an Indian Prince, the candour and charity of his nature will enable him to understand, on due reflection, that the Indian Prince himself may very naturally hold a somewhat high estimate of the duties of his position, and of the importance of his Principality. The Maharajah Holkar, on the outbreak occurring, was not a trooper, or a Colonel of Cavalry, but a Sovereign Prince. The ruler of a State, particularly if he happens to be—as Holkar was—a very young man, is a person whose position has accustomed and compels him to act by, with, and through others ; he must consult relatives and ministers ; and if the safety and welfare of his family and State are to be set aside as unworthy of consideration when servants of the Imperial Power are in jeopardy, it does not follow that Imperial interests would have been more effectually

* *Evacuation of Indore*, footnote, p. 11.

served by rashness than by prudence. If, when the outbreak occurred, Holkar had made any wrong move, he would have lost the power of continuing to render such services to the British Government as he had been rendering up to that day, and as he continued to render during the whole period of the rebellion.

The defence of the Indore Residency during an hour and a half, by a few English officers, and twenty or thirty faithful men of the two Contingents, in the midst of their traitorous comrades, was a sufficiently noble exploit without our attributing to it the characteristics of miracle. The daring charge of Major (now Lieutenant-General) Travers, followed by only five sabres, against guns, infantry and horsemen,—by which that gallant officer nobly won the Victoria Cross,—gained time for the defence and retreat, and must have disconcerted the assailants, but it did not disperse them. That splendid feat of arms could not be repeated; the reinforcement of the attacking, and the treacherous defection from the defending party, went on until the retreat commenced. Then how can the safe retirement of Colonel Durand's party of seventeen, including ten women and children, "*at the rate of two-and-a-half or three miles an hour*", be accounted for, if we believe the suggestions of Mr. Durand that swarms of Holkar's Cavalry — "*swarming under every sort of cover*",* he says, as if to explain their not being very visible—assisted in the attack on the Residency, that "*Holkar's troops came pouring up*,"† or as he afterwards asserts, "*the Maharajah's troops turned out as one man; Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery came pouring up in a mass*, all equally eager to join in the slaughter of the English"?‡ In another passage Mr. Durand does not hesitate to say that his father "*saw the whole of Holkar's troops surging up*", and again that "*he found surging up to surround the Residency, masses of Holkar's troops, consisting of 1,400 Cavalry, 2,000 Infantry, and 25 to 30 guns, besides any amount of armed rabble from the City.*"§

Mr. Durand bases these wild assertions on an alleged statement by the Durbar Vakeel to Colonel Durand, that

* *Central India in 1857*, p. 22.

† *Ibid.*, p. 52.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

§ *Ibid.*, pp. 53, 54, 55.

“the lines were empty”.* These words convey no information unless we know to what hour in the day they refer. That a great number of Holkar’s troops broke loose, and poured down to the Residency when they heard that Colonel Durand had retired and that the British Treasury was being plundered, is perfectly true. But that the Durbar Vakeel, Gunesh Shastree, who is still living, ever said that “the lines were empty”, during the attack or the retirement “at the rate of two-and-a-half miles an hour”, is utterly untrue, and will not bear a minute’s reflection. If any such movement of Holkar’s troops had taken place,—nay, if a hundred horsemen had intervened,—the whole party must have been massacred.

The testimony of Dr. Charles Thomson, in medical charge of the Bhopal Agency, who was present during the attack, and accompanied Colonel Durand’s retreat, negatives Mr. Durand’s assertion that the assailants, whether horse or foot, were “*swarming*” or “*surging*”, in any sense, and confirms his suggestion that the assailants were “under cover”,—that is to say not visible. Dr. Thomson, in the written statement which he made on the 22nd of January 1858, in reply to a requisition from Sir Robert Hamilton, says :—

“After having retired a very short distance from the Residency, the mutineers did not molest us, and during the whole of the mutiny I never saw any of the mutineers.”†

It is also worthy of remark that during the attack on the Residency, and the retreat from it, not one of its English occupants was killed, and only one, Sergeant Murphy, wounded.

No such absurd misstatements as those which disfigure Mr. Durand’s pamphlet were set forth by his distinguished father, but a few loose expressions in some of Colonel Durand’s despatches may explain, though they cannot fully excuse, the exaggerations of the Foreign Office Attaché.

In Colonel Durand’s despatch to Government written from Hooshungabad on the 9th of July 1857, it is not stated that any of Holkar’s troops had attacked the Residency except the three guns and three companies that had

* *Central India in 1857*, p. 53.

† Enclosed is a letter from Sir Robert Hamilton, Governor-General’s Agent in Central India, to the Secretary in the Foreign Department (Gen. No. 309A), No. 47, dated 9th February 1858.

been stationed there ; but, "besides Holkar's troops", says Colonel Durand in this despatch (par. 29), "a large mob of armed men from the city of Indore joined in the attack." He does, indeed, in paragraph 28, report that the unarmed clerks and their families, "living at some distance from the Residency", were "intercepted" and "butchered by Holkar's troops, horse and foot, who, with additional guns, came crowding down to support the attack". But he does not say that what occurred "at some distance from the Residency" came under his own observation, or that of any of his party. Subsequent inquiries proved that these reports as to more troops and "additional guns", set on foot by the mutineers in our own ranks, were false.

The important enclosure to this despatch, the military report from Colonel Travers, speaks of no assailants or opponents except the "Regular Infantry" and "three guns", "sent by the Maharajah Holkar for the protection of the Residency." He says not a word as to any hostile Cavalry, additional guns, or troops of any description arriving, or looming in the distance.

It is true that Colonel Travers (par. 5) says ;—"I was led to believe by reports from my Cavalry that our left flank would be immediately assailed by troops from the city, who were said to be working round into our rear." But these troops from the city, malignantly conjured up to create panic, or to excuse cowardice, evidently never hove in sight, or Colonel Travers could not possibly have abstained from bringing forward such convincing proof of the hopelessness of further resistance.

Mr. Durand in his pamphlet produces an exaggerated effect by introducing this alarming report brought forward by the recreant troopers, as if it represented a real incident. "*Some of Holkar's guns and Cavalry were moving round to cut off the retreat, and they*", the troopers, "intended to make their escape before it was too late".* In a subsequent passage he says :—"After Holkar's troops had begun to cut off the retreat, there was no time left to wait."† But it is quite untrue that anyone "*had begun to cut off the retreat*". The line of retreat on Mhow was quite open, and there was no pursuit.

In complete harmony, as might be expected, with his

* *Central India in 1857*, pp. 24, 25.

† *Ibid.*, p. 56.

original report, the pamphlet of Lieut.-General Travers,—modest and candid in its narrative, though bitterly hostile in vague imputations against Holkar,—tells us nothing of rebel Cavalry, in the open or under cover. He says the Residency was attacked by “*a small party*” of Holkar’s troops.* In describing “the position and strength of the two opposing forces”, just before the retreat began, the General says:—“The enemy had three field guns, one more or less damaged, nine or ten companies of Infantry (I cannot now state positively the exact number)”,—there were, in fact, only three companies,—“and an increased armed crowd from the direction of the City”. And he declares the impossibility of holding out any longer “almost within pistol-range of six hundred Infantry with artillery”.†

Not a word as to swarms of Cavalry. It is quite clear that no rebel Cavalry were present, except, perhaps, a dozen or so of stragglers in addition to the “eight troopers” who, according to General Travers,‡ accompanied Saadut Khan on his arrival, and who doubtless were cowed by the dashing charge of the English Commandant, in which their leader was wounded.

What, indeed, can have been the meaning of that leader, Saadut Khan, quitting the field in search of reinforcements, except that his attack had failed, and he saw that without more men and more show of authority, the work could never be done? To murder helpless clerks and their families, to burn and plunder houses, was, unfortunately, an easy task; but the attack had failed, and the Maharajah’s troops were *not* swarming up to join in it. He went to the Palace to obtain the Maharajah’s countenance and the aid of Cavalry. That attempt failed also; Saadut Khan was shut up for some hours, and Colonel Durand’s party, of whom not one was killed and only one wounded, was unmolested in its retreat.

What can have been the meaning of this miscreant being shortly followed by Bans Gopal, the Commandant of the Infantry and guns? Why did he come to the Palace, and make an appeal or apology to the Maharajah? Clearly because the

* *The Evacuation of Indore*, p. 9.

† *Ibid.*, p. 21.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

attack had been a failure, and his men, being doubtful of the sanction of their Prince, or the support of their comrades, had no stomach for the fight.*

Bans Gopal was now so far committed, and probably so gorged with plunder later in the day, that he eventually threw in his lot with the mutineers, and marched away with them, but it is pretty clear that he was not in the actual plot, which, as was proved by Sir Robert Hamilton's inquiries, and confirmed by the evidence at Saadut Khan's trial in 1874, was of purely Mussulman concoction.

We have seen that Colonel Durand in his original despatch of July 9th, 1857, and Colonel Travers in his military report, written when their recollections must have been fresh and vivid, give no evidence as to any Cavalry having taken part in the attack or threatened the retreat, or as to any additional troops or guns from Holkar's lines having reinforced the assailants. But in Colonel Durand's despatch from Mhow, of August 18th, 1857, there is a sentence which seems to extenuate in some degree the exaggerations of Mr. Durand's pamphlet published in 1876. It is as follows:—

"4. Considering the deliberate arrangements made by Holkar's Cavalry for cutting off European fugitives, even before a shot was fired, it was strange that the Durbar should have failed in receiving early intimation that some unusual movement was taking place. When the treacherous attack of Holkar's guns and troops which were at the Residency was supported by additional guns and troops hurrying to the scene of action from their lines, and no word or message came from the Maharajah, there certainly was every appearance that the troops acting so unanimously must be advancing by order of the Durbar. This conclusion was natural, and at once pervaded the few troops that were loyal to the British officers that commanded them."

The words italicised are quite unaccountable, unless we suppose what Colonel Durand calls the "natural conclusion" of our "loyal" troops to have grown and hardened by frequent repetition into a positive assertion. Colonel Travers, in his

* There has been placed in the Appendix (D), as the clearest and most probable explanation of the demeanour and conduct of Holkar's detachment at the Residency on the 1st of July 1857, a memorandum, found among Mr. Dickinson's papers, by an officer of high rank and reputation and of approved services, Bukhshee Khoman Singh, C.S.I., who commanded the Maharajah's Cavalry in 1857, who, as will be mentioned by-and-by, visited England in 1871, and who now commands His Highness's forces.

despatch, mentions the same "natural conclusion" on the part of his men, but obviously as a false, or at least a doubtful report which he could neither verify by his own observation nor confirm by authentic intelligence.

It was a great mistake to say that "*deliberate arrangements were made by Holkar's Cavalry for cutting off European fugitives*". It was a great mistake to say that "*the treacherous attack was supported by additional guns and troops*", "*advancing as if by order of the Durbar*". No such movements were observed by anyone who took part in the defence of the Residency. No one during the subsequent inquiries testified to any such movements.

If Colonel Durand had ever found "leisure" to "submit his views as to the conduct of Holkar and of his troops", as promised in the last paragraph (32) of his despatch of the 9th of July 1857, he might have corrected these injurious errors, but he never found leisure, and the consequence is that they have remained standing ever since, and have been repeatedly cited in the consultations of Government as a proof of Holkar's unworthiness.

Major McMullen, the Magistrate of Mhow, was appointed by Colonel Durand, when he returned to Indore, to inquire into the occurrences of the 1st of July. As a natural result of Colonel Durand's rash assertion as to "the deliberate arrangements made by Holkar's Cavalry for cutting off European fugitives", Lord Canning was under the impression so late as December 24, 1857, that "the Cavalry were conspicuous in the attack on the Residency on the 1st of July".* Now one of Major McMullen's first operations was to put the Cavalry on their trial. The result was their complete acquittal. It was proved that none of the Cavalry were present at the attack on the Residency, and Major McMullen released them all. General Travers is probably acquainted with this inquiry and its results. Mr. Durand, we may charitably assume, has never come across it.

It is quite certain that not more than about twenty hostile horsemen were present, even as lookers on, during the attack on the Residency; that no "additional guns" arrived; and

* *Further Papers, Mutinies*, (No. 6 of 1858) p. 193.

that no regularly formed body of Holkar's troops came up from their lines to aid the mutineers. A great number of stragglers, chiefly Infantry Sepoys, joined with the rabble from the city, and more may have been dropping in as the retreat commenced; but all the recorded evidence proves that until the news came that the English officers had gone, and that the treasury was being plundered, Holkar's troops did *not* utterly break loose or swarm up to the Residency.

Some of the Durbar troops did not go to the Residency at all on that day; a certain number were accounted for as on guard at the Palace and other posts; some, including the Maharajah's Household Cavalry, obeyed the orders to remain in their quarters. According to the best approximate estimate that could be made, it appeared that only a very small proportion of Holkar's total force had reached the Residency before the retreat,—probably not more than three or four hundred. And all the evidence proved that far from there being "*every appearance that the troops*" were "*acting unanimously*", or "*advancing by order of the Durbar*", they came up in twos and threes, in just such a disorderly rout as might be expected when all were, like the British Sepoys, deserters and mutineers, disobeying the orders of the Durbar that they should not leave their lines. The utter overthrow of discipline that followed the news of the British officers having retired, the impulse of curiosity, and the greed of plunder, led nearly all the troops to visit the Residency in the course of the day, but the only organised body that actually attacked the Residency consisted of Holkar's three guns, and as many men of the three companies of Infantry as could be induced to act, the whole being set on by Saadut Khan, accompanied by a dozen or so of horsemen. The evidence on which Sir Robert Hamilton's despatch of January 5th, 1858, was framed, proved that not more than about fifty of Holkar's Sepoys were with the guns when they opened fire.

The affair of the Indore Residency on the 1st of July 1857 was, with the exception of the daring charge of Colonel Travers, entirely an artillery duel, "a game of long bowls", in which, it must also be remarked, our side had the best of it, for while only one of our men, Sergeant Murphy, was wounded,

we disabled one of the enemy's guns by a round shot, which is not likely to have occurred without some of the enemy being killed. The incredible cowardice of the mutineers is almost enough to prove their numerical weakness. They did not dare even to make a demonstration of their strength, such as it was. Dr. Thomson declared, in words already quoted, that "*from the beginning of the mutiny he never saw the mutineers*". Holkar's men obviously felt that Saadut Khan's leadership was no sufficient guaranty of the Maharajah's orders, and they saw that their own Commandant, Bans Gopal, was held back by similar doubts. The stragglers who arrived before Colonel Durand's retirement were actuated by the same misgivings as their comrades of the escort, and had no mind for anything but plunder.

These views are not, indeed, confirmatory of the loose and unverified statements in Colonel Durand's despatches of the 13th and 18th of August 1857, which were never defined or confirmed by himself or anyone else, but they are in accordance with the testimony collected by Major McMullen and Sir Robert Hamilton, and with the original reports of Colonel Travers and Colonel Durand. They are in accordance with a letter written by Colonel Durand to Lord Lovaine on September the 29th, 1857, in which he speaks of "the humiliation of being forced to withdraw before an enemy that I despised, and who, could I have got anything to fight, would have been easily beaten back. As it was, with only fourteen Golundauz who would stand by their guns, we not only held our own for about a couple of hours, but beat back their guns, and gained temporary advantage". "*We retired unmolested in the face of superior masses, whose appetite for blood had been whetted by the murder of unarmed men, women, and children.*"* Can anyone believe that Holkar's troops, with "*additional guns*", "*Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery, in a mass*", were "*pouring up*", "*swarming*", or "*surging*", at any time during the perilous hour and a half, or while Colonel Durand was retiring "*unmolested*"?

* *Kaye's Sepoy War*, vol. iii, pp. 332, 333.

Although Colonel Durand thought it necessary to leave the Indore territory, his Assistants remained. Although he acted as if Mhow was an unsafe place, they stood fast in Mhow, and cooperated with Holkar for the promotion of Imperial interests. The two senior officers, Colonel Platt and Major Harris, having been killed, the military command at Mhow devolved upon Captain Townsend Hungerford of the Artillery, who, also, on the 3rd of July, in the absence of Colonel Durand, assumed political responsibilities, and re-established at once the most friendly relations with the Maharajah Holkar.

One of Colonel Durand's Assistants, Captain Elliot, found his way to Mhow from an out-station within two or three days of the outbreak.

For more than three weeks after his retreat nothing had been heard from Colonel Durand by any of his Assistants, by Captain Hungerford, who by force of circumstances had fallen into the charge both of military and political affairs, or by the Maharajah. They had all written to him, but the Agent would not vouchsafe a reply. That critical period had been well employed by the English gentlemen at Mhow, with Holkar's help, in restoring postal and telegraphic communications, in regaining a firm hold over local resources, and in smoothing the way for military operations. The Maharajah, fortified by friendly intercourse with our officers, was able to tranquillise the country, and to spread abroad a general impression that the cause of the insurgents was doomed. If Colonel Durand's Assistants had followed their superior's example, or if Captain Hungerford had shrunk from responsibility, Holkar and his Ministers, in the absence of any British political authority, would have lost much, if not all, of their influence for good, and the rebellious faction and predatory tribes of Malwa would have gained proportionate strength.

The first communication received by Holkar from Colonel Durand after the 1st of July, was an alarming letter dated the 3rd of August 1857, containing two charges against his Highness, of having held aloof during the attack on the Residency, and of having allowed supplies and carriage to be furnished to the mutineers. The first letter from Colonel Durand to

any of the officers at Mhow was received on the 25th of July by his Assistant, Captain Hutchinson, and disapproved of that officer having assumed the Agency. Perhaps, under the circumstances in which Colonel Durand found himself, the tone of these letters cannot be wondered at. He could not make a virtual acknowledgment of his own great error. He could not frankly commend the work of Captains Hungerford, Elliot, and Hutchinson without making it very apparent that it was his own work they had taken in hand. He could not afford to reciprocate the "regret" expressed by the gentlemen at Mhow that he had thought proper "to quit that part of the country"; but at the same time it was not easy for him to contradict or rebuke them. So he left their letters unanswered and unnoticed.

Colonel Macpherson, even when compelled to leave Gwalior by the inability of Scindia to control his own troops, maintained an "almost daily" communication with the Maharajah and his Minister,* and kept them in good heart by constant counsel and encouragement. When Colonel Durand left his post—not compelled, as we have seen, for he might have gone to Mhow, and not leaving it vacant, for his Assistants remained,—he stopped all communication for nearly a month with the English officers, and for more than a month with the Prince to whom he was accredited. Not a word of counsel or of encouragement came from him. And when he at last thought fit to re-open a correspondence with the Prince, its tone and tenor were those of suspicious discontent and bitter imputation. The attitude which he assumed towards Captain Hungerford and his own Assistants, and the manner in which he found fault with their proceedings, and made light of their services, in his reports to Government, evinced the same spirit of perverse detraction.

The civil and military officers at Mhow repeatedly and most warmly expressed their goodwill and gratitude to Holkar, and, so far as they could, gave the strongest testimony in his Highness's favour. But these gentlemen had not the same power and influence that Colonel Macpherson, the Resident at Gwalior, had. And although Colonel Durand

* *Return to the Lords, Honours and Rewards, etc.* (77 of 1860), p. 103.

would not notice the Maharajah's letters, did not choose to answer those from the officers at Mhow, expressing their "regret" at his "having quitted this part of the country", and at his "mistaken impression regarding Holkar",* and did not send in his promised report on the conduct of Holkar and the Durbar, he never ceased corresponding privately with the Viceroy, Lord Canning.

In his despatch from Mhow, No. 207 of the 18th of August 1857, to the Government of India (paragraph 7), Colonel Durand says :—

"I have never approved of the assumption of the Agent's powers by Captain Hungerford, Captain Elliot, and Lieut. Hutchinson, when communication with myself at Sehore, Hoshungabad, and Asseerghur was easy and rapid. What was necessary for the security and supply of the military post in the Fort of Mhow, was the duty of Major Cooper, of the 23rd Native Infantry, the senior officer present, to perform. Why Captain Hungerford assumed the powers he did, I can neither understand nor approve; nor can I approve that men in the position of dependence upon Holkar, like Lieut. Hutchinson and the occupants of the Mhow Fort, should assume the political functions of the Agent, and in utter ignorance of what had taken place at Indore, should take upon themselves, contrary to the express orders of the Governor-General in Council, to judge the conduct of Holkar and the Durbar."

He forgets that nobody knew where he was, and that he did not write to Hungerford and his Assistants, or answer their letters. In declaring that "the occupants of the Mhow Fort"—manned by a Company of English Artillery and a hundred unemployed officers and volunteers, well armed with guns, amply supplied with ammunition—were "in a position of dependence upon Holkar", Colonel Durand very strangely seems to give Holkar credit for more absolute military domination, and as ought to follow, for more perfect protection of British honour and interests in Malwa, than the Maharajah himself would have claimed, and certainly more than the gallant "occupants of the Mhow Fort" would have admitted.

The following sentence in a letter, dated 12th of July, from Hungerford to him, was innocently calculated to be very galling to Colonel Durand, an Engineer officer, and peculiarly so if he and Colonel Travers had decided,—as their

* Appendix E, VI.

messenger on the 1st of July 1857, reported,—on not going to Mhow, because they believed that Holkar was going to attack it.

“This fort, thanks to the hard labour of the Europeans, has been placed in such a state of defence, and we are so well provisioned, that it would take an army to attack it.”*

Six weeks after the receipt of this letter, Colonel Durand takes upon himself to say that, during his absence, Hungerford, Elliot, and Hutchinson, had been “*in a position of dependence on Holkar*”. Yet he gives no credit to Holkar, and objects to a “favourable report” being made on his Highness’s “conduct”.

For Colonel Durand thus continues :—

“It was, however, an object with the Durbar to anticipate, if possible, a deliberate review of its conduct, by obtaining favourable reports and opinions which might clog after-measures, and these gentlemen all fell into the trap.”

So did Lord Elphinstone, likewise, if there was any “trap”, is the natural comment on this very ungracious remark, for the Governor of Bombay at once responded to Holkar’s letter of the 1st of July, and sent a sharp rebuke and warning to Colonel Durand on the subject of his “harbouring prejudices” against the Maharajah.

Some allowance may be made for the tone assumed by Colonel Durand, who may not have been aware, until he received the reply to his despatch, of the unqualified praise accorded to Major Hungerford; but Mr. Durand, an Attaché in the Foreign Office, who has evidently had access to all the papers, can hardly have overlooked this fact. Much may be forgiven on the plea of filial piety, but not quite so much as this. When Mr. Durand presumes to sneer at the military capacity and at the political proceedings of Major Hungerford,

* See Appendix C, VI. The following extract from Hungerford’s letter to the Government of Bombay, No. 428, of July 8th, 1857, will show the promptitude of his defensive measures. “3. By the evening of the 3rd a heavy battery was mounted and in position in front of the North gate of the Fort. The North battery consists of one 10-inch howitzer, one 8-inch, one 24-pounder, one 18-pounder, and two 12-pounders. The South battery, of four 18-pounders, was armed on the morning of the 5th. Supplies of all descriptions are laid in for one month. Two light guns are also mounted on each of the four corner bastions of the fort.”

who died in 1858, when he takes upon himself to say that this gallant officer "was not strong before the outbreak", "was not ready during the outbreak", and "was injudicious after the outbreak",* he commits, to say the least, an impertinence, aggravated by his official position and special information. Captain Hungerford's conduct received the unreserved approval of all the authorities at the time,—of the Viceroy in Council, of the Commander-in-Chief, of the Commandant of Artillery, and of the Bombay Government,—of everyone except Colonel Durand, who was not an authority at all, and whose strictures were not accepted by his superiors.

From the moment Colonel Durand left Sehore, the capital of the Begum of Bhopal,—from the moment that he decided not to retreat on the European garrison at Mhow,—he could find no resting-place till he reached Hoshungabad, 160 miles due East of Indore. Colonel Durand's representations from that place of refuge made an impression on the Governor-General that no weight of evidence subsequently received from Western India was able to efface,—an impression which Colonel Durand renewed and kept up during his close attendance on Lord Canning after Sir Robert Hamilton's return.

Holkar's good deeds of active help while Colonel Durand was away, were done in connection with the officers at Mhow and the Government of Bombay, and it was chiefly towards the West that Holkar's good offices were most efficacious. The officers at Mhow, Major Hungerford, Captains Hutchinson and Elliot, Major Timmins at Mahidpore, Colonel Showers at Neemuch, Lord Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay,—all who remained during July within the range of Holkar's influence,—were loud in his praise.

But Colonel Durand, far from giving any one credit—not even to Lord Elphinstone—for what had been done in Malwa during his absence in July, found fault with Major Hungerford, the Commandant of Mhow, and with his own Assistants, Hutchinson and Elliot, and said unpleasant things of them, without effect, in his reports to the Government of India. No wonder Lord Elphinstone's forebodings were fulfilled,

* *Central India in 1857*, p. 63.

and Colonel Durand still "harboured prejudices against Holkar".

It is argued here that Colonel Durand was prejudiced against Holkar, and that he committed an error of judgment in not moving on Mhow,—also, that the erroneous prejudice was partly generated, and altogether confirmed, by the erroneous movement. But the acceptance of this argument by no means requires that we should undertake the responsibility of blaming Colonel Durand. An error of judgment may be inevitable; a prejudice may be irresistible. It is not even necessary for our argument to insist that there was an error of judgment at all. A retirement on Mhow may, without any disadvantage to Holkar's cause, be assumed to have been impossible. All that we must urge is that Holkar's honour and interests have suffered solely because Colonel Durand *did not* go to Mhow. He knew it was right to go to Mhow,—ordered a retreat in that direction, but thought he could not carry it out. If he had pushed on to Mhow on the 1st of July, he would have been in communication with Holkar that same evening, and from that hour the Prince would have been the Agent's coadjutor. Who can believe that Colonel Durand would then have put hard constructions on the motives of Holkar and the Durbar? Occupying the same position and engaged in the same work as Major Hungerford actually was in that same month of July, he must have taken Major Hungerford's view of Holkar's conduct. While daily intercourse and active co-operation prevailed, Colonel Durand could no more have made imputations against the Prince and his Ministers, than he could, in the midst of social harmony and regular subordination, have called for censure on his brother officers and Assistants. His unfortunate withdrawal Eastward was the sole cause of this double misunderstanding. It is hard that Holkar should suffer for it.

It is curious to observe that those who defend Colonel Durand's proceedings and impugn Holkar's claim for reparation, have recently adopted the course of declaring that

Holkar's loyalty has never been called in question, but only his alacrity and energy on the morning of the outbreak; of denying Colonel Durand's prejudices, of suggesting that he never thought *very* badly of Holkar, and that, whatever his first suspicions may have been, he soon arrived at a fair judgment.

One exception to this new line of argument is to be seen in the pamphlet of General Travers, who strongly corroborates our belief as to the mistrust which from the first gave weakness to the British Agent's plans, when he can find "no proof that Durand did or did not", before the outbreak, "put faith in Holkar's loyalty",* and in the following sentence:—*"I have no hesitation in saying that Durand, up to the time of the outbreak, did not consider Holkar altogether against us"*,†—a form of words that certainly signifies mistrust "up to the outbreak" and something worse after it, and doubtless describes very correctly the state of Colonel Durand's mind. What good opportunities of ascertaining the state of Colonel Durand's mind were enjoyed by General Travers will be seen in the following words from the opening page of his pamphlet:—"My official position placed me in constant communication with Durand, and these conversations necessarily were of a confidential nature".

General Travers is, in truth, a living and unimpeachable witness to the strength of those prejudices which his deceased friend entertained, and which more wary disputants would fain cast into the shade. The General, without actually imputing treason to the Maharajah, conceives himself justified in insinuating that Holkar could not have been as innocent of complicity in the outbreak as Sir John Kaye has pronounced him to have been. He writes without bringing forward any evidence that would render probable the charge which he seems inclined to make, though he shrinks from expressing it in so many words. He speaks of his Highness in bitter terms, which tell of the suspicions instilled into his mind at the time, and the taint they have left behind them, but which can add no weight at all to his guesses and his inferences. But General Travers is so perfectly trustworthy as to matters

* *Evacuation of Indore*, p. 7.

† *Ibid.*, p. 9.

within his own observation, that the simple record of his recollections is most useful in enabling us to get some insight into the feelings and motives of the actors in the scene, and into the origin of the prejudices against Holkar.

For example, we must not attribute merely to his ignorance of local forms and customs the blunder into which he has fallen in blaming Holkar for "holding aloof", and not paying visits to the British Agent (*ante*, p. 78). Into this blunder, as into all his blunders, he tells us that he was led by reports from "*Natives*", not otherwise named or specified, except in some instances as "*my men*",—"one of *my Sepoys*",—"a *trooper*" or "*troopers*"—some of those double-faced troopers whom the gallant Colonel still considers to have been "loyal".

The General's testimony may be implicitly accepted when he thus frankly acquaints us with the fact that he also partook in that undue reliance on the veracity and fidelity of his men, to which so many devoted officers of Sepoy corps fell victims. And when he says:—"While our guns were being withdrawn, I was twice informed by troopers that considerable bodies of the enemy were crossing the Mhow road with, as they supposed, the intention of cutting off our retreat";* and in another place "*On the field at Indore, one of my Sepoys (Gunesh Singh, I think) told me that the Maharajah had ordered the attack,*"—that "*most of the Sepoys had heard the order given, and that it had turned many against us*",† there can be no doubt of the fact that these reports—proved to be utterly false—were actually set on foot by the mutinous cowards of our Contingents. They were spread abroad with the obvious intention of creating panic and clearing out the Residency for plunder, and Durand and Travers confessedly commenced the retreat under the impression that these reports were true. These treacherous reports turned them off the Mhow road, and kept them away from Mhow.

The words which immediately follow those last quoted, "I attributed the report to the excitement of the day, and thought no more about it, until after I heard how the mutiny was brought about", seem to require explanation. According to what he "heard", how was "the mutiny brought about"? Does he mean

* *The Evacuation of Indore*, p. 15.

† *Ibid.*, p. 12, footnote.

that he "heard" from Colonel Durand, or had any other grounds for believing, that "the mutiny was brought about" by Holkar? This is a specimen, perhaps the worst, of the General's tantalising style when he wanders from the region of his own experience and perceptions. He then gives us no facts, no grounds of belief, not even a bold avowal, nothing but hints and insinuations, of which we can only guess the source.

In the same way, when the General says:—"It is in evidence that the Maharajah did not give this order",* it is an instance of his undeviating correctness of statement. But when he says:—"The fact is, his Highness's mind swayed to and fro as our prospects darkened or brightened,"† and "He succumbed; and but for the Bukhshee and the Bhao Sahib, he would not have had the benefit of those clearing letters and deeds written and done at their suggestion",‡ we see clearly that he is merely repeating the suspicions and sentiments of Colonel Durand, formed amid the irritation and miseries of his failure and flight, and confirmed by the perplexities of explaining a failure which might so easily have been turned into a success, and justifying so distant a flight, when a place of safety was close at hand.

"The Bukhshee§ and the Bhao Sahib"|| were the Maharajah's bosom councillors, and the suggestion of any divergence of views or of behaviour between them and their master is as unfounded as it is unjust.

General Travers, in a manner which, after making every allowance for inveterate prejudice, must be termed rash and unjustifiable, ventures to cast doubt on two most undoubted instances of the humanity and friendliness with which Holkar acted in the first week of July 1857. He denies that Holkar "gathered up the remains of the English treasure, and sent it under safe escort to Hungerford at Mhow". "I think", says the General,—that word "think" being a full admission of his rashness,—"it will be found that Holkar made no effort to protect our Treasury, that the mutineers helped themselves to

* *Evacuation of Indore*, p. 10.

† *Ibid.*, p. 10.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

§ Khoman Singh, now C.S.I., Commandant of his Highness's forces, the Maharajah's fellow pupil and most intimate companion from youth to manhood.

|| Ramchunder Rao Bhao (deceased) was Holkar's Minister in 1857, and for several years afterwards.

as much as they could carry off; and that, on their departure, the Parsee Treasury clerks gathered up the remains, and applied for an escort and carriage to convey it to Mhow".* The only accurate statement here is that the mutineers "helped themselves to as much as they could carry off". It is admitted that Holkar could not fight the mutineers of the Mhow Brigade and of the British Contingents with his own troops, who had caught the contagion from ours, or protect the British treasury from plunder. But the salvage of what was left was entirely done under Holkar's orders and by his own servants, without assistance from any Parsee clerks. The whole process is carefully recorded, and attested by the receipts of the British officers at Mhow.†

But worse than this, General Travers denies the protection of human life by Holkar on the 1st of July and up to the 4th, when the Mhow mutineers took their departure. In a confused and partially unintelligible paragraph he roundly declares that "*Holkar did not conceal or shelter any of the few connected with us who were left still alive at Indore. This act of humanity emanated from a Fakeer and Tylah. Among the sheltered were the Durbar officers, Seroop Narrain, Dhurm Nana, and here and there a Eurasian. Eventually some went to the Palace*".‡ In the last short sentence the General seems to contradict himself, for if some, including "*here and there a Eurasian*", "*eventually went to the Palace*", they were "*eventually*" concealed and sheltered there by Holkar. The whole paragraph is absurd and inexcusable. Of the mysterious "*Fakeer and Tylah*",—whatever that may mean,—no one has ever heard anything. Can the General give any information about him? What was his name? Were his services ever acknowledged or rewarded in any way? The protection afforded in his Palace by the Maharajah was warmly acknowledged, not only by the Viceroy, but by three Europeans, Messrs. Norris, Farrell, and Sargon, and seven Eurasians, besides several Native Christians, and English-speaking Natives, among whom were Dhurm Narrain and Seroop Narrain, who were not, as General Travers imagines, "*Durbar*

* *Evacuation of Indore*, p. 12, footnote.

† Appendix I.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

officers", but were, and still are, servants of the British Government.* The mutineers on the 2nd of July clamoured for their heads, and for those of Holkar's Minister, the Bhao Sahib, and of Bukhshee Khoman Singh (now C.S.I.), and their demands were resolutely resisted by Holkar, at the peril of his own life. The certainty of those well established facts cannot be shaken by such ill-constructed and inconsistent detractions as those to which General Travers has been so ill-advised as to give the sanction of his name.

At almost every turn where a worse aspect can be given to the incidents of the outbreak by exaggeration, General Travers and Mr. Durand equally and invariably give way, either to misstatements in which they have carelessly trusted, or to their hasty misconstruction of the documents before them. For example, great odium and obloquy have naturally, though most unjustly, fallen upon Holkar, on account of the deplorable massacre of unarmed clerks and their families. The two gentlemen above-mentioned increase the number of those killed, and enhance the horror of the scene by speaking of all the victims as if they were English. Mr. Durand says that "Holkar's" troops were "satiated by the slaughter of some forty Europeans".†

When General Travers, having reduced the three Europeans, seven East Indians, besides Christian and loyal Natives, who were saved in the Palace, into "*here and there a Eurasian*", refers to the exact number of Christian persons murdered on the day of the outbreak, he does it in the following words :—

"The Maharajah ordered that *the thirty-nine bodies of Englishmen, women, and children*, slaughtered by his troops on the first, and which lay scattered about where they fell, should be buried."‡

So much is true that all were decently buried in coffins by his Highness's orders. Assuredly it is not for us to set up distinctions of race when the sacredness of life is in question, or to treat lightly the slaughter of men and women of any

* Both of these Native gentlemen are distinguished public servants. Dhurm Narrain is Meer Moonshee to the Governor-General's Agency at Indore. His brother, Seroop Narrain, is Bheel Agent at Maunpore.

† *Central India in 1857*, p. 26.

‡ *The Evacuation of Indore*, pp. 10, 11, footnote.

complexion, but, as a matter of fact, indignation and horror are more easily and strongly roused where our own fellow-countrymen are concerned, and the erroneous assertions of Mr. Durand and General Travers are calculated to rouse them unduly. Not "*forty Europeans*", nor "*thirty-nine Englishmen, women and children*", were slain on the 1st of July 1857, but *two*. The exact number of names mentioned in the tablet placed in the cemetery at Indore in memory of those killed, is twenty-two, besides whom there were three belonging to the family of Mr. Beauvais who were separately interred, making a total of twenty-five. And out of these, *two*, Mr. Ross MacMahon, Civil Engineer, and Mr. Thomas Henry Brooke, of the Telegraph Department, were English. The rest were all East Indians of mixed extraction. One of them, Mr. Alphonso, a native Portuguese of Goa, was the Maharajah Holkar's bandmaster, and not a British subject or servant. And although some of Holkar's men were proved to have taken part in acts of murder and incendiarism on that day, and suffered accordingly, these crimes were chiefly the work of the fanatics and ruffians who flocked in from the City.

Mr. H. M. Durand is, on the whole, much more mild and moderate, both in matter and manner, than General Travers. He repeats, with some exaggerations that are not easily to be explained or excused, the early errors of Colonel Durand as to the share in the outbreak taken by the Maharajah's troops, and as to the position and authority of the ringleader in the plot. But having evidently been enabled to consult all the official documents in the Calcutta Foreign Office, knowing the stage that has now been reached, and recognising the necessity of diverging from the course hitherto pursued, Mr. Durand does not rashly venture, like General Travers, to reproduce the original imputations against the loyalty of Holkar, or to assert plainly, in the unwarranted words of Colonel Durand, that some "*members of the Durbar*" were "*leaders in the insurrection*". He is more cautious. He takes care not to make his own white too white, but he seems anxious also to convey the idea that Colonel Durand's black was not so very black. He asserts that Colonel Durand's "treatment of Holkar was never harsh or hostile"; and declares that if

Colonel Durand "misjudged or maligned Holkar, he was a bad political officer, or a dishonest man".* Without pleading for a conclusion so strong in its condemnatory language as Mr. Durand suggests, issue may be joined on his own terms. It will be shown that Holkar was "misjudged and maligned" by Colonel Durand, and was treated in a manner both "harsh and hostile".

Mr. Durand admits that "to begin with, Colonel Durand certainly imagined that Holkar had thrown in his lot against us". But, he says, there is "no necessity" for "entering upon a discussion of Holkar's loyalty". "The justification of Colonel Durand's after-treatment of Holkar depends, not upon the proof of Holkar's bad faith, but upon the fact that that treatment itself was never harsh or hostile."† All that the Colonel did, according to Mr. Durand, was to argue that a Prince must be held "*prima facie* responsible" for "the conduct of his troops". "A loyal Chief could easily produce evidence to rebut the presumption in his own case. Holkar himself, for example, produced such evidence, and it was immediately received with favour by Colonel Durand."‡

It would not seem as if the evidence in Holkar's defence was received with much "favour", when on the 18th of August 1857 the best thing that Colonel Durand can say on behalf of Holkar is that "he *may* have been as ignorant of what was plotting as he represents", without expressing belief in his ignorance, coupled with the erroneous assertion that some of "*those who surrounded his person*", and some "*members of the Durbar*", were "*actual participators and leaders in the insurrection*".§

It would not seem as if much "favour", or much consideration, had been given to the evidence exculpating the Maharajah and his ministers, when in that same letter Colonel Durand made the inaccurate statement that "*the treacherous attack was supported by additional guns and troops*", "*advancing as if by order of the Durbar*".||

Immediately after the appearance of the *Calcutta Review*

* *Central India in 1857*, p. 60 and p. 52.

† *Ibid.*, p. 60.

§ *Ante*, pp. 69, 70.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

|| *Ante*, p. 35.

for April 1876, containing Mr. Durand's essay, "*Central India in 1857*,"* it was noticed in the *Pioneer*, published at Allahabad, on Thursday, 6th April 1876, the writer declaring himself to have known the late Sir Henry Durand "intimately, both in official and social life". These words were not needed to prove the personal bias of the article, or to add to the internal evidence of its being the work of a Bengal Civilian having access, like Mr. Durand, to the records of the Calcutta Foreign Office.

The *Pioneer* article contains only one sentence that calls for notice, which, though bearing the appearance of being favourable to Holkar, is really most injurious to him, and most unfairly apologetic for Colonel Durand. After saying that "Holkar had done nothing on the morning of the 1st of July" 1857, the writer erroneously observes "Durand assumed at the time that the Maharajah was unable to do anything, that his Highness's authority was set at nought by his own rebellious forces". A writer in the Foreign Office ought to have known better; Durand "assumed" nothing of the sort "at the time"; he assumed that he was "attacked by Holkar", and wrote to that effect to Lord Elphinstone, denouncing the Maharajah's "*treachery*" as "*of the true Mahratta stamp*". "The Cavalry", he said, "never recovered from the surprise of Holkar's treachery".† Here are two strange errors combined,—one as to "Holkar's treachery", the other as to the attack having been any "surprise" to the men of our Contingents. Lord Elphinstone at once repelled the former error in a letter to Lord Canning dated the 13th of July 1857, and in another to Colonel Durand himself, dated a few days later, begging him "not to harbour any prejudices against Holkar", and conveying, in fact, a warning and a rebuke to him on the subject of his unfounded suspicions.‡

The second error, as to a "surprise", was confessed and corrected by Colonel Durand himself, when in his despatch of the 13th of August 1857, he wrote :—"There cannot be the slightest doubt that their attack" [that of Holkar's troops] "on the Residency was concerted with the Bhopal and Malwa Contingents."

* Reprinted as a pamphlet (Ridgway, London), 1876.

† *Kaye's Sepoy War*, vol. iii, p. 347.

‡ *Sepoy War*, vol. iii, pp. 349, 350.

The former and far more important error, as to Holkar's "treachery", was never fully and fairly admitted; the unfounded suspicions and prejudices were "harboured" throughout the subsequent proceedings, and were privately exhibited in the Secretariat and Council at Calcutta, whenever Sir Henry Durand could find an excuse for bringing them out.

Colonel Durand never seems to have recalled to mind any of the creditable facts of the 1st of July 1857, or to have given them the prominent position they deserved, in his letters to Lord Canning—never seems to have said anything about the numerous instances of active aid and loyal co-operation by the Maharajah Holkar within the first week after the mutinies at Indore and Mhow. These facts might have been mentioned in Colonel Durand's promised report, "at leisure", on "the conduct of Holkar, the Durbar, and the troops", but that leisure, unfortunately, was never found.

And thus alone can the fact be extenuated that Mr. Durand, who evidently, and perhaps naturally, considers himself justified in reproducing or paraphrasing his father's assertions, and in ignoring his omissions, ventures on the following comprehensive depreciation of Holkar's merits.

"It was confessedly in 1857 the Maharajah's misfortune to be powerless. He was not therefore in a position to render any conspicuous active service to the British Government."*

Here we have, under his son's hand, the general impression to be derived from Colonel Durand's most favourable, or neutral, representations regarding Holkar.†

The reports on the conduct of Holkar and the Durbar, from Captain Hungerford and Sir Robert Hamilton, which do, in fact, supply the place of Colonel Durand's unfulfilled promise of a report, seem always hitherto to have been summarily set aside, as if of no authority. Nor is this exclusion of testimony quite unaccountable, if we look at the successive positions occupied by Colonel Durand.

* *Central India in 1857*, p. 61.

† In Appendix E will be found a few extracts from official documents, which may give some little insight into the proceedings of Holkar and the Durbar, during Colonel Durand's retirement, at the time when Mr. Durand says it was "*the Maharajah's misfortune to be powerless*".

If, when "on special duty", and in close attendance on Lord Canning, for the first year after his departure from Indore in December 1857, Colonel Durand counteracted the efforts of Sir Robert Hamilton at a distance,—if as Foreign Secretary, having charge of the records, and as Member of Council, having great control over them, Colonel Durand felt it his duty to reject or to ignore the despatches of Hungerford, Hutchinson and Sir Robert Hamilton, his action was in perfect consistency and continuity with what it had been from August to December 1857, after his return to Mhow from his temporary retirement. He then refused to recognise that Hungerford and Hutchinson had filled his place, pronounced them to have been "in a position of dependence upon Holkar", and therefore incompetent "to judge the conduct of his Highness and the Durbar". At Mhow he clearly made as light of their experience and of their views as he subsequently did at Calcutta.

The consequences of this line of action have been very remarkable. Nothing is more distinctly characteristic in the symptoms of this case than the incessant recurrence of dark and vague imputations against Holkar's conduct, unsupported by a shadow of evidence, and not even shaped into a charge. When Colonel Durand went away from his post, his Assistants remained. They set about the task which he left behind him. And yet, when their efforts, combined with Holkar's, had smoothed the way for the British Agent to return, his reports of what he had not seen, and of the operations in which he had not taken part, and of the Prince whom he had seen twice in three months,* seem to have carried more weight and authority at Calcutta than those made by the officers at Mhow who had succeeded in the work which he had abandoned as impracticable, and by Sir Robert Hamilton, who had been fifteen years at Indore.

Colonel Durand alone could have fully explained why he did not pursue the line of investigation pointed out by the British officers who had occupied his place during his absence, against whom, also, he sent to Calcutta an unfounded and abortive accusation. That the testimony of those gallant

* *Ann.*, p. 78.

officers contradicted his original theory of the outbreak, and placed in strong relief his error in avoiding Mhow, are simple matters of fact. That he so far made a show of sticking to his original theory as to admit nothing more than that Holkar *might be as ignorant of the plot as he represented*, while he persisted in the erroneous assertion that *members of his Highness's Durbar were leaders in the insurrection*, is also a simple matter of fact.

How and why he was led into this wrong course, and why he never made the promised report, "at leisure", on the conduct of Holkar and his troops, are only matters of conjecture.

The injurious effect on Holkar's honour and interests of this wrong course having been pursued, is, again, a simple matter of fact. The result was that untrue charges against Holkar's Durbar were over and over again brought forward as the most specific evidence on record, while the best evidence in their favour was cried down, or thrown aside.

The attack upon the Residency at Indore on the 1st of July 1857, was, according to ample evidence collected by British authorities on the spot, not contrived or commenced by any one of Holkar's Court, or by any active officer of his army, or by any one of Hindoo race or creed, but by three Mohammedans,—Saadut Khan, a dismissed and disgraced servant of the Native Prince; Moulavee Abd-oos-samad, a private person living within the Residency precincts, having no connection with Holkar's Government; and the true ring-leader, the Nawab Waris Mohammed Khan, of Bhopal, the only person of rank among them, quite unconnected with the Court of Holkar, and also living within the Residency precincts. In his report to Lord Canning written from Mhow on the 18th of August 1857, Colonel Durand makes the nearest approach to a definite and intelligible accusation, when he describes Saadut Khan as "*in his Highness's Court and about his person*", and declares that some "*members of the Durbar*" "*were leaders in the insurrection*", the only leader whom he had mentioned by name being that same Saadut Khan. Yet Captain Hungerford and Colonel Durand's Assistants, who had occupied his place at Mhow so well during his absence, were fully acquainted with the part played by

the Bhopal Nawab, and with the actual position Saadut Khan had held, and Colonel Durand ought not to have been quite ignorant of these matters when he was writing this report.

Long before this most serious attempt at a charge was made, there was quite evidence enough in the possession of British authorities to prove that Saadut Khan was not "*a member of the Durbar*", or one of those "*in his Highness's Court and about his person*". On the first day that communications were reopened between Indore and our garrison at Mhow,—July 5th, 1857,—Captain Fenwick, an East Indian officer in Holkar's employ, delivered a report on the mutiny to Captain Hungerford, explaining among other matters the position of Saadut Khan, of which a copy was sent to Lord Elphinstone. Subsequently, Fenwick gave Captain Hungerford a copy of his diary during the mutiny, which described why Saadut Khan was in disgrace. During the interval of one month that elapsed before Colonel Durand's return to his post on the 2nd of August, Hungerford and the two Assistants, Captains Hutchinson and Elliot, had ample opportunity of testing all Fenwick's statements about Saadut Khan, and found them strictly true. For several weeks before Colonel Durand's return these officers had been in intimate and friendly communication and constant co-operation with his Highness and the Durbar, and Captain Hutchinson had visited Indore.

On the most favourable supposition, therefore, and without assuming that the true evidence about Saadut Khan was designedly kept back, a totally unfounded accusation against Holkar's Durbar was forwarded to Calcutta, which has glanced off from them to Holkar himself, simply because Colonel Durand did not make a proper use of the records in his office, and did not consult his Assistants and the Commandant of the Mhow garrison, as to the events that had happened and the intelligence that had been collected during his own absence from the Indore territory.

Repeating the same error, Mr. Durand in his pamphlet says, "*A Durbar officer of high rank called them out to the attack*"; and in another passage, "*One of the leaders of the insurgents was a Durbar officer named Saadut Khan, who*

was hanged two years ago for his share in that day's work".* Saadut Khan was not an "officer of high rank", or "a Durbar officer" at all, if by that term is meant an officer who was in the counsels of the Prince and his Ministers, or even on easy terms with them.†

When forwarding to the Government of India the proceedings on the trial of Saadut Khan, in a letter dated the 10th of September 1874, the Governor-General's Agent calls him (paragraph 3) "a man of weight at Indore". He was not "a man of weight", and, strangely enough, the very next words in the despatch,—“his father had been Commandant of Cavalry, in which he was known as Rissaldar; the Customs Department was also under his control”,—suggest his true position, if the Governor-General's Agent had pursued the clue. His uncle and adoptive father had held the high office of Bukhshee or Commandant of Cavalry, and had also been farmer of the Customs, but Saadut Khan's own character and capacity did not recommend him for the military command, though such a succession would have been in accordance with many precedents. He held the rank, and drew the pay of Rissaldar in the Cavalry, though he never did any active duty, and was allowed, on his adoptive father's death, to retain the farm of the Customs. In consequence of some disorders in that Department the charge was transferred to Captain Fenwick, Saadut Khan being made his Deputy on a salary. A few months before the mutiny, Captain Fenwick, having some reason to be displeased with Saadut Khan's conduct, and to doubt his integrity, suspended him from office. He was, when he joined in the conspiracy, not "*a man of weight*", not "*a Durbar officer of high rank*", but a disgraced and discontented man,—disgraced by the Durbar, and discontented with the Durbar's orders. He was a man with a grievance, and his grievance was the refusal of Holkar to recognise him as a Durbar officer, as one entitled to hereditary rank and emolument.

* *Central India in 1857*, pp. 24 and 52.

† Sir Robert Hamilton in one of his despatches calls Saadut Khan "*a Durbar officer*", but evidently only as he calls Holkar's army "*the Durbar troops*". He does not call him an officer of rank or of high rank.

It cannot fail to be observed how this repeated misdescription of Saadut Khan is calculated to raise prejudice against the Maharajah, and what a different light is thrown upon the scene when this man's true history is made clear. His influence, such as it was, only told among the Mohammedans in the ranks of Holkar's Cavalry. Even with them his weight was not sufficient to induce them to assail or to pursue Colonel Durand and his defenceless party.

The chief conspirator at Indore was the Bhopal Nawab, Waris Mohammed Khan, residing under surveillance within the Residency precincts. Colonel Durand may have well felt some reluctance to dwell upon the leading part in the outbreak taken by this person, whose actual presence at the critical hour in so dangerous a locality as Indore, was the direct result of Colonel Durand having failed for the second time to appreciate his fierce and fanatical character.

When Sir Robert Hamilton was at Indore as Agent to the Governor-General, and Colonel Durand filled the subordinate office of Resident at Sehore, the capital of Bhopal, Waris Mohammed Khan had placed himself at the head of a party opposed to the Regent, Secunder Begum, and upheld the claim to the throne of a son of the old titular Nawab, with a view to himself obtaining the Regency. Immediately on hearing of this traitorous intrigue, Sir Robert Hamilton proceeded in person to Sehore, summoned Waris Mohammed Khan before the Durbar, and then and there deported him to the fort of Mundlaur on the Nerbudda, where he was kept in a sort of honourable arrest, confined to certain limits, but not actually imprisoned. While Colonel Durand was occupying Sir Robert Hamilton's place at Indore, in the height of the mutinies, Waris Mohammed Khan applied, on the plea of ill health, and was immediately allowed, to leave Mundlaur and to take up his abode near his old patron, in the Residency Bazar, where he at once set to work. No information on this subject appears in any of Colonel Durand's despatches, but he could hardly have avoided making some allusion to it if he had ever written "at leisure" his promised report on the conduct of Holkar and the Durbar, and had gone into any details as to the conspiracy and the outbreak.

Colonel Durand's inability to furnish Government in the five months between the 9th of July, when the promise was made, and the 15th of December 1857, when he was relieved by Sir Robert Hamilton, with the promised report, "at leisure," on the conduct of Holkar and the Durbar, has operated most cruelly to the detriment of the Mahratta Prince. Although nearly three out of these five months were passed by him at Mhow, without moving,* Colonel Durand never found leisure either to make a distinct charge against Holkar and the Durbar, or to pronounce their acquittal. He never cleared them of the dark hints in his early despatches; he never cleared his own mind of his original suspicions. And thus in the successive offices he filled, Colonel Durand felt it incumbent on him, whenever the occasion offered, to throw out vague imputations of misbehaviour against Holkar, which carried all the weight of his high position and reputation, and which, we may well suppose, were understood to refer to notorious and recorded facts. And yet there were no facts or distinct charges of an injurious nature on record.

There is nothing to fill up the interval between Colonel Durand's despatch of July the 9th and his departure from Indore on the 15th of December 1857, except the letters of August 13th and 18th, which reveal no facts, present no evidence, accuse no specific person, and exculpate no one, but make general suggestions of criminality or connivance against a great number. "Holkar", says the despatch of the 18th of August (paragraph 8), "*may have been as ignorant*" "*as he represents*"—he, therefore, is not exculpated—"but this was not possible as to the Durbar"—they, therefore, are collectively denounced. He says more than this—"some of these were leaders in the insurrection", a statement entirely erroneous, but which Colonel Durand never had an opportunity of correcting. He never submitted his views on the conduct of Holkar and the Durbar, and his inability to carry out his declared intention was most injurious. Definite views and specific charges lead to inquiry and evidence; they can be answered; but dark suggestions may imprint a foul stain

* See *Dhar Not Restored*, by John Dickinson (King, Parliament Street, 1864), pp. 40 to 46.

without the suspected party having any chance of removing it. And, what is worse, dark suspicions, neither confirmed nor dispelled by patient investigation, too frequently leave an obstinate prejudice behind them. This, it can hardly be doubted, was the case with Colonel Durand, the prejudice being somewhat heightened by a bias in favour of his personal credit and consistency.

The promised report on the conduct of Holkar and the Durbar was eventually made by the officer for whom Colonel Durand had been acting, Sir Robert Hamilton, who resumed his office of Governor-General's Agent on the 15th of December 1857. In a despatch, No. 178, dated the 26th of April 1858, Sir Robert Hamilton, having made that careful inquiry into the events of the outbreak, and into the personal conduct of all who were implicated or suspected, for which Colonel Durand had, unfortunately, never found "leisure", praised highly the great services Holkar had rendered to our Government as "a loyal, faithful and steadfast ally", and accorded much credit to his Highness's family and Court.

Although from special causes this despatch did not meet as prompt an acknowledgment, or produce as full an effect as might have been expected, the fact is not the less absolute that no member of Holkar's Durbar received any blame, but that, on the contrary, all of them received "the cordial thanks" of the Government of India in the reply to that despatch, dated the 16th of January 1860.*

Mr. H. M. Durand has already been corrected in these pages, not, it is thought, without cause, or with undue rigour, for presuming to disparage the tried capacity and approved conduct of the late Major Hungerford.† Making every allowance, as in this first instance, for a son adopting, with natural confidence, his father's favourite aversions, preferences and personal claims, it is impossible to pass over in silence the assumptions of credit which Mr. Durand reproduces, at the expense of others not less distinguished than Sir Henry Durand, not less deserving the fair appreciation of their fellow-countrymen and of history. The late Lord Elphinstone

* *Return to the Lords, Honours and Rewards* (No. 77 of 1860), pp. 118 to 125.

† *Ante*, pp. 109, 110.

left no son, but he has a successor, and is not yet forgotten by a large circle of friends. Sir Robert Hamilton is still among us, full of years and honours, and with children and grandchildren to whom his reputation is precious. Mr. Durand, following the only authority he recognises, would sacrifice them both, and at least half a dozen other meritorious officers, to screen his father's mistakes.

The original and essential mistake was that of not retiring on Mhow, and of remaining for an entire month uselessly and sullenly aloof from the Prince who had covered his retreat and averted its ill consequences, and from the brother officers who were efficiently fulfilling his duties. This breach was to be filled up somehow. Mr. Durand, upon what he considers the best grounds possible, fills it up by a picture of Colonel Durand "*securing the line of the Nerbudda*", and hurrying up troops into Central India by his ubiquitous activity, "*entirely disapproving Mr. Plowden's advice*", "*authorising officers to disregard the orders they had received*", and assuming plenary powers in all directions, "*though he knew that the effect of his representations must at best be very uncertain*". Following the course, now become quite familiar, of maligning every one whose discredit may add to the sum of his hero's achievements, Mr. Durand does not shrink from assailing the Commandant of the Bombay column, General Woodburn, declaring that "*he had wasted a fortnight*", and that "*his delay had done irreparable mischief*".* "*So he*" (Colonel Durand) "*determined to go down himself to Aurungabad, or if necessary, to Lord Elphinstone at Bombay, and force up the column by the weight of personal argument.*"

No doubt Mr. Durand has very fairly derived all these detractions and pretensions from the papers of one whose memory is dear to him, a circumstance that very much mitigates the indignation with which he might be asked whether he thinks that only one man in 1857 had a reputation worth preserving, and that only this one man can have left a son or a widow to care for preserving it.

The sole particle of solid fact in the midst of all this fussy claim of having "*secured the line of the Nerbudda*" by re-

* *Central India in 1857*, p. 30.

monstrances, is that Mr. Plowden, the Commissioner of Nagpore, "under a misconception", as Mr. Durand says,* made a suggestion as to the Bombay column passing through his Province, which he withdrew in a few days, and to which no one attached the slightest weight or gave the least attention. "The effect of" Colonel Durand's "representations was", indeed, "very uncertain"; in truth, their effect was most certainly nothing at all. Lord Elphinstone who, with noble self-denial, had organised the Bombay column for service in Malwa from the slender forces at his disposal, and had it well in hand, wanted no "urgent appeals" or "personal argument", from any subordinate officer to "force" him to push it on, and would not have tolerated any such officiousness. When there appeared a chance, from the threatening aspect of affairs in the Nizam's country, that Woodburn's force might have to be kept back, Lord Elphinstone was actually fitting out another column for Mhow. General Woodburn was not detained on the road for a day without good reason; and the best reason of all was that of stamping out the contagion of mutiny at Aurungabad, —contagion which must otherwise have soon spread to the rest of the Nizam's Contingent and to the Madras Division at Hyderabad. There would, indeed, have been "irreparable mischief" if General Woodburn had done that work less effectually than he did. The suggestion which Mr. Durand puts forth, without any specification, of "*irreparable mischief*" having been done, backed by his fantastic assertion that Colonel Durand, "*resolutely holding, in the teeth of orders, the great natural barrier of the Nerbudda, dragged up Woodburn's hesitating column to Mhow*",† besides the open slur on General Woodburn, involves a libel on Lord Elphinstone. The Governor of Bombay never dreamed of abandoning the line of the Nerbudda.‡

It may be doubted whether any other man deserved so much admiration for cool courage and thorough statesmanship

* *Central India in 1857*, p. 30.

† *Ibid.*, p. 39.

‡ From Lord ELPHINSTONE to Captain HUNGERFORD. TELEGRAPH MESSAGE, July 8th, 1857.—"Unforeseen difficulties have prevented the advance of General Woodburn's force. A second column is now being despatched for your relief, comprising European Infantry and Cavalry, and a half troop of Horse Artillery. It will be pushed on as fast as possible."

throughout the worst crisis of the rebellion, as the Governor of Bombay, Lord Elphinstone. He made no display, and wasted no time in superfluous correspondence. To judge by his more conspicuous acts at that time one might suppose that he had nothing to think of but Imperial interests, that he could easily employ his resources in supporting the general campaign, and that he felt quite safe at home. While mutiny was breaking out at many points within his Government, even at his very doors, while every Mahratta district was honey-combed with conspiracy, Lord Elphinstone's blows continued to fall with the weight and certainty of a steam-hammer, but he still contrived to keep everything so serene on the surface, that the world in general has never looked beneath it. Lord Canning's private letters to Lord Clanricarde prove, however, that he knew the enormous danger that had been impending all over the Western Presidency. It was owing to something like a miracle that the Bombay Sepoys did not drift into universal mutiny like their brethren of the Bengal Army, with all the advantages of Mahratta leadership to be derived from the deposed dynasty of Sattara and the suspended dynasty of Kolapore. The miracle consisted in the happy combination of an able Governor like Lord Elphinstone and an enlightened Mahratta Prince like Holkar. Here is a hint from a published official report:—"There is no doubt that if the Mahratta plots in the West had not, by active operations on a comparatively small scale, been nipped in the bud, the great body of rebels in the East,—that is in Central India, Bundelcund, and near the Jumna,—would have acquired much greater strength for resistance on a large scale."* It would be invidious to rake up conspiracies that were wisely covered up or condoned, but the situation may be understood from Lord Elphinstone's declaration that in July 1857 "*the whole country would have risen*", but that "*all the smaller Chiefs*" waited "*to take their cue from*" Holkar.† We have only to call to mind some of the incidents of that month in the Deccan to perceive how critical the time was, and how a very

* Military letter from the Viceroy in Council to the Secretary of State, dated 4th of April 1861, No. 45.—*Papers*, 498 of 1863, p. 5.

† *Ante*, p. 68.

little more temptation would have maddened the Bombay and Madras Armies, and made the whole Peninsula one scene of insurrection. At Nagpore and Sattara treasonable plots were suppressed, and followed by more than forty executions. On the 17th of July an attack was made on the British Residency at Hyderabad; at Aurungabad a mutiny had broken out in one of the Regiments of the Nizam's Contingent; and a general Mussulman rising, which, if supposed to have the sanction of the Nizam, would have drawn the whole Madras Army after it, was only prevented by the firmness and vigilance of the Nawab Salar Jung, and the prompt march of General Woodburn's Bombay force on Aurungabad. On the 27th of July the 27th Bombay Infantry mutinied and murdered three of their officers at Kolapore. That mutiny was instantly crushed and punished by a force from Bombay under General (now Sir Le Grand) Jacob; and a second outbreak at the same place, in December 1857, was also put down with terrible yet merciful severity by the same able officer, invested by Lord Elphinstone with full civil and military powers. The subsequent mutinies and executions at Ahmedabad, Kurrachee, Shikarpore, and Hyderabad in Scinde, and in the city of Bombay, where two Sepoys were blown from guns, suggest the slippery condition of the Western Presidency. The military operations required to suppress rebellion, not without bloodshed, and to overawe conspiracy, in the Rewa Kanta, in the Satpooora district, on the Goa frontier, in Shorapore, Jumkhundee, and Nurgood, tell us how narrowly a general uprising of the Mahratta Provinces was avoided, and how certainly the influence of any one great name, such as that of Holkar, would have turned the tide against us. That was a name to conjure with. The great mass of the Indian population are accustomed, and, it may be said, necessitated, in the actual stage of their social and spiritual development, to endow the living head of each great family with the qualities ascribed to his most celebrated predecessors by popular tradition and history. Thus the open defection of no Prince during the crisis of 1857 would have been so formidable a blow to us, or so irresistible an attraction to the unquiet spirits of India, as would that of the Maharajah Holkar of Indore, invested as he

is with the imaginative halo of gallantry, good fortune, and generosity which surrounds the memory of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, whose transient success against the English under Monson—the last success gained by any Native Prince—is popularly magnified into a series of splendid victories.

Lord Elphinstone has gone to his grave, and it is insinuated that, but for Colonel Durand's "urgent appeals", he would have abandoned "the line of the Nerbudda"! Holkar is told, as we shall see, that his conduct was unworthy of "respect or gratitude", and this is officially thrown in his teeth again and again, even so late as in a despatch of November 1870!

Having disposed of Holkar as "powerless" in 1857, and "not in a position to render any conspicuous active service to the British Government",*—having got rid of Lord Elphinstone and General Woodburn as guilty of "irreparable mischief", against which Colonel Durand had to contend,—having denounced Major Hungerford as incapable "before", "during", and "after the outbreak",† Mr. Durand then proceeds to sweep away Sir Robert Hamilton. He is charged with "*negligence*" and "*neglect of orders*", to which, according to Mr. Durand, is "attributable the escape" of certain members of the Dhar Durbar "from the punishment they had merited". Mr. Durand's judgments are very confident and very complete. By his own account these persons "were never brought to trial", yet he pronounces both verdict and sentence. So far as anything could be proved in the absence of a trial, the innocence of these persons was proved. The blame of not trying these men might as well be thrown upon the present Agent in Central India as upon Sir Robert Hamilton. Why should justice have waited for Sir Robert Hamilton's return to Indore? Justice was pretty swift and summary in those days; there was no morbid feeling about the lives of rebel prisoners, and punishment followed with anything but a "lame foot" in November 1857. If there had been any plausible charge against these members of the Dhar Durbar, they ought to have been tried at once, while the evidence was hot and at hand; and so they would have been,

* *Ante*, p. 120.

† *Ante*, p. 110.

and hung too, to a certainty, if any taint of rebellion could have been brought home to them. But they were not tried, though Colonel Durand remained in power for a month and a half after their apprehension. They were not tried after Sir Robert Hamilton resumed his place, and could not be tried, because Colonel Durand left Indore without leaving any charges whatever on record against them. When Sir Robert Hamilton had time to make an investigation, he was obliged to bail these persons, because there was no indictment, no visible and no procurable evidence against them. And of this Government was informed at the time, Colonel Durand being then at the Viceroy's elbow. There was no more evidence obtained, there was no more specific accusation made by Colonel Durand against the Dhar Durbar, than there was against the Indore Durbar, whom he branded, with rash inaccuracy, as "participants and leaders in the insurrection".*

"But", says Mr. Durand, "the complicity of the Dhar Durbar in the rebellion was never questioned by anyone in India, not even by Sir Robert Hamilton, the champion of Dhar, till the 5th of July 1858. It fell to Sir Robert Hamilton to carry out the first orders for confiscation, and in doing so he did not hesitate to describe the Durbar as "ungrateful and unfaithful", and to declare that "the treaty with the Dhar State has been completely abrogated by the act of the Durbar".†

Mr. Durand seems to be quite blind to the significance of dates. It is quite true that Sir Robert Hamilton on the 19th of January 1858,—a month after his return to Indore,—obeyed the orders of Government, issued before his arrival, for the confiscation of Dhar; and in carrying out those orders characterised the conduct of the Durbar in the terms quoted by Mr. Durand. Sir Robert Hamilton had nothing then before him but the orders of Government, and the sweeping condemnations of his *locum tenens*, and if these led him for the time to suppose that the case of Dhar was much the same as that of Amjheera, whose Rajah had taken an active and open part in the rebellion, it is not very surprising. The

* *Ante*, p. 118, 122; see also Appendix F. † *Central India in 1857*, p. 67, 68.

distinction between the cases, which Sir Robert Hamilton eventually pointed out,* but which Mr. Durand cannot see,† was that neither the Rajah of Dhar, an infant, nor any member of his family or Durbar, took any active or open part in the rebellion, or could even be charged with complicity in it, except in vague and declamatory denunciations.

Mr. Durand, being content to repeat the tale as told to him, has probably no very clear notion in his own mind regarding the “*negligence*” for which he presumes to condemn Sir Robert Hamilton. Even if he had happened within the first month after his return to doubt the grounds on which Dhar had been sentenced, Sir Robert Hamilton had something else besides Dhar affairs (on which positive orders had been passed) to attend to,—something else to do besides hunting up a cold scent of suspicion which Colonel Durand had neglected for a month and a half.

Sir Robert Hamilton had returned from England when affairs grew serious, after being at home only a few weeks, and had gone, by order, first to Calcutta, to concert with Lord Clyde and Sir William Mansfield a plan of operations for Central India, so as to sweep the country from Jubbulpore and Indore, with Mhow as a base, to the two points of Calpee and Banda,—the entire political authority over all these territories, and much more, being confided to him. He was relied on for information as to the routes, the forts, and the people. From the day of his return to Indore, on the 15th of December 1857, he had to act and move with the force under Sir Hugh Rose (now Lord Strathnairn), and also to keep up daily intercommunication with General Whitlock’s column, which started from Jubbulpore, with respect to intelligence, cash, carriage, and all supplies for the troops, and to manage the whole political business at the same time.‡ The crisis, both military and political,—when Jhansi was occupied by a strong rebel garrison, and Scindia had been expelled from Gwalior by a large army under Tantia Topee,—was unexampled, and the work from December 1857, to June 1858,—Jhansi being stormed on the 3rd of April, and Gwalior retaken

* *Papers, Restoration of Dhar* (49 of 1863).

† *Central India in 1857*, p. 68.

‡ *Parliamentary Papers*, No. 498 of 1863, pp. 33, 39, 43.

on the 19th of June,—was almost sleepless.* Sir Robert Hamilton was not likely to be able to spare much time for going back into the details of the Dhar business,—on which orders had been passed,—in the midst of the tremendous labour and responsibility of this campaign. Such attention, however, as he could from time to time give to it, he gave, and the result of his inquiries was not to confirm, but to dissipate the suspicion of rebellion; and, in his final despatch of August 30th, 1858, he exposed the hollowness of the case against the Dhar Durbar.† This despatch did not, it is true, convince Lord Canning, who was then accompanied in camp by Colonel Durand, and it could not produce any effect upon the Secretary of State, because it was not laid before him until it was too late. When, in December 1859, the Dhar papers came home, in consequence of the very emphatic language used by Mr. Bright,‡ fully informed on the subject by Mr. John Dickinson, they came home overland *minus* Sir Robert Hamilton's despatch of August 30th, 1858, which—doubtless from economical reasons,—was sent by the “long sea” passage, with a cargo of unimportant “collections”. Thus Colonel Durand, who in December 1859 was in the Secretary of State's Council, had the advantage not only of pleading his own pet cause, but of seeing the Dhar case decided virtually on his own statements, the Secretary of State in Council being left in entire ignorance that they had been refuted by Sir Robert Hamilton. In spite of these advantages, although a certain penalty was imposed on Dhar, the case was settled by Sir Charles Wood on the basis recommended by Sir Robert Hamilton, the little State being saved from extinction. We shall yet have to remark upon the irritation created throughout the Foreign Office at Calcutta by this reversal of their confiscating policy, and upon the additional shade thereby thrown over Holkar,—an irritation reflected by Mr. Durand, an Attaché in that Department, when he sneers at Sir Robert Hamilton as “the champion of Dhar”, and accuses him of “negligence” and “neglect of orders”.

* “From the 29th of May until the 19th of June not a European had a night in bed.”—*Papers*, 498 of 1863, p. 41.

† *Papers, Restoration of Dhar*, 30 of 1861, p. 31 to p. 36.

‡ *Hansard*, 2nd vol. of 2nd Session of 1859, pp. 811, 812.

The following despatch will suffice, perhaps, not merely to prove the appreciation of Sir Robert Hamilton's services by the Viceroy and by Her Majesty's Government, but also to show that during the period to which Mr. Durand's modest animadversions refer, the Agent to the Governor-General in Central India was not exactly wasting his time, or neglecting his duties.

*"From the Right Hon. the Secretary of State for India to the
Right Hon. the Governor-General of India.*

" East India House,

" 30th November 1858.

" MY LORD,—Your Lordship's despatch, No. 36 in the Foreign Department, dated September 14th, respecting the distinguished services of Sir Robert Hamilton, having been considered by me in Council, I have much satisfaction in expressing the gratification which it has afforded me to read the high testimony which you have borne to the 'zeal, energy, and ability displayed by that meritorious officer throughout the arduous and protracted campaign which has now been brought to a triumphant conclusion'. Sir Robert Hamilton has, as your Lordship observes, 'in circumstances of great difficulty, rendered admirable service to the British Government'.

" 2. I observe also, with much satisfaction, the commendatory language in which you have spoken of the services of Major Macpherson, 'whose management of political affairs with Gwalior throughout the past crisis has been marked by much judgment and tact', and of Captain Shakespear, Sir Robert Hamilton's Assistant, who accompanied him throughout the campaign, and rendered valuable service to his chief.

" 3. You will be pleased to communicate to these officers the gratification which I have derived from the perusal of this record of their services, and that it will afford me much satisfaction to bring the services of Sir Robert Hamilton to the notice of Her Majesty.—I have, etc., etc.,

" STANLEY."*

To which may be added an extract from Lord Canning's Minute of July 2nd, 1859, published in the *London Gazette* of October 7th, in the same year.

" In December 1857 Sir Robert Hamilton returned to Indore, and Colonel Durand resigned his charge. At the same time Sir Hugh Rose moved into Central India.

" Throughout the campaign in that country, and through the hot season of 1858, Sir Robert Hamilton accompanied Sir Hugh Rose's force

* *Macpherson's Memorials of Service in India* (Murray, 1865), pp. 335, 336.

to the Jumna and Gwalior, and was present in several actions. By his thorough knowledge of the Chiefs and people with whom he had to deal, and by the personal influence which he had known how to establish with them, he contributed largely to the rapid movement and signal successes of the troops, and laid the groundwork of the general pacification of that part of India."

Sir Robert Hamilton (who had previously succeeded to a baronetcy) was made a Knight Commander of the Bath and appointed to the Vice-regal Council in 1859. In 1876 he is charged by an Attaché in the Calcutta Foreign Office with "negligence", because he would not hang the men against whom Colonel Durand could not frame a charge.

Having said so much in the hope of saving Lord Elphinstone, General Woodburn, and Sir Robert Hamilton from being thrown, with Major Hungerford, Colonel Hutchinson, Captain Elliot and the Maharajah Holkar, into the holocaust for Sir Henry Durand's purification, we must now recur for a moment to the alleged anxiety of that distinguished officer to "force up" troops to Mhow. Doubtless that anxiety is not in the least over-rated. Colonel Durand must have been most impatient. Still upholding his original mistrust and prejudices against Holkar, he could not, with any semblance of consistency or any feeling of prudence, make his reappearance on the scene unsupported by troops. To do so would have been to disavow his mistrust, and to admit its injustice. Yet on every account he must have wished to get back soon. Every day that Hutchinson and Hungerford held out at Mhow, in what he was pleased to call "a position of dependence upon Holkar",*—and Hutchinson had even visited Indore,—made his mistake more manifest. But then, of course, he did not believe in his own mistake, and did not believe in the good sense of his brother officers, any more than in the good faith of Holkar. Having left Indore and avoided Mhow, as he did, he could not, with any decency, go back without an imposing force.

It is eminently worthy of remark, that whatever ill opinion he may have conceived as to the Dhar Durbar, or as to the conduct of Holkar, was extended by Colonel Durand to the

* *Ante*, p. 108.

Maharajah Scindia. On the 4th of July he wrote, not very coherently, to Lord-Elphinstone, the Governor of Bombay :— “Scindia and Holkar appear to be allies. Scindia’s treachery, if there was any, never was palpable, but Holkar’s has been of the true Mahratta stamp”.* In his despatch from Mhow, No. 27A, of the 13th August 1857, paragraph 24, he expresses great distrust of Scindia.

The Resident at Gwalior, it must be borne in mind, was officially subordinate to the Governor-General’s Agent, the place which Colonel Durand held while Sir Robert Hamilton was away. From Colonel Macpherson’s Report of February 10th, 1858, we learn that “Scindia was much distracted on or about the 18th of August” (Colonel Durand having resumed his duties at Mhow on the 2nd of that month), “by hearing from his Vakeel with the Officiating Agent that he regarded his conduct unfavourably. I at once assured him”, continues Colonel Macpherson, “that the approbation of the Agent and of the Government was certain when they should be fully informed of the circumstances.” And then he says :—“Upon the 11th of September” (1857) “the Right Honourable the Governor-General was pleased, in compliance with my suggestion, to strengthen my hands by a reassuring message to Scindia, which afforded him the highest satisfaction”.†

No “reassuring message” could come to Holkar. No one stood between him and Colonel Durand ; no one stood between Colonel Durand and the Governor-General. Although Colonel Macpherson was formally subordinate to the Governor-General’s Agent, the distance, the difficulties of correspondence, and Colonel Durand’s temporary withdrawal, made the Resident at Gwalior virtually independent, and brought him into direct relations with the Viceroy. Thus Colonel Durand’s disappearance during the eventful month of July, though most injurious to Holkar, was positively advantageous to Scindia. The blame of this false move was thrown upon Holkar by Colonel Durand, whose absence, on the other hand, relieved Scindia from the dangers of detraction, and left him to the undisturbed good offices of his own friendly Resident. Holkar

* *Kaye’s Sepoy War*, vol. iii, p. 347.

† *Honours and Rewards*, pp. 105, 106.

was cut off from Lord Canning; Scindia was brought into closer contact with him.

Even when Colonel Durand left Indore he only got nearer to Lord Canning. Sir Robert Hamilton's reports to the Governor-General, dated 7th of January and 26th of April 1858, warmly commend "the personal fidelity of Holkar", as "a loyal, steadfast, and faithful ally", when "left entirely to himself, without the counsel or countenance of the Agent".* But we learn, also, from other Parliamentary Papers that Colonel Durand, the Agent in question, was at this very time "on special duty with the Governor-General", and that whenever "his proceedings as Officiating Agent were impugned", or statements made differing from his despatches, Sir Robert Hamilton's letters were laid before him that he might comment on them.† It is not, therefore, very surprising that Sir Robert Hamilton's suggestion that "a *khureeta* should be addressed to the Maharajah, signifying his Lordship's satisfaction and gratification at the fidelity and the efficient and active support" of his Highness, was not very promptly adopted.

For fifteen months from Sir Robert Hamilton's arrival at Indore no answer had been sent by the Governor-General to any of Holkar's letters. And when at last an answer arrived, dated 27th March 1859, it was by no means warm or cordial. While it does not entirely avoid noticing Holkar's eminent services, which had been already warmly acknowledged by the officers who held out at Mhow, by the Governor of Bombay, and by the Cabinet Ministers with whom Lord Elphinstone corresponded, the thanks due to his Highness are quite subordinated to the overwhelming debt of gratitude due from him to us. The central motive of this letter—reminding Holkar that he "*has been exposed to grave dangers by the faithlessness of*" his "*own troops*", and that "*the British Government promptly gave*" him "*its support*"‡—savours less of commendation than of a certain severe doctrine which Colonel Durand ("on special duty") was then inculcating. This doctrine was that Princes must be held strictly responsible for the miscon-

* *Honours and Rewards*, p. 115 to 119.

† *Papers, Restoration of Dhar* (30 of 1861) p. 17 to 27.

‡ *Papers, Honours and Rewards*, p. 115.

duct of their troops and servants—fair enough as a *prima facie* general rule, with reference to any agitation arising within their own territories, but hardly applicable to a tremendous movement from outside, originating in British territory and among British troops, from causes entirely beyond the cognisance of any Indian Prince. Under such circumstances a Prince's responsibility can be justly exacted only so far, that he is bound to show that he was not implicated in the movement, and that he exerted himself to the utmost in resisting and punishing the offenders, and in assisting the Imperial Power. All of which the Maharajah Holkar can show.

In due course, and with special reference to the case of Dhar, a small State bordering on Holkar's dominions, the Court of Directors of the East India Company, in one of the last acts of its existence, Lord Stanley being President of the Board of Control, thus negatived, in a despatch dated June 28th, 1858, the doctrine and policy inculcated by Colonel Durand :—

“We do not perceive how we could consistently punish this, or any other weak State, for its inability to control its troops, when it was patent to the whole world that the more powerful States of Gwalior and Indore, and even the British Government itself, were unable to control theirs.”*

We have said that from special causes the Viceroy's reply to Sir Robert Hamilton's despatch of the 26th of April 1858, describing the services of Holkar and the Indore Durbar, was neither prompt nor pleasant. The reply did not arrive until after a delay of *twenty-one months*, and the acknowledgment of Holkar's merits was qualified and constrained.† It is impossible to avoid identifying those special causes with the constant presence of Colonel Durand, and with the generous intermeddling of Holkar and his Minister in the course of the Dhar controversy.

Lord Canning had unfortunately been led to adopt Colonel Durand's extreme doctrine as to the responsibility of Native Princes, and his policy, founded thereon, as to the confiscation of Dhar.

* *Dhar Papers* (200 of 1859), p. 5.

† *Honours and Rewards*, p. 125.

The complete rejection of both doctrine and policy by the Home Government, under a Conservative and under a Liberal Ministry, was very much taken to heart at Calcutta. The Governor-General in Council contended in favour of his own views as to Dhar, both by passive and dilatory means and by argumentative despatches *for six years and a half*, from June 1858 down to December 1864. The contest at first was for the absolute confiscation of Dhar, and its transfer as a territorial reward to some other Native Prince; afterwards for its retention under the management of an English officer, and for the maintenance of certain restrictions over the Rajah's authority. From these successive positions the Viceregal Government was driven step by step, the last proposal of restrictive conditions being negatived by the Secretary of State, Sir Charles Wood (Lord Halifax), in a despatch dated the 24th of December 1864.*

On the 12th of July 1864, the young Rajah of Dhar himself had placed in the hands of the English Superintendent a formal appeal to the Viceroy that the administration of his territories might be confided to him. This letter was transmitted by the Governor-General's Agent for Central India with a letter from himself, dated August 27th, in which he announces as the "immediate cause" of the Rajah's appeal, "his recent receipt of a copy of a pamphlet lately published in England by Mr. Dickinson, entitled *Dhar Not Restored*", which had been "forwarded to him post-free from this place", Indore, "being probably one of several copies which, I was informed by Maharajah Holkar last June, had been sent to him by the author direct from England".†

The defeat of their policy of confiscation, after it had been so earnestly pressed on the Home Government, and the final pressure very carefully applied, was calculated to be somewhat provoking to the authorities at Calcutta, and to prejudice them still more against Holkar, whose hand had been suspected and was now known to have been raised against them. There had been nothing like intrigue or disloyalty in the matter. Considering the traditional procedure of a Native Court, the

* *Further Papers, Dhar* (196 of 1865), p. 117.

† *Ibid.*, p. 110.

action of Holkar and his Minister had been wonderfully straightforward and generous. The Maharajah had good reason to believe that he had himself been designated as the recipient of some of the Dhar districts, in case of their confiscation, but he had openly declared himself to be deeply interested in saving the little State from extinction, as a matter of principle and policy. His Minister, Ramchunder Rao Bhao, with frankness very unusual among Brahmin politicians in their intercourse with British "Politicals", told Captain Bannerman, one of the Agent's Assistants, that he had exerted himself to the utmost for Dhar, and had sent to England every piece of intelligence and scrap of argument that could aid in its exculpation, or could help the Rāj, because his family had eaten of its salt for thirty years, and it was his duty to come to the rescue when he saw it plunged in undeserved misfortune. Captain Fenwick, also, an East Indian officer who had previously been in the service of the British Government and of the Nizam, and who had paid several visits to England, was at this time in Holkar's employment; and it was through him that the Maharajah had long before commenced a correspondence with Mr. John Dickinson and other supporters of the India Reform Society, and with several Members of Parliament, regarding the wrongs of Dhar and his own anxieties. It was thus that Mr. Bright, Mr. J. B. Smith, then Member for Stockport, and others, became fully acquainted with all that had taken place, and were enabled to inquire and remonstrate with great effect at the India Office and in the House of Commons.*

The Home Government had, in short, been kept well informed by Holkar's friends in London of each vexatious delay and of all the intended restrictions; and as a counterpoise to an unfavourable official report on the young Rajah's capacity, Mr. Dickinson had published his pamphlets of *Dhar Not Restored, A Sequel*, and several letters in the *Times*.

All this was likely to be gall and wormwood at Calcutta, particularly to Colonel Durand, who was now the Foreign Secretary. For an Indian Prince to have established external relations with English gentlemen, and to have assisted in

* *Hansard*, vol. 155 (August 1859), p. 812.

carrying out a measure contrary to official views, would naturally be regarded by the entire body of Secretaries and Political Agents as nothing less than dangerous insubordination. Never content unless he can dictate and domineer, and calculating on never being opposed by any one with larger knowledge, more logical skill, or greater moral courage than an ordinary Pundit, the typical British "Political" is thrown off his balance entirely by the notion that the counsels of a Nawab or a Rajah are fortified by Parliamentary support or inspired by legal advice. An Indian Sovereign may, without remonstrance or objection, closet himself with necromancers and astrologers, or take sweet counsel with musicians and dancing-girls; but to ask for an opinion from a barrister, or to correspond with an English statesman, places him at once beyond the pale of tolerance. Henceforth he need expect no official consideration or sympathy.

Hostile influence has always been unfortunately at hand at every turn in Holkar's affairs. Very soon after the protector of his youth, Sir Robert Hamilton, had resumed charge of the Residency at Indore, Colonel Durand is found, "on special duty", at Lord Canning's side.

It is worthy of careful notice that in a letter from Lord Canning of the 29th of January 1858, to Sir Robert Hamilton, after having received a short despatch from the latter dated the 7th of that month, but before the arrival of the more important narrative of the 26th of April, the Viceroy in Council pronounces a very favourable verdict on the Maharajah's conduct and services—"remarks that personally Holkar has so conducted himself as to give no good reason for distrusting his fidelity", "and if he acts up to his promise in bringing the guilty, especially the highest and most prominent among them to punishment"—here is evidently a reference to Colonel Durand's inaccurate assertion as to "*members of the Durbar*"—"there does not appear to the Governor-General in Council, as at present advised, any reason for withholding a complete and candid acknowledgment of his good and faithful service".

But Lord Canning was very soon to be differently "advised". Colonel Durand about that time arrived in his Lord-

ship's camp "on special duty", and from that day "a complete and candid acknowledgment" of Holkar's "good and faithful service" was effectually withheld.

Since January 1858, when Lord Canning said that "personally, Holkar had so conducted himself as to give no good reason for distrusting his fidelity", or "for withholding a complete and candid acknowledgment of his good and faithful service", no reason, good or bad, has been given for a quite contradictory verdict. Yet the candid acknowledgment has been withheld, and a contradictory verdict, condemning Holkar's personal conduct, and destructive of his honour as a Prince and as a man, but unsupported by any explanation or evidence, was recorded on the 16th of January 1860 in a despatch addressed by the Government of India to the Secretary of State, without any communication to the Maharajah, who was thus precluded from taking any step for his vindication from this unknown and unexpected attack.

For if, indeed, Holkar had up to that time entertained any doubt as to the estimation in which he was held at Calcutta, his anxiety must have been almost, if not entirely, dispelled by the receipt of a second letter from the Viceroy, thanking his Highness for his "loyal co-operation", his "active and seasonable aid", and complimenting him on the "sagacity and determination" with which he had overcome the difficulties of "the late convulsion in Hindostan".* This letter to the Maharajah was dated the 5th of January 1860, within a very few days of the condemnatory despatch to the Secretary of State in London.

No other reason having ever been suggested for these inconsistencies, it is almost impossible to avoid explaining them as the results of official displeasure at the sympathy shown by Holkar for his neighbour of Dhar, and at his correspondence with gentlemen in London. The dates of some of the documents appear to confirm this explanation in a very remarkable manner.

The following extract from Lord Canning's important despatch of April 30th, 1860, to Sir Charles Wood, called the Adoption Despatch, proves that it was known at Calcutta

* *Papers, Honours and Rewards* (Return to the Lords, 77 of 1860, p. 126).

early in 1860, that Holkar was interested in the Dhar case :—

“It is not many months since I was informed, by the Governor-General’s Agent in Central India, that a Native Court had received from England the Parliamentary Papers on Dhar before they had reached my own hand.”

And early in 1860, on the 16th of January, in a despatch mentioning that Scindia’s territorial reward cannot be settled until the Secretary of State replies to a letter of the 6th December 1859, “on the affairs of the Dhar State”—the last effort in favour of confiscation—Lord Canning for the first time announced, in terms of severe condemnation, that he should not propose any territorial reward for Holkar.

“I beg to forward further papers relating to the conduct and services of the Maharajah Holkar of Indore during the disturbances, including the English translation of a letter which I have recently addressed to his Highness. It is not my intention to propose that his Highness should receive any gift of territory. His conduct on the day on which his troops mutinied and attacked the Residency at Indore was not such as to command either the respect or the gratitude of the British Government, and though this may be overlooked, in consideration of the assistance he subsequently rendered to the garrison at Mhow, and to the Agent in re-establishing order in Malwa, it invalidates, in my judgment, any claim which the Maharajah might otherwise have had to an acknowledgment of his services by the extension of his territory.”*

This declaration sets aside, after eighteen months’ apparent acquiescence, the repeated instructions of the Court of Directors and the Secretary of State that Holkar should be placed “high on the list” of those Princes who were to be rewarded with territorial grants.

It likewise contradicts the recorded opinion of Lord Canning in Council. In January 1858, Holkar is declared to have “personally so conducted himself as to give no good reason for distrusting his fidelity”, and so as to entitle him to “a complete and candid acknowledgment of his good and faithful service”. Two years later his personal conduct is denounced as unworthy of “either respect or gratitude”. Yet no new revelations as to Holkar’s conduct on the 1st of July 1857 had been made in this interval. But it was in this

* *Papers, Honours and Rewards (Return to the Lords, 77 of 1860)*, p. 146.

interval that revelations were made as to his intercourse with English gentlemen in London, and as to their influence over the Dhar case.

Nor does it seem quite just, if it be just to tell the *whole* truth, to speak of Holkar's troops having mutinied and attacked the Residency, as if that were a fair and sufficient description of what took place on the 1st of July 1857. There were British troops at the Residency, who joined in the mutiny, and with whom, as Durand himself observed, it was "concerted".* The general conflagration, amidst which the outbreak at Indore was but a single flame, arose within British territory and among troops in British pay. The mutiny of 1857 did not arise from conspiracy within any of the Native States, or from any defects in their administration. All the facts and phenomena of the outbreak at Indore and Mhow, its outward course and brief duration, and its failure to gain any hold upon local resources and influence, prove its extraneous origin, and its utter disconnection from Holkar and his advisers.

If the Maharajah Holkar has cleared himself from all blame for the mutiny of some of his troops, surely he cannot be liable to blame, dishonour, or loss, for the inevitable incidents of mutiny. It cannot be right that he should suffer, personally or politically, as the head of a Princely family, or as the ruler of a protected State, because the same terrible phenomena that invariably accompanied each outburst of a general conflagration which broke out far from his dominions, from causes over which he had no control, were seen also in a particular outburst when the fire had spread to his vicinity.

A few months after the Jubbulpore Durbar, on the 4th of January 1861, when Holkar met Lord Canning, the Queen included his Highness in her first creation of Knights of the Star of India, in acknowledgment, as Lord Canning wrote, of "important and loyal services to Her Majesty's Empire in India". If there seems any inconsistency in the grant of such an honour, on such grounds, to one who in the crisis of danger had lost all claim to "either respect or gratitude", it is not for

us to account for it; and, on the other hand, if Colonel Durand complained of that inconsistency—as he is understood to have done—it is not for us to be surprised at his complaint.

The Maharajah suspected no such inconsistency. He understood that honour, accompanied by gratifying words from Lord Canning, to form a complete acquittal of any imputation on his conduct, and he had reason to believe that it was so understood by English statesmen at home. The hope that the original prejudice against him was dying away at Calcutta, as the result of more full and accurate intelligence, and in the absence of Colonel Durand (who was then a Member of the Secretary of State's Council), now began to revive once more.

These reviving hopes were soon, however, damped again; for in 1861 Colonel Durand returned to Calcutta, and was appointed Foreign Secretary,—a post from which he dominated all the States and Agencies of India, the very office through which every paper affecting Holkar would have to pass, to which any question arising as to his conduct and claims would be referred for explanation and report. At the time of Lord Elgin's death Colonel Durand still filled that office. He held it up to 1864, when he was made a Member of the Governor-General's Council. This place he retained until his appointment to be Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjaub in 1870.

Sir Henry Durand's continuous occupation, during these nine years, of some high place of influence in the counsels of Government, rendered any appeal from Holkar for the removal of the stain on his character almost hopeless, if its favourable consideration depended solely on such support as it was likely to receive in the Calcutta Foreign Office over which Colonel Durand presided, or in the Vice-regal Council where he occupied a seat.

The extract from Lord Canning's despatch of the 16th of January 1860, stigmatising Holkar's conduct, was not officially communicated to his Highness until 1870, but its purport had become known to him, in common with all who chose to inquire, from a Parliamentary Return to the Lords (No. 77), "*Honours and Rewards bestowed upon the Native Princes of*

India", published during the Session of 1860. Here, not in the section of the Return headed "Holkar",* which contains nothing to his prejudice, but mixed up in a despatch describing the Durbars at Agra, Meerut and Delhi, the Maharajah found himself held up to general scorn as having so behaved himself in the hour of need as to have lost all claim to public "respect and gratitude", and to have forfeited the territorial reward, with which, but for his misconduct, he would, like his compeers, have been invested. Thus in asking on every suitable occasion that a territorial reward should be granted to him, Holkar has been making no greedy claim to gain, but has been protesting against a direct attack on his personal honour, against the public substitution of a penal forfeiture in the place of a promised boon.

In 1870, Sir Henry Durand's promotion from the immediate counsels of Government to another sphere of duty, and the arrival of a new Viceroy, unbiassed as to the previous phases of the case, seemed to afford a renewed prospect of redress. The opportunity of a personal interview with Lord Mayo presented itself at Jubbulpore in March 1870, and on that occasion the Maharajah Holkar placed in his Excellency's hands a statement of his claim to a territorial reward. Mr. C. U. Aitchison, having been for several years Assistant to Sir Henry Durand, had now succeeded to the place of Secretary to Government.

A letter of the 10th November 1870, from Mr. Secretary Aitchison to the Governor-General's Agent at Indore, communicated to Holkar the reply to his appeal, and informed his Highness officially, for the first time, that his personal conduct on the 1st of July 1857 was impeached, in the despatch dated 16th of January 1860, and that on this impeachment was founded "a clear and broad distinction" in determining the rewards to be allotted to him "on the one side, and to the Maharajah Scindia and the Begum of Bhopal on the other."†

The case is now brought to this condition. While the

* Commencing at p. 118.

† The whole of this despatch will be found in Appendix G.

Princes whose names were associated with that of Holkar in despatches from the Court of Directors and the Secretary of State as worthy of being placed "high on the list",* and many others, have been rewarded with cessions of territory, no such grant is made to his Highness. On bringing this mortifying distinction under the consideration of the Government of India, he is told that it was their express object to produce such a distinction ; that it became "necessary to draw a clear and broad distinction" between him "on the one side", and "Scindia and the Begum of Bhopal on the other", because at the critical moment his conduct had "not been such as to command either the respect or the gratitude of the British Government". The whole question is thus reopened. Words of reproach, which might be considered as virtually cancelled and consigned to oblivion by subsequent honours and gracious acknowledgments, are now officially placed before Holkar as a mature and deliberate sentence.

Thus, in the appeal that was preferred by Holkar, there were two subjects which might at one time have been separately considered—the refusal of a promised reward, and the infliction of an unmerited stigma :—but since the publication of the despatch of January 16th, 1860, renewed and forced on his Highness's notice in the letter of November 10th, 1870, the two subjects cannot be kept apart. Although the Maharajah was unquestionably led to expect a territorial grant, he never *asked* for one until its refusal in 1860 was declared to be the penalty for unworthy conduct mercifully "overlooked". It then became impossible for him to clear his honour without protesting against that refusal.

Moreover, in the despatch of November 10th, 1870, Holkar is told that he is, in fact, asking for an "*additional reward*"; for not only did "the valuable services which the Maharajah performed", "subsequently" and "ultimately", according to other passages in the despatch, "under great difficulties, and not without danger to himself", "call forth substantial marks of the favour of Her Majesty the Queen, which were considered not incommensurate with the services rendered", but other "substantial marks of favour", in the form of "pecuniary

* *Ante*, p. 76.

concessions", were conferred, with which he ought to be content. Furthermore, it is intimated that these "substantial marks of favour" were conferred in pursuance of a recommendation made by Lord Canning in a despatch dated 11th of March 1862 (the very day before he left India), to the effect that in order to lessen the "mortification" inflicted upon Holkar by the refusal of a territorial reward, "any reasonable concession to his wishes" might be made in other matters.

Now, even if liberal concessions of any sort had been made, they could have had no efficacy for the abatement of a mortifying distinction, unless that object were in some way announced. But no such announcement was ever made, while in the very despatch which explains Lord Canning's latest desire of "dealing with the Maharajah in a spirit of liberality, and of cordially acknowledging the useful and important services which he rendered", the first official intimation is given of his Highness's conduct having been previously denounced as unworthy of "either respect or gratitude"; and this denunciation, approved and reiterated, is placed once more on record, as the basis of Holkar's contemporary reputation and as the materials for future history. What acknowledgment could be considered as cordial with such a drawback?

No gratuitous liberality, no "additional reward", no "pecuniary concessions", such as are alleged in the despatch of the 10th of November 1870, could ever compensate Holkar for the stigma persistently stamped upon his name, unless the gracious communication announcing those "substantial marks of favour" declared the removal of the stigma.

But there have, in fact, been no "substantial marks of favour". The original denunciation was undeserved; there were no grounds for making an injurious distinction between Holkar and other Princes, for setting aside, in his case only, the repeated instructions of the Home Government, the promises of the Viceroy and the Secretary of State. And no "mark of the favour of Her Majesty the Queen", except the Star of India, had been conferred upon Holkar. No "substantial marks of favour", in the form of "pecuniary concessions", had been granted to him, with express view to his

gratification, or without some countervailing advantage for our Government. With the exception of occasional compliments and honours, bestowed upon him in common with other Princes, he has received no reward at all for his sacrifices and services.

Lord Canning's own description of what was intended for Holkar in 1860, will prove that in spite of the views and instructions of Her Majesty's Government, the authorities at Calcutta had no intention to give his Highness anything like a real reward. These words immediately follow the sentence in the despatch of January 16th, 1860, already quoted,* in which the Viceroy declared that he should not propose any territorial grant.

"In obtaining an assurance that the privilege of adoption in his family will be recognised by the British Government, he has received a reward which is especially congenial to his wishes. The Maharajah will be reimbursed any expenditure that he has incurred on account of troops entertained in consequence of the mutiny of the Mahidpore Contingent, towards the support of which the fixed annual contribution has been paid by the Indore Durbar."†

The reimbursement of expenditure necessitated by the mutiny of our troops, hardly resembles a reward, and the credit under that head, claimed in the despatch of November 10th, 1870, deserves no reply.

The terms in which Lord Canning informed Holkar of the policy that would be pursued in the future with reference to adoptions in Princely families, involve a clear admission that there was no reward at all in the matter. After expressing his best wishes for "the dignity and power" of his Highness's "distinguished House", the Viceroy says in his letter of the 5th of January 1860 :—

"If, unhappily, it should be denied to you to bequeath these to an heir of your body, the adoption by your Highness of a successor, according to former usage, will be recognised and respected."‡

That phrase, "*according to former usage*", is almost enough by itself to indicate what was, indeed, the fact, that the Viceroy was simply announcing that the British Government

* *Ante*, p. 145.

† *Honours and Rewards* (Lords, 77 of 1860), p. 146.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

would no longer oppressively pretend to interfere with the Hindu law of inheritance. Here was no special boon, but merely a promise to abstain from a new and unwarrantable encroachment. This is more fully admitted in Lord Canning's Adoption Despatch, No. 43A of April 30th, 1860. In paragraph 19 of this important state-paper Lord Canning distinctly casts aside the pretended precedents by which that engine of spoliation, the doctrine of "Lapse", had been constructed. After alluding to the groundless assertions as to "the practice of those who have preceded us as rulers in India", the Viceroy observes :—

"I believe that there is no example of any Hindu State, whether in Rajputana or elsewhere, lapsing to the Paramount Power, by reason of that Power withholding its assent to an adoption."

This admission of the right of adoption, "according to former usage", and the wrong of "Lapse", as recently enforced, having been proclaimed to the Chiefs of India generally, and published in the *Gazette*, could not well be represented as a reward conferred upon Holkar. Consequently, although Lord Canning had termed it "*a reward especially congenial to his*" (Holkar's) "*wishes*", it is not adduced as such in the despatch of the 10th of November 1870. In order to decide whether Holkar has received any reward at all, we have now, therefore, only to consider the alleged "pecuniary concessions" and "marks of favour" brought forward in that despatch.

To examine in detail, one by one, all the "pecuniary concessions" brought forward in the despatch of the 10th of November 1870 as instances of "substantial marks of favour" conferred upon the Maharajah Holkar in "acknowledgment" of his services, must be a tedious and an unpleasing task, not to be demanded of the general reader unless eventually forced upon us by some rash contradiction. Suffice it now to assert most positively that these alleged "marks of favour" can be shown to have been, one and all, business transactions, in which the interests of the British Government were jealously guarded, and which were entered upon in the ordinary course of public affairs, without reference to any claim of reward, without any acknowledgment of obligation. In all of these cases there is, to say the least, much ground, from Holkar's

point of view, for asserting that he got no more than he was entitled to, in some of them for arguing that he was a loser. So far as relates to the "concessions" alleged in the despatch of November 10th, 1870, to have been "liberally made", in the matter of certain territorial exchanges, the following extract from a Return made to Parliament a year before that despatch was penned, will sufficiently bear out the case of Holkar's Durbar that in this matter there was neither the intention nor the accident of a reward.

"Negotiations were still pending with His Highness Holkar, regarding the Northern frontier of the Nimar district. It was considered an object that the line of division between British and Indore territory should be marked by the Nerbudda, and opportunity was taken of the pending negotiations for Holkar's Deccan possessions to attempt arrangements for rectifying this portion of his frontier. So far, His Highness had on his side obtained sovereign rights over a flourishing tract North of the Nerbudda, including, among other advantages, large ironworks with suitable plant, and a considerable tract South of the river; while the Government on their side had acquired proprietary right in his Deccan possessions, with the important concession of abolition of the transit dues on the Agra and Bombay road. And as the sums leviable from the British territories were calculated on the basis of revenue, while the returns from Holkar's lands were in fact rents, it would seem that both politically and financially he had profited by the transaction, except in the one important respect of the abolition of transit dues, which, though no pecuniary gain to the British Government, was undoubtedly a loss to him, and which it was, perhaps, worth an even greater sacrifice on their part to secure."*

The loss to Holkar by his relinquishment of the transit duties was very heavy. The object of our Government in insisting on that relinquishment as an indispensable condition of the exchanges, was a wise one, an object most legitimate for the Imperial Power of India. But the very circumstances which may be fairly cited as an official vindication of the measure,—the advantages to traders and consumers in British provinces as well as in the Native States, the gain to British customs, the profits to British manufacturers and importers,—all demonstrate most clearly that the object aimed at by our Government in these territorial exchanges, with the concomitant abolition of transit duties, was the promotion of general

* *Moral and Material Progress of India*, 1867-8, p. 66.

advantage, including the enhancement of its own revenue, and not the gratification of any Native Prince, or the fiscal advantage of any Native State.

Only in the case of one of these alleged concessions did the Viceroy express a hope that it would "be regarded as an earnest of our friendly disposition", and as "a more substantial acknowledgment" "of the services of the Maharajah". But even in that one case—the capitalisation of the annual payments for the disbanded Malwa Contingent,—the British Government, although its functionaries in India, accustomed to enforce arbitrary decrees, may care little for such absolution or indemnity, obtained a full acquittance for very questionable receipts in the past, and a substantial compensation for relinquishing at the end of ten years a most debatable demand.

Some extracts of a despatch to the Secretary of State, dated 11th March 1862, are given in the letter of November 10th, 1870, to show that Lord Canning agreed to the commutation, "*among other reasons*", "as an earnest of our friendly disposition towards Indore", and as "a more substantial acknowledgment of the services of the Maharajah". But what were the "*other reasons*"? Lord Canning gives them very plainly in some passages of the same despatch of March 11th, 1862, which were *not* quoted in the letter of November 10th, 1870. They are as follows :—

"It appeared to me there would be advantage to Her Majesty's Government in acceding to any reasonable proposal made by Holkar for the purpose of relieving his State of a payment which is extremely galling to it, and of its liability to which there would seem to be no clear acknowledgment on the part of the Durbar.

"The pecuniary result of this arrangement will be a loss to the British Government of the difference between the present value of a permanent annuity of 120,000 rupees, and the present value of an annuity for ten years of 240,000 rupees,—the difference being equal to about five and a half lakhs of rupees. In my opinion, the arrangement in the shape in which it is proposed by the Agent, and to which it is understood that his Highness will consent, is one which the British Government will do wisely to adopt. It will prevent the difficulties which may at any time arise from the absence of all formal record of the agreement under which the present payment is made. It will remove the irritation and uneasy feeling under which the demand is submitted to by the Durbar."

The validity of the calculation as to loss and gain obviously depends on the answer that can be given to the inquiry, whether "a permanent annuity" was due from Holkar to the British Government by virtue of any contract, or on grounds of moral obligation.

Holkar and his ministers have always denied that the Indore State was bound to continue making any such payment. Lord Canning, when the commutation was proposed, acknowledged, as we have just seen, that the equity of our demand was very questionable, and that no contract on the subject existed.

An annual charge, demanded—according to Lord Canning's despatch of March 11th, 1862, without any "*formal record*", or any "*clear acknowledgment*" of the "*liability*" by the party who submits to it, to whom it is "*extremely galling*", to whom it causes "*irritation and uneasy feeling*",—who pays it, in short, under protest,—can hardly be said to be payable under contract, or by virtue of any moral obligation. If the Viceroy, the stronger Power, could find no more favourable terms for this exaction, it is easy to imagine the terms that would be employed, if he could speak his mind freely, by the weaker party.

Only in one very restricted sense can this or any other of the transactions enumerated in the despatch of Nov. 10, 1870, be accurately represented as having been a boon to Holkar, viz., that the enormous power of the British Government enables it to be the absolute judge in all its own causes, and that thus every one of its concessions may be viewed as an act of pure grace and favour. Undoubtedly our Government possessed the power not only of continuing to exact the annual charges which Lord Canning considered it politic to commute into a capital sum, but might even have increased them, without fear of anything more immediately formidable than a revival of that "*irritation and uneasy feeling*" which the demand had previously called forth.

But whatever might have otherwise been the grace and favour of these concessions, must have been turned into bitterness when they were marshalled in array as gratuitous rewards, accompanied with the first official imputation of misconduct in the hour of danger, deserving of more severe treatment, but "*overlooked*" in consideration of services "*ultimately ren-*

dered". The humiliating distinction between the Maharajah Holkar and his princely neighbours of Bhopal and Gwalior in the special recognition of their services by territorial grants, was now officially explained to have been intended as a personal humiliation.

A most inadequate measure would be taken of the damage done to Holkar by the original condemnation and forfeiture, and by the repeated rebuffs with which his appeals have been met, if his importunity were attributed to mere greed, to pride wounded, or jealousy aroused, by the well-deserved aggrandisement of other Princes. A marked slight inflicted by the Paramount Power on a protected Prince, cannot be without injurious influence on his administration and public authority. Each successive Viceroy, and each successive Governor-General's Agent since the departure of Sir Robert Hamilton in 1859, accepting Sir Henry Durand's prejudiced representations, must have entered on the consideration of Holkar's affairs under the impression that his behaviour at the outburst of the mutinies was unworthy and disloyal. This prejudice, stamped on official records, circulated through the public press, and stirred up by the recurring vexatiousness of Holkar's inquiries and remonstrances, has operated to his Highness's disadvantage in every direction.

Great loss and great pain are inflicted on a meritorious Prince. Nothing has been saved or gained by our Government. There has been no reservation of revenue or beneficial dominion by refusing the territorial reward ; for territory assigned to Holkar would be simply a portion of the British Empire for which he undertakes the administration and police, while it is well understood that there are considerable tracts of land contiguous to Holkar's possessions, to which they would form a profitable addition, but which contain a scanty population, and yield a revenue which, under our system, is hardly worth the cost of collection.*

There has been no gain to our Government in moral power

* In Appendix H I have placed some extracts from Mr. Dickinson's letters addressed to the *Times* and to the *Standard* in 1876, which will make more clear his views on the general question of restoring self-government in India by enlarging Native States under British Imperial supremacy.

or political credit, but, on the contrary, a decided loss. A salutary example might undoubtedly have been placed before the eyes of all the Princes of India, if they had been made to see that one of the highest among them, having faltered in the hour of trial, was—although his offence was mercifully “overlooked”, so far as not to be visited with any positive penalty—negatively degraded by a “clear and broad distinction” between himself and his compeers, deprived of the honourable reward originally designed for him and conferred upon others, and stigmatised for ever in the published records of the Empire as one whose conduct was unworthy of “either respect or gratitude”. But this is what they have never been made, and cannot be made, to see. The peculiar injustice of the decision against Holkar is manifest to them all. The narrowness of its basis, resting on that practical infallibility of the local British official, which they feel as a perpetual menace, is as an open book in every Durbar. It is perfectly well known that Holkar never faltered or wavered at any moment in the crisis of 1857. It is perfectly well known that he did not make any false move, but that Colonel Durand made a false move, and that the Maharajah was cried down to clear the credit of the Agent.

It is well understood that Colonel Durand, in his brief tenure of office as Governor-General’s Agent, did his best for the destruction of Dhar; that he persisted in advocating the same policy when removed to other spheres of action; and that in promoting the restoration of that little State through home influence, both Sir Robert Hamilton and his Ward, Holkar, incurred official enmity. It is perfectly well known in the Durbars of India, that Colonel Durand, within whose temporary supervision Scindia was placed as well as Holkar, expressed the same suspicions of both Princes, and that but for the isolation of Gwalior and Major Macpherson’s protection, the one would have been disparaged as much as the other.* It is known, also, that for many years Colonel Durand subsequently filled a succession of offices giving him great power and influence over the Indian Foreign Department and the counsels of the Viceroy.

No salutary example is conveyed to any one by the morti-

* *Ante*, pp. 137, 138.

fication inflicted on Holkar. No lesson is given to Indian Princes except a repetition of the old bad lesson, that the decrees of the English officer on the spot are for the most part indefeasible ; that no administrative achievements, not even aid and support directly given to the Imperial Power in time of need, will bring them profit or credit, unless all has been done in concert with the British dignitary at their side, unless he has been consulted and brought round ; that if any of the Resident's work breaks down, they will probably have to suffer for it ; that if sour grapes fall to his lot, their teeth will be set on edge.

The distinction drawn between Holkar and other Princes, universally recognised as unjust, is well understood in every State of India to be the result of no impartial deliberation, to be founded on no grand principle, to be in accordance with no Imperial policy. On the contrary, it is known to be, root and branch, a personal, departmental, and petty affair, inconsistent with the policy prescribed by the Home authorities in two despatches, with six months' interval between them, one written in the time of the East India Company, the other under Her Majesty's Government, communicated to the Maharajah Holkar in 1859, and read in open Durbar.*

When it is perceived by all those directly or remotely interested that redress is refused to a great wrong, merely because an eminent official has committed himself on the wrong side, the danger of the Imperial Government falling in general esteem, far outweighs any risk of shaking local authority by reversing one of its judgments. This alleged risk, constantly before the eyes of every hierarchy, civil or ecclesiastical, is excessively deprecated in the upper circle of Anglo-Indian administration. There the doctrine of supporting English authority is maintained, though not avowedly, or, perhaps, quite consciously, in a very absolute form. The infallibility of great functionaries, instead of being tempered, as among us here, by free institutions and the force of public opinion, is there hardened by the differences of race and creed into a fixed principle by which executive power ought to be guided, and on

* *Ante*, pp. 75, 76, and *Return to Lords, Honours and Rewards* (77 of 1860), pp. 7 and 32.

which the safety of the Empire is declared to depend. The superior English officers,—from the Resident, who implores that his decisions may be upheld, to the Councillor, who says that India must be governed in India, that is to say, in his Council,—all preach the same doctrine, that successful opposition to their views by any Indian personage or association in any one instance, would encourage incessant and insolent contumacy and sedition, would impair the strength of our Government, and if pursued to the attainment of its object in London, would bring the Viceroy into contempt.

But all this very natural aversion to the real supremacy of Her Majesty's Government points, in truth, to a danger the very reverse of what is put forward. Order and obedience are not in any appreciable degree preserved by the Indian Government among its subjects and dependent allies through the respect and veneration felt for individual Englishmen. If we could ever place much reliance on such precarious and accidental conditions, that time has gone by. The mystery and awe that formerly surrounded the inscrutable European conquerors have long ago worn off. There are more of us to be seen; our qualifications have become more commonplace and more common. The average force of personal influence over the population in the great body of our civil and military servants, has decidedly diminished, in consequence of their more frequent visits to their own country, and the more rapid changes in the occupancy of appointments. The people are more used to our ways, and have got much nearer to the heart of our secret. If the private or public life of any English official is not as one entire and perfect chrysolite, it is quickly perceived and noted; and the Native public throughout India, very apathetic in many matters, but deeply inquisitive as to our treatment of their Princes and representative men, cannot be satisfied or silenced by the persistent approval of an error like that of Holkar's degradation. The strength of our Indian Government does not consist in local or personal influence, but is based partly on a belief in its material resources, partly on faith in its moral superiority. If that faith goes, everything is lost. The Government of Her Majesty the Queen should try to promote that faith, not by frequent appearances on the scene, but

by decisive intervention to right a wrong whenever the wrong is apparent.

Here the wrong is apparent enough ; and neither the unjustified repetition of a rumour of misconduct, nor the untenable assertion of gratuitous liberality, can render that wrong more defensible on the one side or more endurable on the other. The lapse of time in this case only means the length of suffering, and the nearer approach, in the estimation of the injured person, to a period when the unjust stigma must, if unwithdrawn, be stamped on the Imperial archives as established truth. The lapse of time, therefore, cannot be justly brought forward as a plea for refusing an impartial inquiry.

This wrong is utterly insusceptible of being maintained as a matter of principle or dignity. Its maintenance is a manifest indignity to the Imperial Government. In the eyes of all India, it displays the predominance of the professional functionary over the Minister of the Crown. It is really a case of successful opposition on the part of a single high official, on personal grounds, to the wishes of Her Majesty's Government. It is a case in which the instructions of a Secretary of State, publicly communicated in open Durbar to a Prince by Her Majesty's representative at his Court, are upset by the advice and for the advantage of a previous Resident at the same Court. It is a case that tends most mischievously to confirm the feeling too deeply rooted already in every part of India, that when a bad opinion has been expressed by any Englishman in high office against any Native, be he prince or peasant, a black mark at once attaches to his name that can hardly ever be effaced ; that the interests and honour of the highest in the land are virtually abandoned to the mercy of a local Department, which can, with impunity, first delay and ultimately refuse obedience to the orders of the Government at home, and carry out, by means of off-hand office notes and secret correspondence, a policy in India directly contrary to that which Her Majesty's Ministers have decided to adopt for the interests of the Empire, have announced in formal despatches, and communicated to our Anglo-Indian public servants as the law of their official lives.

A P P E N D I X .

(A.)

FISCAL ENCROACHMENT ON COMMON AND GRAZING LANDS.

(Page 64.)

A GOOD example of the vexatious interference and confiscatory innovations which make our orderly government unpopular, is given with charming simplicity by Mr. C. B. Saunders, late Resident at Hyderabad, and now Chief Commissioner of Mysore, in his Administration Report of the Nizam's Assigned Districts of Berar for 1870-71.

"Under the *raiatwaree* settlement, the untenanted lands of a village belong, *of course*",—observe the "*of course*",—"to Government; and the fuel and grass which are yielded by them are valuable in these days of spreading tillage. No man has a right to these products gratis; *yet all have been accustomed to take them gratis, or on payment of nominal grazing dues.*"

Here an immemorial custom of gathering fuel and grass on their parish and common lands, is declared to confer *no right* on the inhabitants of a village, and these "valuable products" are declared to "belong *of course* to Government". He continues :—

"How to collect a duty on fuel and bush-cuttings over all the waste lands surrounding and interlacing with the cultivated tracts, thus forms one of the problems with which Forest officers—and District officers too—have to deal in Berar."*

The fact of there being any "problem" at all proves that quite a new burden was to be imposed upon the villagers. The Resident goes on to say that he had "to avoid in doing so the infliction of unnecessary annoyance upon the people", but that is merely a well-meant mockery.

* *Administration Reports, Hyderabad Assigned Districts, 1870-71, Section on "State Reserves and District Forests", paragraph 166, page 106.—Printed at the Hyderabad Official Press, 1871.*

Cruel annoyance, under such an order, is inherent and incurable. There are only two methods of dealing with "the problem", and it is difficult to say which method is likely to be the more oppressive. The "duty on fuel and bush-cuttings over all the waste lands interlacing with the cultivated tracts" must either be farmed out, or collected by the lowest underlings of Government. In either case the old woman who has "been accustomed" to pick up sticks and dry leaves on the "waste land" near her own door, becomes a trespasser, subject to summons and fine; the cow or goat "accustomed" to graze on the common will be pounded, and its owner will have to pay poundage fees, in addition to the "duty" to Government which he has basely evaded, and a fine, perhaps, besides. These are, indeed, "unspeakable blessings", for which recently annexed ryots ought to be grateful.

"O fortunatos nimium, sua si bona nôrint,
Agrícolas!"

But Hindus notoriously have no gratitude.

(B.)

SAADUT KHAN AND HOLKAR'S TROOPS.

(Page 73.)

Saadut Khan admitted, on his trial at Indore, that he had received no orders to attack the Residency from anyone at Holkar's Court, and that his fellow conspirators were all Mohammedans,—Waris Mohammed of Bhopal, Moulavi Abd-us-Samad, Jemadar Mohammed Ali, of Holkar's Artillery, and Shere Khan, Jemadar of Infantry. Bans Gopal, the Commandant of the Infantry, was not, he said, in the secret.

Immediately after the execution of Saadut Khan in September 1874, it was asserted by one of those local newspapers which systematically vilify the Native Princes and their administration, as if in the interest and for the glorification of "the Services", that the rebel had confessed at the last moment that he had been instigated and set on by Holkar's Durbar. In its ordinary condition the Indore Government would have allowed this, like many other calumnies, to pass without contradiction, to be repeated in all the papers of India till it found its way into the English press. But luckily for Holkar, he had then in his service a man who was more familiar with English ways, his chief Minister, Sir Madhava Rao, who at once applied to the British officer who had been in charge of Saadut Khan up to the time of his execution, and obtained from him a positive contradiction of the story, which was published at once in the principal newspapers of India.

This led to the following letter in the *Bombay Gazette* of Monday,

November 2, 1874, which brings unexpected and unsolicited testimony to the truth of the assertions made by Holkar's Government, that they used their best and utmost endeavours to prevent their troops from joining the mutineers, not wholly without effect.

"HOLKAR'S LOYALTY".

"Sir,—With reference to recent correspondence concerning Saadut Khan's supposed statement before he was hanged at Indore, I think it right, in the interest of truth, to inform your readers that there is at present in this station (Sehore) an old Christian native of Bagdad, by name John Esau, who was a Subadar in Maharajah Holkar's service when the mutiny broke out in Indore. He speaks in no uncertain tone of the measures that were taken to prevent the Maharajah's troops from participation in the evil doings. He states that when the outbreak took place he was given strict orders to prevent any of the Maharajah's Sepoys from leaving their lines, and he relates that, while on watch for this purpose, a Christian belonging to the English office at the Residency approached with a cloth wound round his head and shoulders. As soon as he was perceived, several of the men called out to shoot him down, but the old Subadar protected him by swearing to kill the man who should fire a shot. He then sent word to the Maharajah, who issued strict orders for the safety of this person, and had him conveyed during the night to Mhow. I may mention that this old Subadar left Indore on a month's leave to place his wife and family at Bhopal, and was induced by the Christians there to remain with them during those troubled times. Thus he lost his post as Subadar in the Maharajah's service !

"G. B. PEART, Capt., Bhopal Battalion."

Captain Peart is an officer in the Bombay Staff Corps, and Second in Command of the Bhopal Contingent.

(C.)

DEPUTATION OF HOLKAR'S OFFICERS TO MHOW ON THE
1ST OF JULY 1857.

(Page 96.)

The following extract from the Diary kept by Ramchunder Rao Bhao (the Bhao Sahib), Holkar's Minister, fills up some of the particulars referred to in Captain Hungerford's letter, No. 460, dated 19th September 1857, to the Secretary to the Government of India :—

"July 1st, 1857. At half after two Bhao Sahib was directed by his Highness to proceed to Mhow, and wait on Colonel Platt to explain everything to him, to ask his advice as to what should be done. Bukhshee Khoman Sing and Gunput Rao Wakeel were ordered to accompany him with an adequate escort. About 3 P.M. the Bhao Sahib with his party started from

Indore, and reached the village of Rao at 4 P.M., where they learned that a picket from Mhow had been posted at the mango-tope near the village of Peevrai, about half way between Mhow and Indore. On learning this, they did not deem it prudent to advance further. The Bhao Sahib got the Wakeel to write an English note to the officer commanding the pickets, which was forwarded by a hurkara. The party waited for about half an hour, and then sent a Sowar with a letter for Colonel Platt. A Sowar was also sent to learn the cause of the delay at the picket. He returned and reported that the note had been forwarded to Mhow, and as soon as instructions were received the officer of the picket would communicate the same. An hour after this the first hurkara returned, and said that a gentleman had come from Mhow, and the writer of the notes was desired to attend. Gunput Rao Wakeel was sent. After meeting the gentleman at the picket, he sent back a message by a Sowar, desiring the Bhao Sahib and the Bukhshee to proceed there without any escort. When they arrived near the picket, the Wakeel was met returning, who informed them that the gentleman from Mhow had gone back. On this, the party deemed it expedient to return to Indore, where they arrived at between 10 and 11 P.M.

"The mutiny at Mhow broke out at about 10 P.M. that night, about two hours after the deputation had left the place where the picket was posted on the road to Indore."

The note sent to Colonel Platt was in the following terms:—

"Mhow, 1st July 1857, 6 P.M.

"To Colonel Platt, Commandant at Mhow.

"Sir,—His Highness the Maharajah of Indore has deputed me to inform you of the mutiny which took place in the morning at the Residency. His Highness's troops, which had been sent to give assistance to Colonel Durand, were, I believe, joined by the Mahidpore and Sehore Contingents, who committed a dreadful mischief this morning. The particulars will be given to you personally. The rest of his Highness's troops are quite disobedient, and declare that they would not proceed to attack the mutineers. I am, therefore, desired by his Highness to go and see you and ask your advice on the subject, and had Colonel Durand been at Indore, I would not have troubled you.

GUNPUT RAO, Wakeel of H. H. Holkar.

"P.S.—An answer will highly oblige. Pray excuse pencil."

The officer whom Gunput Rao (Gunesh Shastree) met at the picket was Major McMullen, afterwards Cantonment Magistrate at Mhow. Considering what was known to have happened at the Indore Residency that morning, and was expected to happen at Mhow every minute, it is not very surprising that this officer was in a somewhat excited state and not disposed to friendly intercourse. He did not attempt to conceal his suspicions. The first note, intended for his own perusal, having been wetted, he sneeringly asked the Wakeel if it had been "*wetted with*

blood". The Wakeel asked where Colonel Durand was. The answer was, "I shall not tell you".

(D.)

Memorandum by Bukhshee Khoman Singh, C.S.I., as to the conduct of Holkar's troops and the British Contingents on the 1st July 1857.

(Page 102.)

The requisition made by Colonel Durand in June was for our Cavalry, Artillery, and Infantry; and, in compliance with it, about 300 of my Cavalry had been picketed near the Residency. But I was extremely anxious about their conduct, knowing that so many of them were Mussulmans, and related to the men of the Mahidpore Contingent. Fortunately there was a heavy fall of rain, which wetted all their bedding and saddles; and some of their things were carried away by a flood of the river which runs close by. I took advantage of this circumstance, and got permission from Colonel Durand, through the Wakeel, to remove the men to their lines. I should, in the ordinary course, have ordered out another party from my Cavalry to relieve them, but I intentionally omitted to do it. Thank God, none of our Cavalry were there on the day of the mutiny, for, if they had been, Colonel Durand and the officers and families could never have escaped with their lives.

The number of our troops at the Residency was much less than that of the British troops. Our troops could, therefore, never have thought of mutiny without the advice and consent of the British Sepoys. The reason why our troops first opened fire I consider to be this. The British troops might naturally have argued that if they commenced operations first, and the Maharajah's troops did not follow their example, the news would reach the city that the British troops alone had mutinied, and then the whole of his Highness's army might, for all they knew, come out to punish them. But when his Highness's name was involved by his own troops taking the lead, there would be difficulty, as they well understood, in getting his Highness's army to obey orders at once. I firmly believe that it was with this motive that his Highness's troops were pressed and persuaded to open fire against the Residency, with the full concurrence, if not suggestion of the British troops. It is, therefore, idle on the part of General Travers to say that his troops were panic-stricken. They pretended a panic, but they were actually disloyal, and refused to obey orders, not because they were afraid of the handful of his Highness's troops, who took very good care not to hurt them, but because they actively wished the British cause to be lost.

KHOMAN SINGH.

(E.)

SOME PROCEEDINGS OF HOLKAR WHEN "HE WAS
UNFORTUNATELY POWERLESS".

(Page 108.)

(1.)

No. 5 of 1857.

From Rao Ramchunder Rao Martund, Officiating Minister, Indore
Durbar, to the Officer commanding at Mhow.

Indore Palace, 7th July 1857.

SIR,—I am directed by His Highness to send you the treasure, supposed to be between three or four lacs, but not counted, this day, with trustworthy guards, and hope it may reach you safe.

2. The plundered amount now being daily recovered in detail from several parties will be accounted for hereafter. The Government notes valuing rupees twenty-four lacs, and a chest of jewels, are also sent.

3. Hurree Baboo, Buddreenath Khuzanchee, and Gunput Rao, on our part, have been deputed with the treasure, and I hope they will make over the said treasure to you.

4. The guards are as follows:—Forty Sowars of Hoozerat, fifty Sowars of Rissala, and two companies of Nujeebs.

5. I shall feel highly obliged by your granting a receipt for the said treasure. Other particulars will be explained by Gunput Rao Wakeel, who also accompanies.

6. I have also thought this to be the safest opportunity of sending Mr. Norris to Mhow, but the East Indians protected in the Palace are willing to remain here safe till the European troops arrive at Mhow, and have not therefore been sent.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) RAO RAMCHUNDER RAO,
Officiating Minister, Indore Durbar.

Received from Maharajah Tookajee Rao Holkar a box containing Company's Paper for rupees 23,40,500, and another containing jewels belonging to Sir Robert Hamilton.

(Signed) A. ELLIOT,
Assistant-General Superintendent in Malwa,
in temporary charge of Treasury.

Mhow Fort, 8th July 1857.

Received from his Highness Maharajah Tookajee Rao Holkar the sum of rupees 4,16,690. 8a. (four lacs, sixteen thousand six hundred and

ninety and eight annas), being the amount found in the Indore Agency Treasury after it had been plundered by the mutineers, viz.:—

Company's rupees	1,66,581	0
„ half rupees	2,000	0
„ quarter rupees	449	8
Furruckabad rupees	4,000	0
Holkar rupees	2,43,653	0
Copper coins	7	0

(Signed) A. ELLIOT,

Assistant-General Superintendent in Malwa,
in temporary charge of Treasury.

Mhow Fort, 8th July 1857.

(II.)

From Rao Ramchunder Rao Martund, Officiating Minister, to Captain Hungerford, Commanding at Mhow.

Indore, 7th July 1857, 11 P.M.

MY DEAR SIR,—His Highness the Maharajah has learnt with great regret the astounding account of Captain and Mrs. Hutchinson and party's detention at Amjheera. He looks upon Mrs. Hutchinson as his sister, and the whole family as his own relations; and though not crediting that the Rajah of Amjheera could be so blind to his own interests, he has, however, lost no time in ordering Bukhshee Khooman Sing, with three companies of infantry, two guns, and 200 sowars, towards Amjheera, with orders to blow up the town, and bring in the Rajah dead or alive, should he have proceeded to any extremities with the party. Amjheera, it must be recollected, is not a tributary to Holkar, but to Scindia; but in this emergency His Highness thinks hesitation as to its being a foreign State inadmissible.”

Jabooah, 11th July 1857.

To His Highness the Maharajah Holkar.

YOUR HIGHNESS,—I am much gratified at the receipt of your letter, dated Indore Palace, the 8th instant, which has just been delivered to me by Buxee Khooman Singh, who has arrived with a party of horse for my escort, and I hope to leave this some time to-morrow. I cannot describe the anxiety that I have felt for your Highness, not having heard from yourself, or in fact from any one at Indore since this most unfortunate affair.

I am deeply obliged to you for all your kindness to us, and I shall make the best of my way to Indore, where I shall be happy to do any-

thing in my power for you. My districts are in a very disturbed state, but I am in hopes that the policy your Highness has adopted will tend to keep people quiet. You have heard how the Amjheera Rajah has behaved; he has plundered the post-office and the dispensary. My house has been stripped. We are all quite well, I am thankful to say.

Believe me your Highness's sincere friend,

A. R. E. HUTCHINSON.*

Mhow Fort, 17th July 1857.

To His Highness the Maharajah Holkar.

YOUR HIGHNESS,—We arrived here all safe yesterday at 10 p.m. I have received every attention and kindness from Khooman Singh, and I am most grateful to your Highness for what you have done for me and my family. We are now completely settled in the fort.

I have had a consultation with Captain Hungerford and the other officers here, and they advise my not going to Indore at present, for the excited state of your Highness's army may be aggravated by my presence in the Palace, and it is advisable not to bring on any fresh disturbance which might endanger your Highness's safety.

I have telegraphed to Lord Elphinstone, and will acquaint your Highness with the answer I receive. Khooman Singh will explain to your Highness my wishes, and how disappointed I am. However, I still hope to be able to see you soon.

Believe me always your sincere friend,

A. R. E. HUTCHINSON.

(III.)

No. 10 of 1857.

To Captain Hungerford, Commanding at Mhow.

Palace, Indore, 8th July 1857.

SIR,—I am directed by H. H. the Maharajah Sahib to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 428, of yesterday's date, and to inform you that the two Sepoys belonging to the mutineers of the Mhow Regiment, therein alluded to, who were caught by our officers, have been this day despatched to you under a proper guard; an intimation as to their safe delivery will greatly oblige.

I have, etc.,

(Signed) RAO RAMCHUNDER RAO,
Officiating Minister, Indore Durbar.

P.S.—One horse and four bullocks belonging to the British Government are also sent herewith.

* Colonel Hutchinson, of the Bengal Staff Corps, was Resident at Gwalior up to March 1877, when he retired on a pension.

No. 431.

From Captain Hungerford to the Bombay Government.

Mhow, July 10th, 1857.

1. I regret to say that both Captain Elliot and myself have written to Colonel Durand without reply; and that, although officers' servants and others have come in from Sehore with letters, no communication has been received from Colonel Durand, whom we believe to be at that place.

5. Yesterday evening the Maharaja sent in two prisoners (Mahomedans), Sipahies of the 23rd Regiment N.I., who were tried by drum-head court martial, sentenced to death, and hanged at once. The Bhao Rao Ramchunder, who paid me a visit last evening, reported that the giving up of these prisoners had caused great excitement amongst the Maharajah's troops, and that he had only been enabled to leave Indore under the protection of a strong guard.

(IV.)

No. 11 of 1857.

To Captain A. Elliot, Assistant-General Superintendent and Joint Magistrate, Mhow.

Indore Palace, 9th July 1857.

MY DEAR SIR,—Your very obliging letter of yesterday's date, on the subject of the disorders and robberies prevailing in the Dhar territory, and the interruption caused to the dawks and telegraph, etc., has been read by me to H.H. the Maharajah Sahib, and I am directed to inform you that although the Dhar Government is not under Holkar, being a separate Principality, His Highness has, however, addressed a letter to the Rajah of that place to take immediate measures to put a stop to the prevailing anarchy, to protect the public dawks, the signallers at Khull, and to put down the plunderers, Bhoomias, etc. Copy of this letter is enclosed for your perusal. H.H. has further despatched a guard of his own to Khull to protect the signallers there, and has placed 25 Sowars under your orders, to be employed in any manner you think best calculated to secure the safety of the roads below the Ghaut.

Dhurm Narain will leave this to-day to join you, having been provided with the conveyance and the escort he wanted. His Highness fully understands your difficulties, and is thankfully prepared to give you any facility in his power in the good work you have so kindly assumed. He has yet heard nothing from Colonel Durand, which makes him

anxious. With many thanks for your friendly and unreserved communication.

I have, etc.,
(Signed) RAO RAMCHUNDER RAO,
Officiating Minister, Indore Durbar.

(v.)

No. 16 of 1857.

From Rao Ramchunder Rao Martund, Officiating Minister, Indore Durbar. To Captain Hungerford, Commanding at Mhow.

Palace, Indore, 10th July 1857.

SIR,—With reference to your letter of yesterday's date regarding the continuance of the Malwah Contingent under pay, I am directed by H.H. the Maharajah to inform you that measures have been taken by the Durbar in conformity with your advices therein conveyed, and a respectable Sirdar of the Court, Mama Sahib Ram Rao Mankur, has been ordered to proceed to Mahidpore at once, to assume the command of the corps.

You are already aware of the objections which exist as to the nomination of Captain Fenwick as a commandant. In the first place his services are daily required at Indore, and even if he could be spared his nomination under the present state of feelings of the troops all over India against the European officers, would not be either prudent or entirely free from danger.

Should you therefore feel satisfied with the arrangements made, H.H. hopes you will have the goodness to convey to him your concurrence in the measure.

(vi.)

From Captain Hungerford, Commanding at Mhow, to Colonel Durand, Offg. Agent Governor-General, Central India.

Mhow Fort, July 12th, 1857.

MY DEAR SIR,—Both Captain Elliot and myself have written to you, detailing events at Indore and Mhow; but, from your not having replied to our letters, I fear they must have miscarried.

I regret exceedingly your having quitted this part of the country, the more so as you appear to have been under a mistaken impression regarding Holkar's intentions. Holkar was as helplessly under the control of his mutinous troops as we have ourselves been under that of ours. Since the mutineers from Mhow, joined by some of Holkar's troops (the whole headed by Saadut Khan, who attacked you), left Indore on the

4th, the Maharajah has done everything in his power to aid us in our efforts to tranquillise the country, and has shown by his actions his earnest desire to fulfil faithfully his duties to the British Government. Copies of correspondence which has passed between the Durbar and myself have been forwarded to you. The whole country is now in a tranquil state in the neighbourhood of Mhow. At Indore some of the Mahomedan troops are still in an excited and insubordinate state, and the Maharajah cannot yet control them; but as soon as the European troops, advancing from Aurungabad, reach this, it is the intention of the Maharajah to disarm all those on whom he cannot place dependence, and to punish severely those who have been implicated in any way in the late disorders. This fort, thanks to the hard labour of the Europeans, has been placed in such a state of defence, and we are so well provisioned, that it would take an army to attack it. Captain Elliot has been most kind in assisting me; and, had it not been for his advice and assistance in many matters, much would have been unthought of which has been of great use and benefit. I trust that what I have said will induce you to return to Mhow. Your presence would restore confidence. The country itself is tranquil. A few European troops would enable Holkar to disarm those who were implicated in the late outbreak; and a small movable force, to punish those tributaries of Holkar who have taken advantage of the disturbances at Indore to cause dissensions in their own petty districts, would be sufficient to bring the whole surrounding country under complete control.

(VII.)

No. 19 of 1857.

From Rao Ramchunder Rao Martund, Officiating Minister, Indore Durbar.
To Captain Hungerford, Commanding at Mhow.

Palace, Indore, 13th July 1857.

SIR,—I beg to inclose a copy of a Persian petition presented to H.H. by the inhabitants of the Indore Residency for your perusal, and seize this opportunity to beg of you to appoint a Native officer, if you think it proper, to take charge of the Residency. This will, I hope, encourage the people to re-occupy their houses, and thus the whole Residency in a few days will be reinhabited. The Durbar will, on its part, afford every assistance to the officer you may choose to appoint, and supply guards, etc., for protection.

I am commanded by H.H. to propose for your consideration to have the opium scale for the present at Indore, where our joint officers will carry on the weighing: a Native officer from you will answer the purpose. The papers may be signed by you at Mhow.

An arrangement of the kind may very likely restore the trade to its former footing, and give confidence to the merchants and other classes of the community.

(VIII.)

From Captain Hungerford to the Bombay Government.

No. 439.

Mhow, July 17th, 1857.

No communication of any kind has been received by the Indore Durbar, or by me, from Colonel Durand. The accompanying letter will prove to Government the tranquillity which prevails at the present time throughout Holkar's territories.

(IX.)

To Captain A. Elliot, etc., etc., etc.

Indore Palace, 18th July 1857.

MY DEAR SIR,—I have been commanded to despatch to you twelve Sowars more, to escort Mrs. Elliot and her child, Mrs. Stockley and her four children. They are all Mahrattas, and are of the same troop which is commanded by Soobhan Rao.

I am highly gratified to hear of the safe arrival of Captain and Mrs. Hutchinson, Mrs. Stockley and four children, and Dr. Chisholm. Pray let me know whether Captain Hutchinson has assumed the Political power, and oblige.

(Signed) RAMCHUNDER RAO.

(X.)

To Captain Hungerford,

Indore Palace, 18th July 1857.

MY DEAR SIR,—I beg to inform you that a report was received from the Amil of Mahidpore, stating that Major Timmins has returned from Neemuch, and has taken the command of the corps.

(Signed) RAMCHUNDER RAO.

(XI.)

Telegraph message from Indore, from Rao Ramchunder Rao to Poonah, to E. Impey, Esq., Postmaster-General of Bombay.

We gave Sowars and runners, etc., to the Deputy Postmaster here,

and got seven Dawk-lines opened, namely Neemuch, Bhopawur, Oojein, Boorhanpore, Sehore, Bombay, and Calcutta, viâ Nagpore. The business goes on very nicely here. We intend opening the line between Agra and this, shortly. Kedarnath Baboo* also agrees with us. Please answer by telegraph.

Palace, 22nd July 1857.

(F.)

THE DURBAR.

(Pages 118, 122, 133.)

The persons who formed the Durbar or Council at Indore, and with whom alone the Maharajah was in the habit of consulting in affairs of State, were (1) his own brother, Kashee Rao Holkar (K.C.S.I.); (2) his preceptor and Private Secretary, Oomed Singh; (3) the acting Dewan, Ramchunder Rao Bhao; (4) Bukhshee Khoman Singh, Commandant of Cavalry; (5) and Gunput Rao Seetaram, commonly called Gunesh Shastree, the Durbar Wakeel, or agent for daily communications with the British Resident. These five were all good English scholars, and during the two days of rebel ascendancy at Indore—2nd and 3rd July—they actually became as much the objects of the mutineers' hate and fury as if they had been Europeans. Besides these there were (6) Bhowanee Singh Sir-nobut, head of the Household Horse; (7) Bhim-gir, head of police; and (8) Ram Rao Narain, the hereditary and titular Dewan. All of these, with five other officers of rank at Holkar's Court, received "the cordial thanks" of the Governor-General for their "excellent services", "loyalty", and "assistance" given to the British Government [*Lords' Return* (77 of 1860), *Honours and Rewards*, pp. 119, 120, 125].

During Colonel Durand's retirement, their own observations and experience, and their inquiries at Mhow and Indore, convinced Major Hungerford and Captains Hutchinson and Elliott, as certified, for example, by Major Hungerford in a letter to Rao Omed Singh, the Maharajah's Preceptor and councillor, dated "Mhow, February 1st, 1858", that "the whole of the members of the Indore Durbar during the time of the disturbances at the city vied with the Maharajah in displaying feelings of unflinching loyalty and devotion to the British Government, even at a time when such feelings exposed them to great danger from a mutinous soldiery".

It may be said in extenuation of Colonel Durand's hasty suspicion and denunciation of the Indore Durbar, that he can have known little of

* The Postmaster of Indore Residency.

the character and qualifications of any of these gentlemen, with the exception of Gunput Rao Seetaram, the Durbar Wakeel, who afterwards accompanied him in the field and received a specific reward from our Government, for during the three months of his residence at Indore, he had only seen the Maharajah himself twice [see Mr. H. M. Durand's *Central India* in 1857, p. 69, and *ante*, p. 78].

I may as well remark here, as I have somehow or other omitted to mention it in the text, that the ignorance of local etiquette and customs displayed by General Travers [*ante*, p. 78] is not at all surprising, since that gallant officer had only been a fortnight at Indore when the outbreak occurred. For the same reason, and in consideration of Colonel Durand's superior military rank and high civil position, Major Travers, though nominally in command, could hardly be held responsible for the sad neglect of defensive measures and of any arrangements for a rendezvous or rallying-point [*ante*, p. 80].

(G.)

MARKS OF FAVOUR AND PECUNIARY CONCESSIONS.

(Page 148.)

From C. U. Aitchison, Esq., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, to Major-General H. D. Daly, C.B., Officiating Agent to the Governor-General for Central India.

No. 1,907 P. Dt. Fort William, the 10th Nov. 1870.

SIR,—It will be within your recollection that, when His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor-General met His Highness the Maharajah Holkar at Jubbulpore in March last, the Maharajah, at a private interview with His Excellency at which you were present, placed in His Excellency's hands a Memorandum and printed collection of papers, in which he recounted the services he rendered to the British Government in 1857, and prayed that he might receive a substantial territorial reward such as had been granted to some of the other leading Princes of India.

2. His Excellency, you will remember, informed the Maharajah at the time that it would be impossible to entertain this request, and that only under very exceptional circumstances could the British Government ever cede to Native Princes lands or territories which had been for any length of time under British administration. At His Highness's urgent request, however, His Excellency agreed to take the Maharajah's case into consideration, and to communicate a final decision in writing as soon as possible.

3. I am now instructed to inform you that His Excellency in Council

has perused not only the Memorandum submitted by the Maharajah, but all the correspondence on record relating to His Highness's services, with the care and attention due to any request preferred by so distinguished a Prince; and that, after mature deliberation, His Excellency in Council is unable favourably to entertain the Maharajah's claim to additional reward. It is not without pain and regret that His Excellency in Council is compelled to refuse a request personally preferred to him by the Maharajah, and in a matter to which His Excellency in Council well knows the Maharajah attaches the greatest importance; but under the circumstances of the case His Excellency in Council has no other course. His Excellency in Council acknowledges with pleasure the distinguished services to which His Highness refers with pride and satisfaction. The British Government have repeatedly and cordially acknowledged them. His Highness will therefore readily believe that, in setting forth the reasons which have prevented His Excellency in Council from giving a favourable answer to his claim, His Excellency in Council has no wish whatever to depreciate the valuable services which the Maharajah performed under great difficulties, and not without danger to himself. These services, however, great as they undoubtedly were, received the most careful consideration by the Government of the day, and called forth substantial marks of the favour of Her Majesty the Queen, which were considered at the time to be not incommensurate with the services rendered. Lord Canning's successors in the Government have refused to re-open the question, and His Excellency in Council, after full consideration of all the facts of the case, can discover no sufficient reason for differing from the decision arrived at by his predecessors.

4. Sir Robert Hamilton, in a letter dated 26th April 1858, reported most favourably on the services of the Maharajah and his consistent loyalty throughout the time of trouble. With this report before him, Lord Canning deliberately came to the determination that it was inexpedient to give Holkar a reward in land. His reasons for this decision are given in the following extract from his despatch to the Secretary of State, No. 6, dated 16th January 1860:—

“In connection with this part of the subject, I beg to forward further papers relating to the conduct and services of the Maharajah Holkar of Indore during the disturbances, including the English translation of a letter which I have recently addressed to His Highness. It is not my intention to propose that His Highness should receive any gift of territory. His conduct on the day on which his troops mutinied and attacked the Residency at Indore, was not such as to command either the respect or the gratitude of the British Government, and though this may be overlooked in consideration of the assistance he subsequently rendered to the garrison at Mhow, and to the Agent, in re-establishing

order in Malwa, it invalidates in my judgment any claim which the Maharajah might otherwise have had to an acknowledgment of his services by the extension of his territory."

After the Durbar held at Jubbulpore on the 14th January 1861, at which the Maharajah was received by Lord Canning, His Highness pressed Sir R. Shakespear, then Agent to the Governor-General, to state why a substantial reward in land had not been conferred on him. A record of that "most painful and embarrassing interview" was submitted with Sir R. Shakespear's letter, No. 33 A, dated 28th January 1861, and Sir R. Shakespear states that he spoke openly and unreservedly on the subject to the Bhao Saheb and Gunesh Shastree, the two Ministers of the Indore State, and authorised them to communicate his remarks to the Maharajah. At a subsequent interview the Agent to the Governor-General ascertained from the Maharajah that the Bhao Saheb had told him everything. His Highness is therefore fully aware of the reasons which determined the Government of the day to grant him no territorial reward. It is therefore only necessary here to add that in 1864, at the request of the Secretary of State, Lord Lawrence gave careful consideration to the whole correspondence, but declined to re-open the case; and that His Excellency in Council must now adhere to the decision of his predecessors.

6. But while refraining, for good and sufficient reasons, from conferring on the Maharajah a reward in land, Lord Canning was desirous of dealing with the Maharajah in a spirit of liberality, and of cordially acknowledging the useful and important services which he rendered after the first outburst of the mutiny had passed by. "I have had many proofs", wrote Lord Canning in his despatch to the Secretary of State dated 11th March 1862, "that the Maharajah regards with mortification the fact that while the territories of Gwalior and Bhopal have been considerably augmented, his own remain as they were before 1857; and, although in determining the rewards to be bestowed on these States, it was necessary to draw a clear and broad distinction between the case of Holkar on the one side, and those of Scindia and the Begum of Bhopal on the other, it is no less desirable that the British Government should now gratify the former by any reasonable concession to his wishes, and thereby remove any impression on his mind that the services which he ultimately did render are not fully appreciated, or that his relations with the British Government are to be marked as less cordial and friendly than those of other Native States".

7. Accordingly, when the Maharajah proposed to commute his perpetual annual payment of about Rupees 1,20,000 for the Malwa Contingent and Bheel Corps to an annual payment in round numbers of Rupees 2,40,000 for ten years—a proposal which involved a loss to the British Government of about five and a half lakhs of rupees, or the differ-

ence between the value of a perpetual annuity of Rupees 1,20,000 and an annuity of double that amount for ten years—Lord Canning agreed to that, among other reasons, because “it will be regarded as an earnest of our friendly disposition towards Indore, and as a more substantial acknowledgment than any that I have hitherto thought right to make of the services of the Maharajah”.

8. Again, in 1863 the Maharajah was re-imbursed the entire cost of the levies he entertained, in common with the Chiefs of Jowrah and Dewas, to supply the place of the mutinous Mahidpore Contingent. When payment was first offered to the Maharajah, in 1860, he refused to accept any payment whatever for the services he had rendered in entertaining these levies. But four years after his refusal to accept what had been voluntarily offered by the British Government, he himself preferred a formal request for payment. The claim was admitted without a question, and a sum of Rs. 306,992 was paid to the Maharajah, although, if he had been paid at the same rates as the Chiefs of Jowra and Dewas, he would have been entitled only to Rs. 90,924. A pecuniary concession of Rs. 2,16,068 was thus made to the Maharajah.

9. Similarly, concessions have been liberally made to the Maharajah in the various discussions which have arisen out of the negotiations for exchange of territory. Thus, *e.g.*, the value of the service conditions in his tenure of villages in Bombay has been excluded from the estimate in the exchange; the benefit of Rupees 2,156 a year in the value of Abkari revenue has been conceded to him; a gift was made to him of buildings in Mundlaur valued at Rupees 13,225; and a claim of Rupees 2,100 a year on account of a lapsed Jaghir in Chota Kusrawud has been conceded to him expressly on the ground that “the Right Honble. the Secretary of State is of opinion that the Maharajah should be treated with liberality”.

10. If His Excellency in Council has been reluctantly compelled to refer to these pecuniary concessions, it has only been with a view to convince His Highness the Maharajah that the British Government are not insensible to the value and importance of the services which he has rendered, and have not failed to mark their cordial appreciation of them by substantial marks of favour; and that, although they have been unable to meet His Highness's wishes or expectations in regard to a cession of territory, it has been their constant desire in all their negotiations and transactions with the Maharajah to enhance his dignity and uphold his exalted position among the Rulers and Princes of India.

(Signed) I have, etc., C. U. AITCHISON,
Secretary to the Government of India.

It may as well be explained here that after this letter had been communicated to the Maharajah Holkar in reply to his appeal, he determined in 1871, without, it is believed, the advice, certainly without the approval, of his English friends, to despatch to England two of his state officers, Bukhshee Khoman Singh (now C.S.I.) and Gunput Rao Seetaram, commonly called Gunesh Shastree, for the purpose of making direct representations to Her Majesty's Government on the subject of the reproach cast upon his personal conduct, and of his claim to a territorial reward,—as originally intended and promised,—in reparation of that reproach, if on inquiry it should prove to have been unjust.

Both of these officers had been eye witnesses of the occurrences of July 1857,—Bukhshee Khoman Singh, Commandant of Holkar's Cavalry, having been placed at the head of the expedition which rescued Captain and Mrs. Hutchinson and the family of Colonel Stockley from the rebellious Rajah of Amjheera; and Gunesh Shastree, who was the Residency Wakeel, having accompanied Colonel Durand in camp and in the field after his return to Mhow in August 1857, and having received the warm commendations of that gentleman, and a special reward from our Government for his services. Holkar informed the Viceroy of his desire to send these two officers to England, and of the object of their deputation, and requested that they might be supplied with letters of introduction to the Secretary of State. In conformity with long established usage, the Governor-General declined compliance with his Highness's request; and on the arrival in London of Bukhshee Khoman Singh and Gunesh Shastree in May 1871, they ascertained that their mission could not be recognised, and that the Secretary of State would not give them an audience. In October of that year they returned to India.

During their visit to England Holkar's officers were closely examined by Mr. Dickinson as to all the events of 1857, and the documents and diaries they brought with them were carefully sifted. On the basis of the information obtained from them, a Memorial was drawn up, called "Reply from his Highness the Maharajah Tookajee Rao Holkar, G.C.S.I., to a charge made against his character in a despatch from the Government of India dated November 10th, 1870", and was forwarded to the newly appointed Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, on the 20th of April 1872, by the Governor-General's Agent for Central India, General Sir Henry Daly.

The style and language of this Memorial were ruled to be highly objectionable by the Viceroy in Council. Except with regard to its style it underwent no consideration, and no judgment was passed upon it.

If the Reply of 1872 had been written in a more acceptable tone, and had been taken into full consideration, inquiry might have been

made for those reports on the conduct of Holkar and the Durbar, from Captain Hungerford and Sir Robert Hamilton, which supply the place of Colonel Durand's unfulfilled promise of a report, but which have always hitherto been summarily set aside, as if of no authority. But it was not to be so. "Office notes" and personal considerations once more stopped the way, and the memorial was returned to the Maharajah in a despatch to General Daly, dated 31st of May 1872, with an expression of the "surprise and grave displeasure" of his Excellency in Council, at its "highly unbecoming and objectionable terms", and declining "to discuss or to pass any orders" upon it.

Since receiving that rebuke, the Maharajah Holkar has made no formal or official application on the subject.

On the publication of the pamphlets by Mr. Durand and General Travers, Mr. Dickinson at once applied to Indore for distinct answers as to several points newly raised, and it was in reply to one of these inquiries that he received the Memorandum given in Appendix D.

(H.)

LAST WORDS ON AN IMPERIAL POLICY.

(Page 156.)

"To the Editor of the 'Standard'.

"As you have allowed me to state in two previous letters that I expect the 'Royal Titles' Bill to be recognised five years hence as one of the most politic measures that our Legislature ever enacted for India; and that I look for a great economy in the cost of our Imperial Government as one of its consequences; I hope you will allow me to explain how I expect our Indian Government, and administration, to be influenced by the new Title: especially with reference to the Native States, who are most directly affected by that establishment of British supremacy *de jure*, as well as *de facto*, which will unite and vivify the Empire.

"To understand the actual position of the Native States, and the intensely interesting problem we have to solve with regard to their destiny, it is necessary to glance at the aspects in which they appeared at three different periods of their history; 1st, after the second Mahratta war; 2ndly, during the high tide of the Annexation Policy; and 3rdly, after the Rebellion—the latter period reaching to our own day.

"About the end of the first quarter of the 19th century, when the Mahratta Confederation, as well as the Mogul Empire, had been levelled with the dust, and there was no longer any chance of the supremacy of the British Government being successfully contested by any Indian

Prince or combination of Princes, the most far-sighted Anglo-Indian Statesmen were struck by the conviction that our circumstances had so changed as to require a complete change of policy; and that whereas until then, it had been necessary for us to break down the power of any possible rival in India, after having effected that object our peril would come from exactly the opposite quarter; that we must apprehend danger in the future, not from the existence or power of the Native States, but, on the contrary, from our diminishing or extinguishing their power; that they became indispensable accessories to our Empire in India, from the time they became subordinate to it.

"Sir Henry Russell said that, simply because we were 'foreigners', 'every increase of our subjects, and still more of our Native troops, was an increase not of our strength, but of our weakness, since there never can be any community of feeling between us'. Lord Metcalfe was still more emphatic; he abounded in such warnings as these: 'The domination of strangers—in every respect strangers—in country, colour, dress, manners, habits, and religion, must be odious'—'the spirit of disaffection is rooted universally among our subjects'—'in the case of insurrection, without the presence of a military force, the civil power and all semblance of the existence of our Government are instantly swept away by the torrent'—'our subjects are internal enemies'—'we can retain our dominion only by a large military establishment, and without a considerable force of British troops the fidelity of our Native army cannot be relied on'—'the only portion of our soldiery whose hearts are with us, and whose constancy can be relied on in the hour of trial, are the comparatively few European regiments'—'from one end of India to the other we have no hold on the affections of our subjects.' Lord Metcalfe added that 'the feeling was quite natural without any misgovernment', and he 'believed it was mollified by our good government'; but on this point Sir Thomas Munro said that good government by 'foreigners' was 'purchased by the sacrifice of independence, of national character, and of whatever renders a people respectable'; that it was 'a mere animal state of thriving in peace', tending 'to debase the whole people'. Finally, Sir John Malcolm said that the safety of our Empire in India depended on 'an example of submission to the rule of foreigners' being given to their countrymen by the Native Princes and Chiefs, who 'had still the hereditary attachment and obedience of millions of those classes' who were 'alike suited to maintain or to disturb the public peace'.

"It is not necessary for my argument that these doctrines should be admitted to their full extent; though for my own part I fully accept them, and though the acknowledged ability and great services of the statesmen who uttered them make them worthy of all respect. These doctrines being clearly hostile to the extension of

civil and military patronage, have never been popular either in British India or at home, and have always existed rather as a prophecy or a protest of persons not in office, than as a policy heartily carried out by any English Cabinet. Although originally inculcated by so many Anglo-Indians of the highest authority, and revived by Lord Canning and others after the Mutiny,—with the advantage of showing how some of the predictions I have cited had been fulfilled to the very letter, how the dangers of an opposite policy had been revealed, but not fully developed, by the Mutiny, and how they must go on increasing with the progress of education,—still these doctrines have made their way with little official assistance.

“The second aspect of the Native States which I propose to notice, was during the flowing tide of the Annexation Policy. About the middle of the 19th century, an opinion which had long been visibly growing, became at length dominant in the British Government, the Indian Civil and Military Services, and the public of this country, that the Native States were, politically and socially, simply a nuisance in India: and I must remark that although the good sense of such men as the Duke of Wellington, Sir John Malcolm, and others mentioned above, enabled them to see clearly the political utility to our Government of preserving the Native States, they felt as much as the annexation school which succeeded them, that the Native States were, in Sir John Malcolm’s words, *‘obviously at our mercy’*, and most of them advocated their maintenance rather in a tone of contemptuous tolerance than of sympathy.

“The policy or even the possibility of reforming the protected States of India had not as yet entered into the minds of those who were most friendly to their continued existence. Here and there a desultory effort was made, as by Sir Charles Metcalfe in the Nizam’s Dominions, but such experiments were deprecated rather than encouraged by the authorities at Calcutta, and had been generally discontinued or dropped before Lord Dalhousie positively refused his sanction to anything more of the sort, notably in the cases of Hyderabad and Oude.

“It will be enough to prove the wisdom of making more use of the Native States than we do, if we call up once more the recollections of 1857 and 1858. We all saw at that crisis the remarkable moral influence of the Native Chiefs as asserted by Malcolm, and so highly appreciated afterwards by Lord Canning. We saw those effects described by Metcalfe, of our being *‘strangers’* among the people of India, striking no root in their soil. We saw our civil power suddenly isolated, and all semblance of the existence of our Government swept away by insurrection. We saw our military officers murdered by the Native soldiers they thought they understood; but who had long been plotting against them. We saw in practice the important distinction

between merely *administering* the subject-races and *governing* them, in the sense that their Chiefs govern, by a hold on their affections and passions: and the great lesson taught us by the crisis was, the excellent use we might make of the natural leaders of the people, and how invaluable we should find their influence, as Lord Canning declared, if we would but turn it to account. He believed what he said so thoroughly, that although in the beginning of 1860 he had decided, after long consultation, that the permanent garrison of European troops in India could not be less than 85,000 men, in the autumn of the same year he reduced this number by 20,000 men, because in the interval he had seen the rapid pacification of the country and become convinced of the future friendship and support of the Talooqdars of Oude. I would pledge my life for the loyal co-operation of the Native Princes if we would trust them.

"After the Mutiny and Rebellion of 1857-58, Lord Canning, who had gone out to India and commenced his vice-royalty as a disciple of the annexation school, became a zealous convert to the policy of preserving and utilising the Native States. He had seen, in his own words, 'a few patches of Native Government prove breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave'; and he dreaded to think what would be the consequences if the Native Chiefs were not heartily on our side, in case India should be threatened by an external enemy, or in case of a quarrel with any civilised Power, when, he said, we must hold India by some other means than the few British Regiments we should then be able to spare. In any such crisis, he declared that we should find the Native States 'one of the best mainstays of our Empire, if we treated their Chiefs and influential families with consideration and generosity, and convinced them that they have nothing to gain by helping to displace us in favour of any other ruler from within or from without'. Again and again he repeated this language in the strongest way: 'In one way or other—in every way in short—we must (he said) teach these men unmistakably that, whether they be Chiefs of States or subjects, no change in the Supreme Power in India will be a gain to them, either as regards property, religion, social position, or national prejudices; and that the largest possible share of consideration and authority which they can have under any Paramount Power, they shall have under ours'. Of the Chiefs especially, he said: 'We have nothing to fear from them individually, if we treat them rightly; whilst they have individually an influence which is invaluable to us as Supreme Rulers of India, if we will but turn it to account'.

"What, then, is that 'individual influence' of men who have been 'obviously at our mercy', so far as material force is concerned, for above half a century? The answer was given clearly long ago by the states-

men I have named. It is the purely moral force of sympathy. It is the Native Chiefs' 'possession' (not through their own merits, but the mere accident of their nationality and their descent) 'of that hereditary attachment and of the obedience of millions of those classes who are alike suited to maintain or disturb the public peace' (to quote Malcolm again), which the people of India cannot feel for 'foreigners'—'aliens' to them in every sense of the word. We should not blame or hate them for this feeling: it is perfectly natural, and if it were manifested by any people under some other domination than our own, we should admire it.

"In the year 1850, when I was first induced to employ my pen in the service of India, public opinion seemed to have doomed all the Native States to extinction sooner or later; and there were many plausible reasons for this conclusion, though every one of them has since proved to be erroneous. First, it was assumed that as the Imperial Government was charged with the defence of India against external and internal enemies, it was a positive injustice and great loss to the finances, to allow a large portion of the revenues of India to be paid to 'effete' Native Princes, and wasted on the 'parasites', and 'favourites', who 'fattened on the corruption of their Courts'; especially as their territories were 'obstacles to safe communication and combined military movement', preventing 'the consolidation of our military strength', and making these 'petty intervening Principalities' a possible 'means of annoyance', though they 'could never be a source of strength' to us. Secondly, it was assumed that the Government of Native States was not only bad, but 'incorrigible', because it depended on the personal character and caprice of arbitrary despots, whose irregular administration was contrasted with the 'wise and fixed principles of law', and 'just system of revenue', which characterised British rule; while their supporters were taunted with a '*sentimental* advocacy of the cause of Native Princes as Princes, without reference to the merits or demerits of their Government'. At the same time indiscriminate eulogy was lavished on our Civil Service in India; young officers, formally superintending the immemorial routine of Native officials, and doing similar work to that of Tax Commissioners and County Court Judges in England, being transfigured into patriarchs and statesmen, and supposed to be looked up to as almost divine by the Natives; their names, if at all distinguished, being rapturously mentioned here, as if there was a spell about them; and so, by degrees, the people of this country were persuaded that annexation promoted the security of our Empire, and every moral and material interest of the Indian people. The Native Princes were much in the case of those to whom it was said: 'It shall come to pass that whosoever killeth you shall think that he doeth God a service', and with the sanction of public opinion at home, the work went on

apace in India, where annexation meant, above everything, unlimited patronage and promotion. The States of Sattara, Jhansi, Nagpore, the Punjab, and Oude were annexed; all the rest received notice to quit. 'The two hundred and fifty kinglings' (said the organ of the annexation party) 'whose names and territories have been recorded by the Court of Directors, must inevitably disappear, and that speedily'.

"As Honorary Secretary of the India Reform Society, I found that our Parliamentary and public support had dwindled in 1856 almost to nothing. However, the Rebellion followed, and showed the Native States for a while under quite a new aspect. First, it revealed to the most enlightened actors in the struggle, even to Lord Canning, who found himself in the position of Balaam the son of Beor,—constrained to bless what he had come out to curse,—that some of those 'petty intervening Principalities' had saved the Empire, proving 'breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us in one great wave'; and Lord Canning trembled to think what would be the consequences of a quarrel with any civilised Power, which would render us unable to spare many British regiments for India, if the Native Princes were not heartily on our side at such a time. He therefore strongly recommended that they should be treated in future with such 'consideration and generosity' as to 'convince them that they would have nothing to gain by helping to displace us in favour of any new rulers, from within or from without'. Secondly, the Rebellion revealed, even to Lord Canning, who loudly proclaimed the fact in the case of the Punjab, that the annexation policy, even in the lowest pecuniary sense, did not 'pay'; although its 'paying', in the slang of that day, had been assumed as a fact beyond dispute. But we know now that every Native State which, before annexation, maintained a military force at our disposal, besides yielding a tribute, after annexation, not only pays no more tribute and gives no more military service, but actually imposes additional taxation on the rest of the Empire to pay for an expensive force to garrison it, and defray the cost of that English patronage which always follows an extension of our dominions.

"The Rebellion revealed that incurable danger, pointed out and traced to its consequences by the statesmen who foresaw it half a century ago, the danger of our being destined to remain for ever in India 'strangers' and 'foreigners', in the strongest sense of the word. It is this that rendered us, in Sir Henry Russell's words, 'always objects of jealousy and dislike';—that 'enlarged the sphere of our danger by every enlargement of our territory';—and that made him 'look upon every extinction of a Native State as a nail driven into our own coffin'. It is this that made Lord Metcalfe reiterate that 'our subjects are internal enemies';—that 'from one end of India to the other we have no hold on the affections of our subjects'.

"The dangers thus foreseen were for a brief space revealed to all eyes by the storms of 1857 and '58; as long as the battle thunder roared and the lightning flashed, we saw as visibly as those statesmen had foreseen, the effects of our being 'strangers' to the people of India, and striking no root in their soil. Again and again, in Lord Metcalfe's phrase, our civil power, all trace of our Government, was at once swept away by insurrection; while our military officers were massacred by the Sepoys they trusted, who had been conspiring against them for months. It was clear that we had been merely *administering* the subject races; but not *governing* them, in the sense that their own Chiefs govern, by a moral power over their affections and sympathies. And this hopeless separation between the races, for the gulf between us is widening, persuaded some in this country that such an unnatural rule could not last, that we must lose India before long, and it was no use trying to find a remedy.

"But this conclusion is a cowardly betrayal of the interests of our fatherland; for to lose India in the present state of our relations with it would be the utter ruin of this country; and it ignores the greatest of all the lessons of the Rebellion, that we *can* govern India through its natural leaders; that if we make the Native Princes and Chiefs the organs of our policy, and the agents of our administration, we *can* make our Imperial Government popular, in spite of our being 'foreigners', though our direct rule is never likely to be so.

"It is a great pity that we brought so much of India under our direct rule; it was a dangerous mistake, weakening our military strength, and entailing a heavy and most unsafe debt, and endless deficits. But there are many Native Princes and Chiefs left, and we may still derive the most important military, financial, and political advantages from them, *quid pro quod*. Of course, if we show no confidence in them, they cannot feel confidence in us. If we show no attachment to them, they cannot be really attached to us. If we are to make the Native States, what Lord Canning said they might be, 'one of the best mainstays of our Empire', we must reach their rulers' hearts, and our own hearts must be in sympathy with them before we can do so.

"The Native States not only give us an opportunity of making our Imperial Government (as distinguished from our direct rule) decidedly popular, in spite of our being 'foreigners'; they also offer us military and financial advantages of the first importance. A Native Chief's troops are the only Native troops we can rely upon; and they need not be the contemptible force they now are, if it was our policy to make them otherwise. We can make sure of the troops of a Native State, unless they are in contact with overwhelming masses of our own mutineers, as sometimes happened in 1857, because we can make sure of the Chief and a few Ministers and nobles in his Durbar, who have everything to lose, who are personally responsible, and know that we can identify them.

A friendly Native State not only ensures to us the loyalty of its own troops and military classes, and often of those in adjacent British territory, but in time of trouble it can be temporarily denuded of troops with safety, of which there were examples in 1852. It is virtually a British garrison of itself, at no cost to us; whereas not only must we garrison our own territories strongly even in time of peace, much more in time of danger, but we must maintain at vast cost a proportionate British force as a check and balance against our own Native troops. It would be infinitely safer for us to adopt the proposals of some who have deeply studied the subject, to convert our Native army as far as possible into auxiliary troops belonging to Native States. Such purely local corps, properly equipped and disciplined, and brigaded every two or three years in camps of exercise with British movable columns, could be rendered as efficient as we desire, could be trusted, and would be a display of moral strength in our favour, visible to others besides the people of India: while the great diminution of numbers rendered possible by periodically *mobilising* the army of India, and adopting Sir Henry Havelock's suggestion of 'Mounted Rifles', would (it has been calculated) economise six or seven millions a year of our present enormous military expenditure."

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